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Abstract
For most governments, facilitating economic growth is a top priority. Sometimes, in
their pursuit of this objective, governments interfere with private property. Often, they
do so by indirect means, for instance through their power to regulate permitted land
uses or by adjusting the tax code. However, many governments are also prepared to
use their power of eminent domain in the pursuit of economic development. That is,
they sometimes compel private owners to give up their property to make way for a new
owner that is expected to put the property to a more economically profitable use.
This thesis asks how the law should respond to government actions of this kind, often
referred to as economic development takings. The thesis makes two main contributions
in this regard. First, in Part I, it proposes a theoretical foundation for reasoning about
the legitimacy of economic development takings, including an assessment of possible
standards for judicial review. Moreover, the thesis links the legitimacy question to the
work done by Elinor Ostrom and others on sustainable management of common pool
resources. Specifically, it is argued that using institutions for local self-governance to
manage development potentials as common pool resources can potentially undercut
arguments in favour of using eminent domain for economic development.
Then, in Part II, the thesis puts the theory to the test by considering takings of
property for hydropower development in Norway. It is argued that current eminent do-
main practices appear illegitimate, according to the normative theory developed in Part
I. At the same time, the Norwegian system of land consolidation offers an alternative
to eminent domain that is already being used extensively to facilitate community-
led hydropower projects. The thesis investigates this as an example of how to design
self-governance arrangements to increase the democratic legitimacy of decision-making
regarding property and economic development.
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1 Introduction and Summary of
Main Themes
Thieves respect property. They merely wish the property to become their property that they
may more perfectly respect it.1
[Granting] a takings power, then, may not be viewed as an act that wrenches away property
rights and places an asset outside the world of property protection. Rather, it may be seen as
an act within the larger super-structure of property.2
Property can be an elusive concept, especially to property lawyers.3 Indeed, in legal language,
the word itself often only functions as a metaphor – an imprecise shorthand that refers to a complex
and diverse web of doctrines, rules, and practices, each pertaining to different “sticks” in a bundle
of rights.4 Should we conclude that property as a unifying term is lost to the law? It certainly
seems hard to pin it down. In the words of Kevin Gray, when a close scrutiny of property law gets
1 GK Chesterton, The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare (Dodd, Mead and Company 1908) 58.
2 Abraham Bell, ‘Private Takings’ (2009) 76(2) The University of Chicago Law Review 517, 583.
3 See, e.g., Emma JL Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (PhD Thesis, 2009) 225-226 (“It
is a testament to the elasticity of the concept of property that it is able to represent all things to all people, and
to accommodate so many conflicting calls.”); Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) The Cambridge Law
Journal 252, 252 (“But then, just as the desired object comes finally within reach, just as the notion of property
seems reassuringly three-dimensional, the phantom figure dances away through our fingers and dissolves into a
formless void.”).
4 See generally Thomas C Grey, ‘The Disintegration of Property’ in James Roland Pennock and John W Chapman
(eds), Nomos XXII, Property (New York University Press 1980); Daniel B Klein and John Robinson, ‘Property: A
Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium’ (2011) 8(3) Econ Journal Watch 193.
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under way, property itself seems like it “vanishes into thin air”.5
Arguably, however, property never truly disappears.6 Indeed, there is empirical evidence to
suggest that humans come to the world with an innate concept of property, one which pre-exists any
particular arrangements used to distribute it or mould it as a legal category.7 Specifically, humans
and a seemingly select group of other animals appear to have an intuitive ability to recognise
thievery, the taking of property (not necessarily one’s own) by someone who is not entitled to do
so.8
Taken in this light, Proudhon’s famous dictum, “property is theft”, might be more than a
seemingly contradictory comment on the origins of inequality.9 It might point to a deeply rooted
aspect of property itself, namely its role as an anchor for the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate acts of taking.
In this thesis, I will study takings of a special kind, namely those that are sanctioned by a
government in the pursuit of some public use or interest. Specifically, the word taking will be used
to refer to an exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain.10 In legal language, especially
in the US, takings by eminent domain are often referred to as takings simpliciter, while other kinds
of “takings” require further qualification, e.g., in case of “takings” based on contract, taxation, or
5 See Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (n 3) 306-307. See also Grey, ‘The Disintegration of Property’ (n 4) 81 (arguing
that the eventual consequence of the bundle view is that property will cease to be an important category for legal
and political reasoning).
6 See Kevin Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47(2) Current Legal Problems 157, 159 (“We are continually prompted
by stringent, albeit intuitive, perceptions of ’belonging’.”).
7 See Jeffrey Stake, ‘The Property “Instinct”’ in Semir Zeki and Oliver Goodenough (eds), Law and the Brain (Oxford
University Press 2006).
8 See Sarah F Brosnan, ‘Property in nonhuman primates’ [2011] (132) New Directions for Child and Adolescent
Development 9, 11-13; Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (n 6) 159.
9 For Proudhon’s theory of property generally, distinguishing between de facto possession and de jure property (re-
garded as theft), see Derek Strong, ‘Proudhon and the Labour Theory of Property’ (2014) 22(1) Anarchist Studies
52.
10 See generally William B Stoebuck, ‘A General Theory of Eminent Domain’ (1972) 47 Washington Law Review 553
(clarifying the status of eminent domain from a US perspective, tracing its roots back to early civil law writers
such as Grotius and Bynkershoek). Takings will also be referred to as expropriations, especially in the context of
Norwegian law. In England and Wales, the corresponding notion is that of compulsory purchase.
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1 Introduction and Summary of Main Themes
adverse possession. The US terminology is intuitive and helps bring the issue of legitimacy to the
forefront, so I will adopt it throughout this thesis.11
When guided by eminent domain, the taking of private property without the owners’ consent is
not theft. But it is not necessarily that far removed from it either; the default assumption is that
takings are legitimate, but if they are not, one may well be permitted to call them by a different
name.12
More generally, the idea that the government’s power to take is not unlimited seems funda-
mental. Indeed, the expectation that an owner might find occasion to resist an act of taking, and
may or may not have good grounds for doing so, appears deeply rooted in pre-legal intuitions.13
This raises the question of how to approach the legitimacy of takings in legal reasoning and what
conceptual categories we can benefit from when doing so. This is the key question that is addressed
in this thesis, for the special case of so-called economic development takings.14
Such takings occur when a government uses the power of eminent domain to stimulate economic
growth, typically by providing property to for-profit companies. The canonical US example is Kelo
v City of New London, which resulted in great controversy and a surge of academic work on the
legitimacy of takings.15
11 Sometimes it is convenient to draw up the notion of a taking more widely than I do in this thesis, e.g., to include
adverse possession, see Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 3) 19-21. However, such
a broader notion will not be used in this thesis. This choice appears natural in light of how the thesis focuses
specifically on takings motivated by a government’s desire to facilitate concrete economic development projects.
12 See Kevin Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ in Susan Bright (ed), Modern studies in property law: Volume 6 (Hart
Publishing 2011) 8-10 (discussing case law from the US, with state judges describing illegitimate takings as “plunder”,
“rapine”, and “robbery”).
13 See, e.g., Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (n 6) 159.
14 For a sample of scholarship based on this term, see Charles E Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New
London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy 491; Ilya Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ English (2007)
15(1) Supreme Court Economic Review 183; Michael Paul Wilt, ‘Intermediate scrutiny for economic development
takings: proposing a new test based on Justice Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence’ (2009) 31(2) Thomas Jefferson Law
Review 431; David S Yellin, ‘Masters of Their Own Eminent Domain: The Case for a Reliance Interest Associated
with Economic Development Takings’ (2011) 99 Georgetown Law Journal 651.
15 Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469 (2005).
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The Kelo case concerned several homes that were taken by the government in order to ac-
commodate private enterprise, namely the construction of new research facilities for Pfizer, the
multi-national pharmaceutical company. Several home-owners, among them Suzanne Kelo, pro-
tested the taking on the basis that it served no public use and was therefore illegitimate under the
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. The Supreme Court eventually rejected their arguments,
but this decision created a backlash that appears to be unique in the history of US jurisprudence.16
In their mutual condemnation of the Kelo decision, commentators from very different ideological
backgrounds came together in a shared scepticism towards the legitimacy of economic development
takings.17 Interestingly, their scepticism lacked a clear foundation in US law at the time, as the
Kelo decision did not appear particularly controversial in light of established eminent domain
doctrines.18 Hence, when the response was overwhelmingly negative, from both sides of the political
spectrum, it seems that people were responding to a deeper notion of what counts as legitimate.
If the law is meant to deliver justice, widely shared intuitions about legitimacy deserve attention
from legal scholars. In the US, legitimacy intuitions pertaining to economic development takings
have indeed received plenty of attention after Kelo. Despite the outcome of the case, it is now hard
to deny that cases such as Kelo belong to a separate category of takings that raises special legal
questions.19 As this change in the narrative was largely the result of a popular movement, there is
reason to think that the category of economic development takings is a powerful addition to the
discourse on legitimacy, potentially relevant also outside of the US.
16 See generally Ilya Somin, ‘The Politics of Economic Development Takings’ (2008) 58 Case Western Reserve University
Law Review 1185.
17 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’ (2006) 106(6) Columbia Law Review
1412, 1413-1415 (“Everyone hates Kelo”, commenting on how criticism was harsh from across the political spectrum).
18 See, e.g., Bell and Parchomovsky, ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’ (n 17) 1418 (“The most astounding feature of
Kelo, as even the case’s harshest critics agree, is that from a legal standpoint, the ruling broke no new ground.”).
19 See, e.g., Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic De-
velopment Takings’ (n 14); Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’
(n 14).
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1.1. PROPERTY THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
To explore this further, it should first be acknowledged that there is a risk that takings for
economic development can be improperly influenced by commercial, rather than public, interests.
This risk is clearly higher in economic development situations than in cases when takings take
place to benefit a concretely identified public interest, such as the building of a new school or
a public road. Hence, it is intuitively reasonable to single out economic development takings for
special attention at the political and normative level. However, should the categorisation also be
recognised as a basis for justiciable restrictions on the takings power?
This is not obvious, as it conflicts with the prevalent idea that governments enjoy a “wide
margin of appreciation” when it comes to their use of eminent domain.20 However, as the US
debate shows, it might be hard to deny judicial review as soon as the special features of economic
development takings are brought into focus. This points to the first main theme of this thesis:
an analysis of economic development takings as a conceptual category for legal reasoning about
property protection.
1.1 Property Theory and Economic Development Takings
In Part I, this thesis will argue that economic development takings should be recognised as a
distinct category of takings at the theoretical level, with respect to fundamental rules that protect
private property. This claim will be made on the basis of a theory of property that is broader than
typical approaches found in the law and in legal scholarship. Specifically, the thesis rejects the view
that private property should be understood as a form of entitlement protection.21
Instead, chapter 2 will argue for a social function understanding, with an emphasis on human
20 This expression has been used by the European Court of Human Rights, see James and others v United Kingdom
(1986) Series A no 98, para 54. In the US, the same attitude was clearly a factor motivating the majority in Kelo
(n 15).
21 For a famous entitlements-based view of private property, see Guido Calabresi and A.Douglas Melamed, ‘Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089.
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flourishing as the normative foundation for private property.22 In short, property should be protec-
ted because it can help people flourish, as members of a democratic society.23 Moreover, property
is meant to serve this function not only for the owners themselves, but also for other members of
their communities.24
Such an ambitious take on property must necessarily also give rise to a broader assessment
of legitimacy when the state interferes with it.25 This is what inspires my initial discussion on
economic development takings in chapter 2. There I will present the basic definition of such takings
and discuss the Kelo case in some more detail. Specifically, I will argue that Justice O’Connor’s
strongly worded dissent – finding that the taking should be rescinded – is consistent with, and
conducive to, a social function perspective on property.26
It should be emphasised that the focus will be on the question of when a taking is legitimate as
such, not the question of how much compensation should be paid to the owners. Of course, the two
questions are related; the amount of compensation can influence the degree of legitimacy of the
interference. Some scholars go further and argue that the legitimacy question is primarily about
finding the appropriate mechanism for awarding compensation.27 With the theoretical approach
to property adopted in this thesis, this view must be rejected; the social functions of property are
not reducible to financial entitlements. Moreover, the aim of this thesis is to discuss precisely those
aspects of legitimacy that cannot be addressed through compensation. The link to compensation
22 For human flourishing theories of property generally, see Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo Pen˜alver, Community
and Property (Oxford University Press 2010) chapter 5.
23 See also Colin Crawford, ‘The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish’ (2011) 80(3)
Fordham Law Review 1089, 1089.
24 See generally Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (n 6); Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Pen˜alver, ‘Properties of
Community’ (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127; Gregory S Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of
Private Law Values’ (2014) 99(3) Iowa Law Review 1257.
25 See also Laura S Underkuﬄer, ‘Kelo’s moral failure’ (2006) 15(2) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 377.
26 See Kelo (n 15) 494-505.
27 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, ‘Taking Eminent Domain Apart’ (2004) 2004 Michigan State Law Review 957;
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘Taking Compensation Private’ (2007) 59(4) Stanford Law Review 871;
Amnon Lehavi and Amir N Licht, ‘Eminent Domain, Inc.’ (2007) 107(7) Columbia Law Review 1704.
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will be mentioned when it seems relevant, but the compensation issues that arise for economic
development takings will not be analysed in any depth.28
While I will advocate for a broad approach to the question of legitimacy of economic develop-
ment takings, this thesis will focus on owners and their communities. Questions pertaining to the
environment and social welfare will be considered as they arise in disputes about takings, not as is-
sues in their own right. These aspects of economic development will therefore receive less attention
here than they would in a thesis focusing specifically on environmental law or social and economic
rights. That said, one of the main arguments made in chapter 2 is that the social function perspect-
ive on property implies that we should take broader societal and environmental effects into account
also when assessing the legitimacy of interfering with private property. The thesis argues for this
coming from property theory, and in so doing will also touch on the conservation and social justice
dimensions of economic development. In addition, chapter 2 will argue that if the social functions
of private property support egalitarianism and equity at the local level, then private property can
serve as an anchor for justice also with respect to the environment and the social and economic
rights of non-owners. This point will also be made in Part II of the thesis, when discussing the
issue of hydropower development in Norway. In future work, I hope to develop the idea further,
to embark on research that will connect the social function account of property even more closely
with environmental law and social and economic rights.
Chapter 3 builds on the property theory developed in chapter 2 by giving a more in-depth
presentation of the legitimacy question, leading to a proposal for a justiciable legitimacy standard
that makes judicial intervention possible. To make the discussion concrete, the chapter first offers
a brief review and comparison of jurisprudential developments in the US, the UK, and at the
European Court of Human Rights. These jurisdictions are chosen specifically for their many close
28 For such an analysis, see Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘On the compensatory approach to economic development takings’
in Bjo¨rn Hoops and others (eds), The Context, Criteria, and Consequences of Expropriation (forthcoming, Ius
Commune 2016).
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connections with the Norwegian system, making them a natural reference point also for the case
study in Part II of the thesis. Moreover, all the countries discussed are in comparable socio-
economic situations, with property having a similar social function across the jurisdictions studied.
This permits a comparative discussion that focuses specifically on the issue of takings, reducing the
risk that the analysis will be distorted by significant differences in the social and economic context
of takings law across different jurisdictions. The broader insights gained from the work done in
this thesis might still be highly relevant to jurisdictions that have not been explicitly discussed.
But a further treatment of this issue, for instance with respect to jurisdictions from the developing
world, raises additional questions that must be left for future work.
Based on the choice of jurisdictions justified above, the thesis reviews several approaches to
judicial review, culminating in a recommendation for a perspective based on institutional fairness
that I trace to recent developments at the European Court of Human Rights. Specifically, the Court
in Strasbourg has begun to look more actively at the systemic reasons why violations of human
rights occur, in order to address structural weaknesses at the institutional level in the signatory
states.29 This approach is arguably one that fits very well with the sort of analysis carried out by
Justice O’Connor in Kelo, perhaps more so than the approach induced by the Fifth Amendment.
Importantly, the institutional perspective appears to be a sensible middle ground between
procedural and substantive approaches to legitimacy, directing us to focus on decision-making
processes without giving up on substantive fairness assessments. To ensure fairness, in particular,
is not just about making good decisions, but also about how those decisions came about, and
how likely it is that the system will have disproportionate effects at the societal level. This way
of thinking about legitimacy brings me to the second main theme of this thesis, concerning the
question of democratic merit.
29 See generally P Leach and others, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judg-
ments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and Their Impact at National Level (Intersentia 2010).
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1.2 A Democratic Deficit in Takings Law?
As discussed in chapter 2, two of the key social functions of property is to promote social justice
and to facilitate democratic decision-making.30 In addition, property is meant to serve as a bridge
between individual needs, community interests, and policy making at the national and the interna-
tional stage. Through the law of property, societal priorities can be communicated to owners and
communities without depriving them of their right to self-governance.31
These functions of property are easily undermined if there is an excessive concentration of power
and wealth among the elites of society. As indicated by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, this
is one of the key reasons why economic development takings should be looked at with suspicion.
In short, the concern is that economic development takings can both reflect and exacerbate a
democratic deficit.
There are many symptoms that can suggest a lack of democratic legitimacy, and to make
the discussion more concrete, chapter 3 proposes a legitimacy test consisting of nine indicators of
eminent domain abuse. The first six points are due to Kevin Gray, while the final three are additions
I propose on the basis of the work done in this thesis.32 I call the resulting list the extended Gray
test, a heuristic for inquiring into the legitimacy of an economic development taking.
Arguably, the most important indicator is the one pertaining to the overall democratic merit
of the taking (one of my additions). When taken together with the other points, this indicator
should induce an assessment of legitimacy against the decision-making process as a whole. Hence,
it emphasises the institutional fairness perspective. If a taking fails the legitimacy test on this
point, it might indicate an existing weakness of the system or a trend towards deterioration of
30 See also, with further references, Carol M Rose, ‘Property as the keystone right?’ (1996) 71(3) Notre Dame Law
Review 329; Janet Jackson, ‘What is Property? Property is Theft: The Lack of Social Justice in US Eminent Domain
Law’ (2010) 84(1) St. John’s Law Review 63.
31 This is discussed in depth in chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.5.
32 For Gray’s original points see Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 12).
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the institutional framework surrounding eminent domain. This problem, moreover, might not be
noticeable unless one considers an aggregated view of all the indicators of the extended Gray test,
to shed light on what they tell us about the democratic legitimacy of existing practices.
Admittedly, asking courts to test for legitimacy is an incomplete response to the worry that
economic development takings might result from, and give rise to, a democratic deficit at the
societal level. This point has been argued by some US scholars, who claim that increased judicial
scrutiny is neither a necessary nor a sufficient response to takings such as Kelo.33 Instead, these
scholars try to come up with institutional innovations that can restore legitimacy in cases when
the government wishes to ensure economic development on private property.
The most notable work in this direction so far is that of Heller and Hills, proposing what
they call Land Assembly Districts (LADs) as possible alternatives to the use of eminent domain.34
The idea is that LADs will be set up to replace the traditional takings procedure in cases where
property rights are fragmented and the potential takers have commercial incentives. The basic
mechanism is one of self-governance; the owners themselves should be allowed to decide whether or
not development takes place, using an appropriate collective choice mechanism (possibly as simple
as a majority vote). In this way, the holdout problem can be solved (individual owners cannot
threaten to block development to inflate the value of their properties). At the same time, the local
community’s right to manage its own property is recognised and respected.
The LAD proposal is closely linked to more general ideas about self-governance and sustainable
resource management, particularly the theories developed by Elinor Ostrom and others.35 On the
33 See generally Lehavi and Licht (n 27); Michael Heller and Rick Hills, ‘Land Assembly Districts’ (2008) 121(6)
Harvard Law Review 1465.
34 See Heller and Hills (n 33).
35 See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge University
Press 1990). For the connection with property theory generally, see Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, ‘Private and
Common Property’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert (ed), Property Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2010); Carol Rose,
‘Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy’ (2011) 5(1)
International Journal of the Commons 28; Lee Ann Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’
(2011) 5(1) International Journal of the Commons 9.
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basis of a large body of empirical work, these scholars have formulated and refined a range of design
principles for institutions that can promote good self-governance at the local level.36
At the end of chapter 3, I argue that this work can be used to address the legitimacy of takings
in a principled way, to arrive at refinements or alternatives to the proposal made by Heller and
Hills. Alternatives to expropriation based on self-governance can be a powerful way to address
the worry that economic development takings might otherwise be associated with a democratic
deficit. At the same time, the context-dependence of solutions along these lines make sweeping
reform proposals unlikely to succeed. Rather, it is important that the institutions that are used are
appropriately matched to local conditions.37 This sets the stage for the second part of the thesis,
consisting of a case study of takings for Norwegian hydropower development.
1.3 Putting The Theory to the Test
In Norwegian law, the takings question begins and ends with the issue of compensation.38 If an
owner has grievances about the act of taking as such, rather than the amount of money they
receive, takings law has very little to offer. In fact, it does not appear to offer anything that does
not already follow from general administrative law. The owner can argue that the taking decision
was in breach of procedural rules, or grossly unreasonably, but the chance of succeeding is slim.39
In cases involving hydropower development, the position of property owners is also strongly
influenced by sector-specific legislation, as well as special administrative and market practices.
36 For a more recent empirical assessment (and refinement), see M Cox, G Arnold and SV Tomas, ‘A Review of Design
Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management’ (2010) 15(4) Ecology And Society 38.
37 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 35) 92.
38 See generally Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘Norwegian Waterfalls: A Case Study of Commercial Expropriation in Light of
Property as a Human Right’ in Ann Apers and others (eds), Property Law Perspectives III (Ius Commune: European
and Comparative Law Series, 2015) vol 132; Dyrkolbotn, ‘On the compensatory approach to economic development
takings’ (n 28).
39 See Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), Expro-
priation Law in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 384-386.
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Chapter 4 begins the case study by discussing this in more depth, setting the stage for the discussion
on expropriation that follows in chapter 5. A first important observation is that the hydropower
sector in Norway was liberalised in the early 1990s.40 This means that the energy companies
benefiting from eminent domain are now commercial enterprises, not public utilities.
A second important observation is that the right to harness the power of water is considered
private property in Norway, typically owned in common by members of nearby rural communities.41
This does not mean that freely running water, as a substance, is subject to private property. What
it means is that riparian owners have an additional stick in the bundle of rights that the law
associates with being the owner of land over which water flows. A useful comparison can be made
with fishing rights; the right to the hydropower in a river arises from landownership, but it is
conceived of as a separate, transferable, right in property.42 It is referred to in Norwegian as a
“fallrett”, which can be translated as a waterfall right. This thesis will therefore often refer to
waterfalls and owners of waterfalls when discussing the right to harness the power of water in a
river.43
As discussed in Part II of this thesis, hydroelectric companies in Norway have traditionally
had easy access to privately owned waterfalls, made possible through the government’s power of
eminent domain. However, since deregulation, local owners have begun to resist such takings. This
40 The crucial legislative reform was the Energy Act 1990.
41 See Water Resources Act 2000, s 13. This arrangement has long historical roots and makes intuitive sense in a
mountainous country with a very vast number of small and medium sized rivers coming down from steep outfield
mountains. For the historical development of the law on this point, see Ernst Nordtveit, ‘History of Water Law in
Scandinavia’ in Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre and Tadessa Kasse Woldesadik (eds), A History of Water, Series III,
Volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law (IB Tauris 2015) 109-116.
42 Apart from this explicit recognition of water power as a separate right in property, the Norwegian system of riparian
rights appears to be historically quite similar to the riparian common law, see generally William Howarth, ‘The
History of Water Law in the Common Law Tradition’ in Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre and Tadessa Kasse Woldesadik
(eds), A History of Water, Series III, Volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law (IB Tauris 2015).
43 In some cases, especially historically, a waterfall right would be formally registered as a separate unit of real property
to facilitate transfer to someone other than the owner of the surrounding agricultural land. However, waterfall rights
can also be formally registered as rights of use attaching to the real properties from which they arise. In relation
to Norwegian expropriation law, and for the purposes of this thesis, the distinction between these two ways of
registering waterfall rights will not play an important role and will not be discussed further.
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has been motivated by the fact that owners can now undertake their own hydropower projects as a
commercial pursuit; unlike the situation before liberalisation, owner-led development projects can
demand access to the electricity grid as producers.44 This has led to heightened tensions between
takers and owners, tensions that the water authorities are now forced to grapple with on a regular
basis.
Chapter 4 argues that despite their improved position following liberalisation, local owners
remain marginalised under the regulatory framework. Specifically, despite political support for
locally organised small-scale development, the large energy companies have continued to enjoy
a privileged position in their dealings with the water authorities. Building on this observation,
chapter 5 goes on to discuss eminent domain in more depth. The chapter tracks the position
of owners under the law and administrative practices that relate to takings of waterfalls. The
key finding is that expropriation is usually an automatic consequence of a large-scale development
license.45 That is, commercial companies that succeed in obtaining large-scale development licenses
will almost always be granted the right to expropriate. This right will be granted, moreover,
with little or no prior assessment as to the appropriateness of depriving local communities of
their resources. Indeed, the fact that expropriation tends to follow automatically from a license
to develop has led the water authorities to focus their attention on the licensing question and
associated procedures. No distinction appears to be made between cases involving expropriation
and cases that do not. This has a significant effect on the level of procedural protection offered
to local owners. For instance, according to written testimony during a recent Supreme Court case
on legitimacy, the water authorities do not recognise any duty to give individual notice to local
owners before processing applications that involve expropriation of their waterfalls.46
44 See, e.g., Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Møllen Rt-2008-82 (Uleberg).
45 In some cases, this follows explicitly from the water resource legislation, while in other cases it follows from admin-
istrative practice. For further details, see below in chapter 5, section 5.3.
46 The case in question was M˚aland v Jørpeland Kraft AS Rt-2011-1393.
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While the appropriateness of taking property from local people is rarely discussed, the issue of
how hydropower affects the environment has received increased attention in recent decades. Some-
times, environmental impact assessments will uncover negative effects and the water authorities
will reject development applications, also when the applicant is a large energy company. In general,
the framework for management of hydropower in Norway has an important conservation dimension
that is clearly recognised by the government.47 However, as argued in this thesis, the effect on local
owners and communities still receives little or no attention.48 In order to explore this phenomenon
and investigate its consequences, the thesis focuses specifically on the taking of private property,
while conservation issues remain in the background.49
In relation to the compensation issues that arise following expropriation, the owners’ legal posi-
tion initially grew stronger after liberalisation. Specifically, the lower courts started to compensate
local owners for the lost opportunity to profit from hydropower.50 This led to a dramatic increase
in compensation payments compared to earlier practice.51 However, a recent decision from the
Supreme Court appears to largely reverse this development, since a large-scale license may now
be considered proof that alternative development by owners is unforeseeable and therefore not
compensable.52
47 See Inge Lorange Backer, Innføring i naturressurs- og miljørett (5th edn, Gyldendal 2012) (presenting Norwegian
environmental law).
48 See especially the discussion in chapter 5, sections 5.6 and 5.7.
49 That said, chapters 4 and 5 will touch on two key debates regarding environmental law in Norway in recent years.
The first pertains to the sector-based approach to natural resource regulation, which some argue is at odds with the
holistic approach encouraged by international law instruments. The second debate, which is closely related to the
first, concerns the extent of the government’s duty to assess alternative resource uses and development schemes when
considering license applications for concrete projects. See generally Nikolai K Winge, Kampen om arealene: Retts-
lige styringsmidler for en helhetlig utmarksforvaltning (Universitetsforlaget 2013); Inge Lorange Backer and Hans
Chr Bugge, ‘Forsømt konsekvensutredning av alternativer – Høyesteretts dom i Rt-2009-661 om den amerikanske
ambassade i Husebyskogen’ [2010] Lov og Rett 115.
50 See Uleberg (n 44) (specifically, it was observed that waterfalls now had a market value, due to the increasing
prevalence of owner-led hydropower).
51 See especially the discussion in chapter 5, section 5.5.1.
52 See Bjørnar˚a v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening Rt-2013-612.
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In light of this and other data discussed in chapter 5, my conclusion is that recent takings for
hydropower do not in fact pass the extended Gray test. The current practices appear illegitimate
with respect to the theory of property developed in Part I of the thesis. At the same time, Nor-
wegian law offers a promising institutional path towards the restoration of legitimacy in economic
development contexts. Specifically, the unique framework for land consolidation found in Norway
can serve such a function. This has already been demonstrated in the context of hydropower de-
velopment, where land consolidation courts have been able to successfully organise development
projects on behalf of owners who wish to undertake development but disagree about how it should
be done. This brings me to the fourth key theme of this thesis.
1.4 A Judicial Framework for Compulsory Participation
The fourth and final key theme, presented in chapter 6, consists of an assessment of the Norwegian
land consolidation courts. These courts have the power to order owners to undertake or allow
development projects (without depriving them of their property), as an alternative to expropriation.
Moreover, they are presently used in this way in the context of hydropower development. The large
energy companies almost never use consolidation, but local communities often do.53 In these cases,
the land consolidation courts have proved themselves effective in making self-governance work, also
in cases when some of the owners do not with to undertake development.
The land consolidation alternative can make a great difference, especially since it strives to
ensure legitimacy through participation. The potential democratic deficit associated with economic
development takings is dealt with by mechanisms that seek to enable owners to take active part
in the management of their property in the public interest. At the same time, the procedure can
be quite effective, since participation is compulsory and the consolidation judge may intervene to
53 According to the Court Administration, as of 2009, land consolidation proceedings had facilitated a total of 164
small-scale hydropower projects with a total annual energy output of about 2 TWh per year (enough electricity to
supply a city of about 250 000 people), see Gevinstbetraktninger ved Jordskifte (Domstoladministrasjonen 2009).
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settle conflicts and establish organisational order. Chapter 6 also addresses possible objections to
the procedure, but concludes that the continued development of the land consolidation institution
provides the best way forward for addressing problems associated with economic development
takings in Norway.
If the integrity and efficiency of the procedure can be preserved, it appears to have great poten-
tial as an alternative to eminent domain in general, also in cases involving large-scale development
and cooperation with external commercial actors. Moreover, while the system is designed to work
in a setting of egalitarian property rights, it is interesting to consider whether key features of the
procedure could inspire solutions to the takings problem in other jurisdictions.
It might well be, for instance, that a land consolidation approach coupled with a human flour-
ishing understanding of property can be a good way of including non-owners in the process, in
jurisdictions where property rights are not distributed as widely among the population as in Nor-
way. This might make the procedure more complex and give rise to new risks of abuse by local
elites, but it seems like an interesting idea to explore in future work.
In short, the consolidation alternative provides a starting point for an approach to legitimacy
that takes a wider view of what property is, and what role it can and should play in a democratic
society. In this way, the chapter on consolidation also returns to the conceptual premise discussed
in the first chapter of this thesis, whereby the purpose of property is to promote human flourishing.
1.5 Some Terminological Clarifications
Property is a key notion in this thesis. As mentioned already, it is an elusive legal term, with different
decomposable meanings depending on the context of use and the jurisdiction within which we find
ourselves. In the first part of this thesis, the notion is explored conceptually, to develop a theory
of property’s role and purpose within law and society. The details of how the notion is defined in a
given jurisdiction will not be our concern. In general, there is quite some variation in this regard,
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among the different jurisdictions considered in this thesis. With respect to the European Convention
of Human Rights, for instance, we encounter a notion of property (or “possession”) that is very
wide, one that also covers social welfare entitlements and immaterial benefits, including future
pension payments and goodwill acquired by holding a professional title.54 This is a broader concept
of property than that usually encountered in private law, also in jurisdictions that incorporate the
Convention into their national legal order. The issues that can arise form this, when several distinct
notions of property co-exist in the law, will not be considered here; the thesis will remain focused
on “classical” instances of property, typically property in land and related resources.
That said, the theoretical argument made in chapter 2 might well be relevant for property
lawyers working with disputed definitions of private property within a specific legal framework.
Indeed, the theory presented in this thesis can be used to argue normatively that a given jurisdiction
relies on a notion of property that is either too wide or too narrow to cater to important social
functions. For instance, it would be interesting to consider the implications that a social function
understanding can have in the context of intellectual property, specifically to shed light on the
normative question of what kinds of immaterial property the law should recognise. However, this
line of research must be left for future work.
There is one special type of property encountered in this thesis that deserves a special mention.
This is the notion of common property in land and natural resources. This notion is notoriously
ambiguous, used to refer to at least three different kinds of legal arrangements.55 First there are
open-access resources, which are sometimes (erroneously) referred to as common property. These
resources are characterised by the fact that everyone is in principle entitled to make use of them.
Hence, it is more accurate to say that they are resources that have no owner. The use of such
54 See Tom Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart Publishing 2005) 73-77.
55 SV Ciriacy-Wantrup and RC Bishop, ‘“Common Property” as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy’ [1975] (15)
Natural Resources Journal 713, 714-715. See also Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’ (n 35)
12-13.
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resources is typically managed by the government through regulation, sometimes under a public
trust doctrine. The questions of sustainable resource management and governance that arise in
this regard are interesting in their own right, but are not considered in any depth in this thesis.
The second type of legal arrangement often referred to as common property is the collection
of rights and responsibilities attaching to common land. This is land over which a specific group
of people enjoy use rights and where special rules are in place to regulate the exercise of these
rights and the management of the underlying resources. A typical example is found in the law of
the commons in England and Wales, as regulated today by the Commons Act 2006.56 Use rights
on the commons can be thought of as property rights, but under individualistic accounts of what
property is, it might not be appropriate to do so. The distinguishing feature of rights in common is
that they provide an anchor for a special legal framework, a set of rules, institutions and customs
that pertain specially to the communal character of such rights. This function of rights in common
can be distorted if those rights are fitted into an entitlements-based framework for maintaining
rights in property.57
Under a social function theory of property, by contrast, it becomes much more appropriate (at
the conceptual level, at least) to think of rights in common as private property rights. Moreover,
as discussed further in chapter 2, the social function theory can support arguments to the effect
that all instances of property, even traditional forms of private property, can be viewed as being
part of a commons in an abstract sense of the word.58 This point will also be made in chapter 6,
when I discuss how land consolidation can be used to set up institutions for collective management
56 See generally Christopher Rodgers, ‘Reversing the ‘Tragedy’ of the Commons? Sustainable Management and the
Commons Act 2006’ (2010) 73(3) The Modern Law Review 461.
57 For a concrete example, see Rodgers, ‘Reversing the ‘Tragedy’ of the Commons? Sustainable Management and the
Commons Act 2006’ (n 56) 469–471 (analysing the effect of the Commons Registration Act 1965 (England and
Wales)).
58 See also Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’ (n 35) 16-18 (“Property, as experienced on the
ground, is never wholly individual nor wholly held in common, but instead always represents a mix of ownership
types.”).
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of private property rights within a local community. This form of property intervention can be
understood as an effort to bring key ideas behind the commons to bear on private property rights.
The connection with the commons is made at the theoretical level; the thesis will not address
existing legal frameworks used to regulate rights in common as such. Specifically, the special issues
that arise when new forms of economic development interfere with such rights will be left for future
work.
The third legal arrangement that can be referred to as common property is encountered when a
property is owned, in a conventional private law sense, by a group of owners. Shared forms of private
ownership are supported by most jurisdictions, including those considered in this thesis. Shared
private ownership is particularly important in Part II of the thesis, since the takings discussed
there will typically involve rights to hydropower that are owned by several private parties in
common under a legal framework that resembles the concept of a tenancy in common, known from
commonwealth jurisdictions. A brief presentation of this form of private ownership in Norway is
provided in chapter 4, along with a discussion of the importance of egalitarianism in Norway.59
Legitimacy is a second key notion used in this thesis. The notion is consistently used in a
normative sense, to describe that an interference in private property appears morally justified.60 It
is not used as a term with a specific descriptive meaning within a given jurisdiction. A key aim of
this thesis is to address the question of when an interference in private property should be regarded
as legitimate. All the jurisdictions I consider have their own specific rules in place that are meant
59 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1.
60 For a concise presentation of moral legitimacy, see Christopher A Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in
International Law’ (2014) 34(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 729, 438-441. See also Frank I Michelman, ‘Justice
as fairness, legitimacy, and the question of judicial review: a comment’ (2004) 72(5) Fordham Law Review 1407;
Dan Priel, ‘The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory’ (2011) 57(1) McGill Law Journal 1. Moral legitimacy becomes
particularly important under natural law theories, since such theories make the moral status of a rule directly
relevant to the question of its legal validity. However, moral legitimacy is also relevant on a positivist understanding
of law; it is a descriptive fact that moral considerations shape the law, not only through explicit law-making, but
also because judges are unable to completely separate formal reasoning about legal content and validity from moral
reasoning about legitimacy. For a longer argument to this effect, coming from a self-described positivist, see Richard
H Fallon, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118(6) Harvard Law Review 1787, 1801-1802.
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to ensure legitimacy in takings law. The most common legal terms that are used in this context
are the notions of public use, public purpose, and public interest. Specifically, a typical takings
provision states that the public must benefit, directly or indirectly, in order for an interference in
private property to count as legitimate. Such provisions or their near equivalents can be found in
a range of different jurisdictions, including all those studied in this thesis.
The meanings of the terms used are similar across different contexts and legal systems. Still,
since these are formal legal terms, it is worth keeping in mind that their meaning is relative to the
jurisdiction under consideration. For instance, while most of the jurisdictions considered in this
thesis do not recognise any substantial difference between public use, public interest and public
purpose, some jurisdictions maintain such distinctions and attach important legal consequences to
them. Most famously, the position that public use literally means use by the public, and is therefore
quite distinct from public interest and public purpose, is forcefully advocated by several US legal
scholars, including at least one member of the Supreme Court.61
When terms such as public use, public interest or public purpose are used in this thesis, their
exact meaning correspond to the meaning given to them by the jurisdiction under consideration.
If the terms occur in theoretical discussions, their meaning should be understood according to a
natural language interpretation that points to the general idea behind using terms like these in the
law of takings. The reason why notions such as public interest and public use are important is that
they can help enforce the natural idea that interferences in private property should only occur for
the good of the people. This much is common to all jurisdictions considered in this thesis.
Adding to the generally accepted starting point, the thesis will argue that legitimacy also
requires decision-making to take place in an equitable and inclusive manner, such that owners
and others who depend closely on the properties in question have a say that is commensurate
with what is at stake for them. This perspective, combining procedural and substantive ideals
61 As demonstrated by Kelo (n 15).
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of fairness, will not rely on finer distinctions between notions such as public use, public purpose
and public interest. In my opinion, this is a strength of the theory developed in this thesis, an
escape from what Gregory Alexander calls the “formalist trap”, characterised by an exaggerated
focus on constitutional property clauses and how they are formulated.62 As Alexander argues,
excessive formalism can cloud the issue of legitimacy because it blocks from view those important
institutional and political processes that determine the actual level of protection given to property
and its owners within a given jurisdiction. Building on this, my thesis will develop an integrated
approach to legitimacy based on the idea that private ownership is meant to be an anchor for
democracy and a promoter of human flourishing.
62 See Gregory S Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Juris-
prudence (University of Chicago Press 2006) Chapter 1.
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Part I
Towards a Theory of Economic
Development Takings
33

2 Property, Protection and
Privilege
2.1 Introduction
The category of economic development takings makes intuitive sense; it targets situations when
property is literally taken for economic development. In most cases considered in this thesis, eco-
nomic development is even the explicitly stated aim used to justify the exercise of eminent domain.
However, as mentioned in the introduction, the legal relevance of the category cannot be taken
for granted. Indeed, a superficial look at typical approaches to takings in the law would seem to
indicate that the nature of the project benefiting from a taking is not usually a major issue when
assessing the legitimacy of interference.1
This chapter challenges that idea, by offering an argument as to why the purpose and context
of a taking matters, not only as a question of public policy but also with respect to property
as a fundamental right. From the point of view of US law, providing such an argument might
1 For instance, in Europe, the property jurisprudence at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deals almost
exclusively with other aspects of legitimacy. The Court typically stresses that interference must be in the public
interest, but then leaves this aspect of legitimacy behind after making clear that the member states enjoy a wide
margin of appreciation in relation to the public interest requirement. See, e.g., James and others v United Kingdom
(1986) Series A no 98; Lindheim and others v Norway ECHR 2012 985 (however, the form and strength of the
public interest is potentially relevant to the Court’s fair balance assessment, as discussed in chapter 3). Similarly, in
the US in the 1980s, Merrill claimed that most observers thought of the public use clause in the Fifth Amendment
of the US Constitution as nothing more than a “dead letter”, see Thomas W Merrill, ‘The Economics of Public Use’
(1986) 72 Cornell Law Review 61, 61.
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not be strictly required, since economic development takings have already gained recognition as
an important category of legal reasoning.2 However, a conceptual discussion of what exactly the
category represents appears to be missing in the literature so far. In Europe, moreover, the category
has so far not received much recognition as a legally relevant way to address the legitimacy of
expropriation. Hence, in a comparative study, a conceptual investigation into the very idea of an
economic development taking is a necessary first step.
This chapter argues that in order to make this step, we should broaden our theoretical outlook
compared to traditional forms of legal reasoning about property. It will be argued that a suitable
conceptual reconfiguration is implicit in some recent strands of scholarship, particularly those that
focus on the social function of property.3 Indeed, the crux of the main argument presented in this
chapter is that the social function view compels us to pay attention to the special dynamics of
power that tend to manifest in cases when private property is taken by the state for economic
development.
To make clear why such takings are special, this chapter abandons the traditional entitlements-
based perspective on property in favour of a perspective that emphasises the ideal function of
property as a guarantor of social justice and a building block of democracy and participatory
decision-making. This allows us to shift attention away from the effect that a taking has on in-
dividuals one-by-one, towards the question of whether the purpose of the taking, and its broader
societal effect, merits interfering with private property. When this question is recognised as falling
2 See generally Charles E Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 491; Ilya Somin, ‘Controlling
the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ English (2007) 15(1) Supreme Court Economic
Review 183; Robin Paul Malloy (ed), Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (Ashgate
2008).
3 See generally Gregory S Alexander and others, ‘A Statement of Progressive Property’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law
Review 743; Sheila R Foster and Daniel Bonilla, ‘The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective’ (2011)
80 Fordham Law Review 1003; Jospeh William Singer, Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (Yale University
Press 2000); Laura S Underkuﬄer, The Idea of Property: Its meaning and power (Oxford University Press 2010);
Gregory S Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence
(University of Chicago Press 2006); Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo Pen˜alver, Community and Property (Oxford
University Press 2010); Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2011).
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within the sphere of takings law, it also provides a potential basis for judicial review rooted in
property protection.
This chapter will also argue that private property is important because it gives owners a right to
take part in decision-making processes concerning economic development, a right that also typically
gives owners a duty to participate, not only on their own behalf, but also on behalf of broader com-
munity interests. In my view, this highlights how property rights can empower local communities
in their interactions with powerful commercial and central government interests. Clearly, the use
of eminent domain can undermine this function of property, thereby threatening the democratic
legitimacy of the decision-making process, by depriving local communities of a potentially robust
source of participatory competence. Moreover, when property interests are transferred away from
the local community on a permanent basis, this threatens to leave a lasting democratic deficit
in the wake of economic development. Arguably, this is the key reason why we should recognise
economic development takings as a separate conceptual category.
To motivate the theoretical work, I start by considering the Balmedie controversy, pertaining to
Donald Trump’s plans for a golf resort in Scotland. I use this concrete example to highlight tensions
between property’s different functions in the context of economic development, to motivate the
theoretical arguments that follow.
2.2 Donald Trump in Scotland
On the 10th of July 2010, the property magnate Donald Trump opened his first golf-course in
Scotland, proudly announcing that it would be the “best golf-course in the world”.4 Impressed
with the unspoilt and dramatic seaside landscape of Scotland’s east coast, the New Yorker, who
made his fortune as a real estate entrepreneur, had decided he wanted to develop a golf course in
4 See Joe Passow, ‘Trump Scotland is on its way to being one of the best courses in the world’ (Golf Magazine,
13th July 2012) 〈http://www.golf.com/courses-and-travel/donald-trump-scotland-golf-course-lives-hype〉 accessed
16th April 2015.
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the village of Balmedie, close to Aberdeen.
To realise his plans, Trump purchased the Menie estate in 2006, with the intention of turning
it into a large resort with a five-star hotel, 950 timeshare flats, and two 18-hole golf-courses.5 The
local authorities were divided on the issue of whether to grant planning permission, which was
first denied by Aberdeenshire Council.6 One of the reasons for rejecting the plans was that the
proposed site for the development had previously been declared to be of special scientific interest
under conservation legislation.7 The frailty and richness of the sand dune ecosystem, it was argued,
suggested that the land should be left unspoilt for future generations. Several members of the local
population actively campaigned against the plans, with some also refusing to sell property that
Trump wanted to include in his development project.8
Trump was not deterred, and in the end he was able to convince Scottish ministers that he
should be given the go-ahead on the prospect of boosting the economy by creating some 6000 new
jobs.9 Activists continued to fight the development, launching the “Tripping up Trump” campaign
to back up local residents who refused to sell their properties.10 One of these, the farmer and
quarry worker Michael Forbes, expressed his opposition in particularly clear terms, declaring at
5 See Haroon Siddique, ‘Trump triumphs in battle for Scottish golf resort’ (The Guardian, 3rd November 2008)
〈http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/03/donaldtrump-scotland〉 accessed 26th August 2015.
6 See, e.g., ‘Trump’s £1bn golf plan rejected’ BBC News (London, 29th November 2007) 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk news/scotland/north east/7118105.stm〉 accessed 18th April 2015.
7 See ‘Trump’s golf submission swings in’ BBC News (London, 30th March 2007) 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk news/scotland/north east/6506923.stm〉 accessed 18th April 2015.
8 See ‘Donald Trump’s plea to homeowners on the Menie Estate’ (The Scotsman, Edinburgh, 12th November 2010)
〈http://www.scotsman.com/news/donald-trump-s-plea-to-homeowners-on-the-menie-estate-1-1370270〉 accessed
16th April 2015.
9 See Severin Carrell, ‘‘World’s best golf course’ approved - complete with 23-acre eyesore’ The Guardian (London,
4th November 2008) 〈http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/04/donald- trump- scottish- golf - course〉
accessed 16th April 2015. Trump’s plans attracted significant public attention, and his interaction with Scottish
decision-makers came under critical scrutiny by commentators, see, e.g., Simon Jenkins, ‘Scotland’s gullible politi-
cians are the victims of a colossal Trump try-on’ (The Guardian, 13th June 2008) 〈http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2008/jun/13/donaldtrump.scotland〉 accessed 16th April 2015. For a more general assessment from
the point of view of conservation interests in the UK, see Arts Koen and Gina Maffrey, ‘Trump’s golf course –
Society’s nature. The death and resurrection of nature conservation’ (2013) 34(1) ECOS 49.
10 See ‘Tripping up Trump’ 〈http://www.trippinguptrump.co.uk〉 accessed 16th April 2015.
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one point that Trump could “shove his money up his arse”.11 Trump, on his part, had described
Forbes as a “village idiot” that lived in a “slum”.12 Moreover, he had suggested that Forbes was
keeping his property in a state of disrepair on purpose, to coerce Trump to pay more for the land,
to remove the blight.13 Forbes was offended and he proudly declared that he would never consider
selling, as the issue had become personal.14
At the height of the tensions, Trump asked the local council to consider issuing compulsory
purchase orders (CPOs) that would allow him to take property from Forbes and other recalcitrant
locals against their will.15 These plans met with widespread outrage. The media coverage was wide,
mostly negative, and an award-winning documentary was made which painted Trump’s activities
in Balmedie in a highly negative light.16 The controversy also found its way into UK property
scholarship. Kevin Gray, in particular, a leading expert in property law, expressed his opposition
by making clear that he thought the proposed taking would be an act of “predation”.17
In fact, the case prompted Gray to formulate a number of key features that could be used
11 See (n 8).
12 See ‘Trump may pursue housing laws over golf ‘slum’’ BBC News (London, 1st June 2010) 〈http://www.bbc.com/
news/10205781〉 accessed 16th April 2015.
13 See ‘Fisherman bunkers Trump golf plan’ CNN (Atlanta, Georgia, 10th October 2007) 〈http://edition.cnn.com/
2007/WORLD/europe/10/10/trump.golf/〉 accessed 16th April 2015.
14 See Brian Ferguson, ‘Farmer who took on Trump triumphs in Spirit awards’ The Scotsman (Edinburgh, 29th Novem-
ber 2012) 〈http://www.scotsman.com/news/scotland/top-stories/farmer-who-took-on-trump-triumphs-in-spirit-
awards-1-2668649〉 accessed 16th April 2015.
15 See Mark Macaskill, ‘Donald Trump accused of new clearance’ The Sunday Times (London, 6th September 2009)
〈http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk news/article184090.ece〉 accessed 16th April 2015. It would not
have been the first time Donald Trump benefited from eminent domain. In the 1990s, he famously succeeded in
convincing Atlantic City to allow him to take the home of Vera Coking, to facilitate further development of his
casino facilities. But in this instance, Trump did not get his way. Indeed, the taking of Vera’s home was eventually
struck down by the New Jersey Superior Court, an influential result that was hailed as a milestone in the fight
against “eminent domain abuse” in the US. See Stephen J Jones, ‘Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument
for Strict Scrutiny Analysis under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment’ (2000) 50 Syracuse Law
Review 285, 297-301. See also Nick Gillespie, ‘Litigating for Liberty’ Reason (Los Angeles, 2008) 〈http://reason.
com/archives/2008/03/03/litigating-for-liberty/4〉 accessed 16th April 2015. For the decision itself, consult Casino
Reinvestment DevAuth v Banin 727 A2d 102 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1998).
16 See Anthony Baxter, ‘You’ve been Trumped’ (3rd May 2011) 〈http : / / www . youvebeentrumped . com /
youvebeentrumped.com/THE MOVIE.html〉 accessed 16th April 2015.
17 Kevin Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ in Susan Bright (ed), Modern studies in property law: Volume 6 (Hart Pub-
lishing 2011).
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to identify situations where compulsory purchase would be likely to represent an abuse of power.
Gray noted, moreover, that Trump’s proposed takings would fall in line with a general tendency
in the UK towards using compulsory purchase to benefit private enterprise, even in the absence
of a clear and direct benefit to the public. In light of this, it seemed realistic that CPOs might
be used in Balmedie.18 It would not be hard to argue that the public would benefit indirectly in
terms of job-creation and increased tax revenues. Moreover, Scottish ministers had already gone
far in expressing their support for the plans.
But then, in a surprise move, Trump announced he would not seek CPOs.19 Instead, he decided
to pursue a different strategy, namely that of containment. He erected large fences, planted trees
and created artificial sand dunes, all serving to prevent the properties he did not control from
becoming a nuisance to his golfing guests. One local owner, Susan Monroe, was fenced in by a wall
of sand some 8 meters high. “I used to be able to see all the way to the other side of Aberdeen”,
she said, “but now I just look into that mound of sand”.20 She also lamented the lack of support
from the Scottish government, expressing surprise that nothing could be done to stop Trump.
There was little left to do. As soon as the decision was made to build around them, the
neighbouring property owners found themselves marginalised. Trump, on his part, was declared
a valuable job-creator whose activities would boost the economy in the region. He even received
an honorary doctorate at Robert Gordon University, a move that prompted the previous vice-
chancellor, Dr David Kennedy, to hand his own honorific back in protest.21
18 Moreover, a statutory authority is found in section 189 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997,
stating that local authorities have a general power to acquire land compulsorily in order to “secure the carrying out
of development, redevelopment or improvement”.
19 See ‘Scepticism as Donald Trump claims no evictions over Menie’ The Scotsman (Edinburgh, 31st January 2011)
〈http ://www.scotsman.com/news/scepticism- as - donald- trump- claims- no- evictions - over - menie - 1 - 1499167〉
accessed 17th April 2015.
20 See Robert Booth, ‘Donald Trump opens £100m golf course’ (The Guardian, 10th July 2012) 〈http : / / www .
theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/10/donald-trump-100m-golf-course〉 accessed 16th April 2015.
21 See ‘Degree returned over Donald Trump’s RGU award’ BBC News (London, 28th September 2010) 〈http://www.
bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-11421376〉 accessed 17th April 2015.
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In the end, then, it was not by taking the land of others that Trump triumphed in Scotland.
Rather, he succeeded by exercising “despotic dominion” over his own.22 This proved highly effect-
ive. After he fenced them in, his neighbours were hard to see and hard to hear. The Balmedie
controversy went quiet, the golfers came, Trump got his way. As he declared during the grand
opening: “Nothing will ever be built around this course because I own all the land around it. [...]
It’s nice to own land.”23
. . .
The tale of Trump coming to Scotland serves to illustrate the kind of scenario that I will be looking
at in this thesis. In addition, it puts my work into perspective. For a while, it looked like Balmedie
was about to become a canonical case of an economic development taking. But in the end, it
became an illustration of something more subtle, namely that what it means to protect property
depends on value judgements regarding opposing property interests. In particular, while Trump
achieved his ends in Scotland by relying on his own property rights, he did so by undermining the
property rights of others, even if he did not formally condemn those rights.
This was made possible by an exercise of regulatory and financial power. Hence, we are re-
minded that the function of property as such is deeply shaped by social, political and economic
structures. For the powerful owner, property can be used offensively to oppress weaker parties.
For the marginalised, it might well be the last line of defence against oppression. Indeed, Donald
Trump’s ownership of the Menie estate has a vastly different meaning than does Michael Forbes’
ownership of his small farm. To many observers, the former kind of ownership will represent some
combination of power, privilege and profit, while the latter will be regarded as imbued with a
mix of defiance, community and sustenance. Different values are inherent in these two forms of
22 To quote Blackstone, see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 2: A Facsimile of
the First Edition of 1765–1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979) 2.
23 See Booth (n 20).
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ownership, and when Trump came to Balmedie, they clashed in a way that required the legal order
to prioritise between them.
In Trump’s narrative, upholding the sanctity of property in Balmedie entails allowing him
to protect his golf resort plans from what he regards as backwards locals who attempt to fight
progress. If this is one’s starting point, property protection might even come to involve the use of
compulsory purchase of rights that are seen as a hindrance to the full enjoyment of property by a
more resourceful owner.
For Michael Forbes and the other local owners, protecting property has a completely differ-
ent meaning. To them, it was paramount to protect the local community against what they saw
as a disruptive and damaging plan, one that threatened to turn them and their properties into
mere golfing props. Again, adequate protection might require an interference in property, to pre-
vent Trump from using his land according to his own wishes, because this causes damage to his
neighbours.
In the case of Balmedie, we are forced to recognise that protection implies interference and
vice versa. Moreover, we see how both sides of that equation can involve the interests, ambitions,
fears and aspirations of private individuals. This shows the conceptual inadequacy of the idea
that property protection is all about weighing private against public interests, to strike a balance
between the state’s power to do good and owners’ right to do as they please. In reality, matters
are often more subtle, involving a number of additional dimensions. Importantly, how we assess
concrete situations where property is under threat depends crucially on what we perceive as the
“normal” state of property, the alignment of rights and responsibilities that we deem worthy of
protection. Our stance in this regard clearly depends on our values. But values themselves are in
turn influenced by the context of assessment within which they arise. An additional challenge is
that our assessments are often influenced by our perception of the relevant context, rather than by
facts.
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For example, property activists in the US tend to regard the value of autonomy as a fundamental
aspect of property. But this must be understood in light of the idea that US society is founded
on an egalitarian distribution of property, where ownership is meant to empower ordinary people
by facilitating self-sufficiency and self-governance.24 Hence, the autonomy inherent in property
ownership is not thought of as being bestowed on the few, but on the many. Protecting autonomy
of owners against state interference is not about protecting the privileges of the rich and powerful,
but is embraced as a way to protect against abuse by the privileged classes.25
This, however, is only an idea of property protection. It might not correspond to the reality
surrounding the rules that have been moulded in its image. Indeed, it has been noted that despite
the great pathos of the egalitarian property idea, egalitarianism has actually played a marginal
role to the development of US property law.26 More worryingly still, research indicates that land
ownership in the US, which is hard to track due to the idiosyncrasies of the land registration
system, is not actually all that egalitarian.27 In this way, we are confronted with the danger of a
dissociation of values, reality and the law.
In Scotland, a similar story unfolds. Here the traditional concern is that land rights are mainly
held by the elites.28 As a result, Scottish property activists tend to focus on values such as equal-
ity and fairness, calling also on the state to regulate and implement measures to achieve more
egalitarian control over the land. Indeed, reforms have been passed that sanction interference in
24 See, e.g., James W Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights (Oxford
University Press 2007) 173; Carol M Rose, ‘Property as the keystone right?’ (1996) 71(3) Notre Dame Law Review
329.
25 This narrative is enthusiastically embraced by US activists who fight economic development takings, see, e.g., ‘Castle
Coalition’ (2015) 〈http://castlecoalition.org/〉 accessed 18th April 2015.
26 Joan Williams, ‘The Rhetoric of Property’ (1998) 83 Iowa Law Review 277, 361 (“Why does the egalitarian strain of
republicanism have such a substantial presence in American property rhetoric outside the law but so little influence
within it?”)
27 Harvey M Jacobs, Who Owns America?: Social Conflict over Property Rights (University of Wisconsin Press 1998)
246-247.
28 See generally Andy Wightman, Who owns Scotland? (Canongate 1996); Andy Wightman, The Poor Had No Law-
yers: Who Owns Scotland and How They Got It (Birlinn 2013).
43
established property rights on behalf of local communities.29 At the same time, cases like Balmedie
illustrate that the Scottish government, now with enhanced powers of land administration, may
well choose to align itself with the large landowners. Moreover, research indicates that recent re-
forms in Scottish planning law, which serve to enhance the power of the central government, can
have the effect of undermining local communities and their capacity for self-governance.30 Again,
the danger of a disconnect between influential property narratives and reality is brought into focus.
On the other hand, grass roots property activists in the US and Scotland may well be closer
in spirit than they seem. Although their perception of the role of the state is very different, they
appear to share many of the same concerns and aspirations. Arguably, differences arise mainly from
the fact that they operate in different contexts and engage with different discourses of property.
The challenge is to find categories of understanding that allow us to make sense of both their
commonalities and their differences.
I think the example of Balmedie suggests a possible first step. It illustrates the need for a
framework that will allow us to recognise that opposing the use of compulsory purchase for eco-
nomic development is perfectly consistent with supporting strict property regulation to prevent
the establishment of golf resorts in fragile coastal communities. Both of these positions, moreover,
should be viewed as efforts to protect property. To the classical debate about the limits of the
state’s authority over property, such a dual position can be hard to make sense of. But in my
opinion, this only points to the vacuity of the conventional narrative.
In general, I think it is hard to make sense of many contemporary disputes over property if
we do not have the conceptual tools to distinguish between (1) egalitarian property held under
29 See generally John A Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’ (2011) 89(4)
Nebraska Law Review 739; Matthew Hoffman, ‘Why community ownership? Understanding land reform in Scotland’
(2013) 31 Land Use Policy 289.
30 See generally Michael Pacione, ‘Private profit, public interest and land use planning – A conflict interpretation of
residential development pressure in Glasgow’s rural–urban fringe’ (2013) 32 Land Use Policy 61; Michael Pacione,
‘The power of public participation in local planning in Scotland: The case of conflict over residential development
in the metropolitan green belt’ (2014) 79(1) GeoJournal 31.
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a stewardship obligation by members of a local community, and (2) neo-liberal property held by
large enterprises for investment. Moreover, there is no contradiction between promoting the value
of autonomy for one of these, while emphasising the need for state control and redistribution when
it comes to the other. The broader theme is the contextual nature of property and its implications
for protection of property rights. In the coming sections, I will propose a theoretical basis that
integrates this viewpoint into legal reasoning about interference in property rights.
2.3 Theories of Property
What is property? In common law jurisdictions, the standard answer is that property is a collection
of individual rights, or more abstractly, a means of protecting entitlements.31 Being an owner, it
is often said, amounts to being entitled to one or more among a bundle of sticks, floating on
streams of protected benefits associated with, and thereby serving to legally define, the property
in question.32 This point of view was first developed by legal realists in response to the natural
law tradition, which conceptualised property in terms of the owner’s dominion over the owned
thing, particularly his right to exclude others from accessing it.33 In civil law jurisdictions, rooted
in Roman law, a dominion perspective is still often taken as the theoretical foundation of property,
although it is of course recognised that the owner’s dominion is never absolute in practice.34
In modern society, the extent to which an owner may freely enjoy his property is highly sensitive
31 The idea that property rules are a form of entitlement protection was developed to great effect in the seminal article
Guido Calabresi and A.Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089.
32 See Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, ‘What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?’ (2001) 111(2) Yale
Law Journal 357, 357-358. The “classical” references on the bundle of rights theory in the US and the UK respectively
are Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale
Law Journal 710; Anthony M Honore`, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961).
33 Daniel B Klein and John Robinson, ‘Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium’ (2011)
8(3) Econ Journal Watch 193, 193-195.
34 For a comparison between civil and common law understanding of property, see generally YC Chang and HE Smih,
‘An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property’ (2012) 88(1) Notre Dame Law Review 1.
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to government’s willingness to protect, as well as its desire to regulate. To dominion theorists, this
sensitivity is typically thought of as giving rise to various restrictions on property, but for bundle
theorists it is often thought of as constitutive of property itself.35
The bundle of rights theory has long historical roots in common law. Arguably, it was distilled
from the traditional estates system for real property, which was turned into a theoretical foundation
for thinking about property in the abstract.36 However, during the 18th and 19th century, natural
law theorising made the dominion idea influential in common law. This is evidenced, for instance,
by the works of William Blackstone and James Kent.37 Towards the end of the 19th century, it
became increasingly hard to reconcile their absolutist approach to property with the reality of
increasing state regulation. Hence, the bundle metaphor that gained prominence in the early 1900s
can be seen as a return to a more modest perspective.38
On the bundle account, property rights are thought to be directed primarily towards other
people, not things.39 This underscores an important point about property in the real world, namely
that the content of rights in property are necessarily relative to a social context as well as the
totality of the legal order. For instance, when relying on a bundle metaphor it becomes easy to
explain that a farmer’s property rights protects him against trespassing tourists, but not against
the neighbour who has an established right of way.40
35 Chang and Smih (n 34) 7.
36 See Chang and Smih (n 34) 7 (“The “bundle of rights” is in a sense the theory implicit in the common law system
taken to its extreme, with its inherently analytical tendency, in contrast to the dogged holism of the civil law.”).
37 See generally Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 2: A Facsimile of the First Edition of
1765–1769 (n 22); James Kent, Commentaries on American law (1st edn, Commentaries on American Law, vol 2,
O Halsted 1827).
38 See Klein and Robinson (n 33) 195.
39 See Merrill and Smith, ‘What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?’ (n 32) 357-358 (“By and large, this
view has become conventional wisdom among legal scholars: Property is a composite of legal relations that holds
between persons and only secondarily or incidentally involves a “thing”.”).
40 It has been argued that this way of thinking about property, as a web of (legal and social) normative relations
between persons, does not entail the bundle of sticks idea, see Avihay Dorfman, ‘Private Ownership’ (2010) 16(1)
Legal Theory 1, 23-25. I agree, and I also believe that endorsing the property-as-relations perspective is largely
appropriate, even if one does not otherwise agree with the bundle perspective. Historically, however, the two ideas
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By contrast, the dominion theory suggests viewing such situations as exceptions to the general
rule of ownership, which implies a right to exclusion at its core. In the case of property, exceptions
no doubt make up the norm. But in civil law jurisdictions one lives happily with this. It takes the
grandeur away from the dominion concept, but it retains a nice and simple structure to property
law. In the civil law world, it is common to say that what the owner holds is the remainder, namely
what is left after deducting all positive rights that restrict their dominion.41 Moreover, while there
may be many limitations and additional benefits attached to property, they are all in principle
carved out of one initial right, namely that of the owner. In this way, the civil law system can be
more easy to navigate.
Some common law scholars have recently elaborated on this to develop a critique of the bundle
theory, by suggesting that it should at least be complemented by a firm theory of in rem rights
in property. This, they argue, would allow the law to operate more effectively, by relying on a
simple and clear rule that, although defeasible, would generally suffice to inform people about
their relevant rights and duties in relation to property.42
In addition, some scholars point out that the bundle theory does not adequately reflect the
sense in which property is a right to a thing, serving to create a person-object bond that is not
easily reducible to a set of interpersonal legal relationships.43 In the US, where the bundle theory
have in fact been closely associated with one another, so presenting them together seems appropriate. Moreover,
I will not actively enter into the theoretical debate on this point, since I believe that the social function account
of property, discussed in more detail in section 2.4, takes us further than both bundle and dominion perspectives.
However, as will hopefully become clear, the social function theory itself may be seen as a continuation of the
property-as-relations idea, catering also to a more holistic perspective on social structures (although it otherwise
manages to remain largely neutral on the bundle v dominion issue).
41 Chang and Smih (n 34) 25.
42 Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, ‘The Property/Contract Interface’ (2001) 101(4) Columbia Law Review 773,
793 (“The unique advantage of in rem rights – the strategy of exclusion – is that they conserve on information costs
relative to in personam rights in situations where the number of potential claimants to resources is large, and the
resource in question can be defined at relatively low cost.”); Merrill and Smith, ‘What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?’ (n 32) 389 (“The right to exclude allows the owner to control, plan, and invest, and permits this
to happen with a minimum of information costs to others.”). See also RC Ellickson, ‘Two Cheers for the Bundle-
of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and Smith’ (2011) 8(3) 215 (arguing that Merrill and Smith’s analysis
nicely complements and improves upon the bundle theory).
43 Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, ‘The morality of property’ (2007) 48(5) William and Mary Law Review 1849,
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has traditionally been dominant, this critique seems to be gaining ground.44
In this thesis, the efficiency and clarity of different property concepts will not be a primary
concern, nor will in rem theorising about ownership play a particularly important role.45 Hence, I
will remain largely agnostic about this aspect of the debate between dominion and bundle theorists.
In particular, the differences between civil and common law traditions in this regard do not cause
special problems for my analysis of economic development takings. For the purposes of this thesis,
it is more important how different ways of looking at property can influence our reasoning about
takings under constitutional and human rights law. Hence, I now turn to the question of whether
or not there are any significant differences between dominion and bundle theories when it comes
to the question of legitimacy of takings.
2.3.1 Takings under Bundle and Dominion Accounts of Property
Bundle theorists might be expected to have a comparatively relaxed attitude towards state inter-
ference in property rights. Indeed, thinking about property as sticks in a bundle may lead one to
think that property rights are intrinsically limited, so that subsequent changes to their content,
made by a competent body, are reflections of their nature, not a cause for complaint. In particular,
the theory conveys the impression that property is highly malleable.
For the theorists that developed the bundle of sticks metaphor in the late 19th and early 20th
century, this aspect was undoubtedly very important. By providing a highly flexible concept of
property, they helped the state gain conceptual authority to control and regulate.46 The early
1862. For a slightly different take on attachment, highlighting how the ‘thingness’ of property marks its conditional
nature and transferability, see JE Penner, ‘The “bundle of rights” picture of property’ 43(3) UCLA Law Review
711, 799-818.
44 See generally Klein and Robinson (n 33).
45 The personhood aspects of property that are sometimes highlighted in this regard are relevant to the analysis of
economic development takings. However, personhood accounts do not depend on a rejection of the bundle theory,
although they might carry some implicit criticism of it, see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property
(University of Chicago Press 1993) 127-130.
46 Klein and Robinson (n 33) 195.
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bundle theorists not only developed a theory to fit the law as they saw it, they also contributed to
change.
In takings law, the bundle narrative has been particularly important in relation to the conten-
tious issue of so-called regulatory takings.47 Such takings occur when government regulates the
use of property so severely that it may be classified as a taking in relation to the law of eminent
domain.48 In the US, the question of when regulation amounts to a regulatory taking is highly
controversial.49 The stakes are high because takings have to be compensated in accordance with
the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution.50 At the same time, the law is unclear, and the
limited amount of statutory law on the issue means that cases tend to be adjudicated against the
Constitution, often the relevant state Constitution in the first instance.51
If property is thought of as a malleable bundle of entitlements that exists only because it is
recognised by the law, it becomes natural to argue that when government regulates the use of
property, it does not deprive anyone of property rights. It merely restructures the bundle. In the
case of Andrus v Allard, the Supreme Court adopted such an argument when it declared that
“where an owner possesses a full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety”.52
Hence, with regards to the issue of regulatory takings, the bundle theory was actively used by
47 See generally R Alterman (ed), Takings International: A Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and
Compensation Rights (Amercian Bar Association 2010) (a comparative study of regulatory takings in thirteen
countries).
48 See William A Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Harvard University Press 1995) 1.
Regulatory takings proper arise when the (contested) right to compensation is inferred from a takings clause, such
as in the US. However, the overarching question is how to deal with changes in property values caused by regulation,
a question of universal importance across jurisdictions that may also be addressed by the legislator as a separate
issue, see Alterman (n 47) 3-10.
49 See generally Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (n 48).
50 See Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution 1791.
51 See Alterman (n 47) 31-32. Indeed, the federal doctrine on regulatory takings appears to be marked by deference
to state courts. See Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (n 48) 66.
52 Andrus v Allard 444 US 51, 65–66 (1979).
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those who favour a less restrictive approach to interference with private property rights. However, it
is wrong to conclude that the bundle theory necessarily implies a less restrictive stance on takings.
Epstein, for instance, argues that as every stick in the property bundle represents a property right,
government should not be permitted to remove any of them without paying compensation.53
More generally, Epstein does not believe that the bundle theory is responsible for what he
regards as a weakening of property rights in the US during the 20th century. Instead, he thinks
this weakening resulted from a tendency to adopt a “top-down” approach to property. According
to Epstein, too many scholars view property rights as vested in, and arising from, the power of the
state, not the possessions of individuals.54
Epstein successfully shows that as a rhetorical device, the bundle of rights theory may be turned
on its head compared to how it was used in Andrus v Allard. Moreover, his arguments illustrate
that the bundle theory itself does not appear to dictate any particular position on the degree of
protection that private property should enjoy against state interference.55
In the civil law world, the relationship between property theorising and property protection
is similarly hard to pin down at the conceptual level. Again, the issue of regulatory takings illus-
trates this. In some civil law countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, the owner’s right to
compensation for burdensome land use regulation is strong, while in other civil law countries, such
as France and Greece, it is very weak.56 In particular, the exclusive dominion understanding of
53 RA Epstein, ‘Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property’ (2011) 8(3)
Econ Journal Watch 223, 232-233.
54 Epstein, ‘Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property’ (n 53) 227-228
(“In my view, the nub of the difficulty with modern property law does not stem from the bundle-of-rights conception,
but from the top-down view of property that treats all property as being granted by the state and therefore subject
to whatever terms and conditions the state wishes to impose on its grantees.”).
55 To further underscore this point, it may be mentioned that while US courts recognise that a regulation can amount
to a taking, this is practically unheard of in several other common law jurisdictions, including England and Australia.
This is despite the fact that these countries all paint property in a similar conceptual light. Moreover, while the
issue of regulatory takings is considered central to constitutional property law in the US, it is considered a fairly
marginal issue in England, see Michael Purdue, ‘United Kingdom’ in R Alterman (ed), Takings International: A
Comparative Perspective on Land Use Regulations and Compensation Rights (Amercian Bar Association 2010).
56 See generally Alterman (n 47).
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property does not appear to commit one to any particular kind of policy on this point.
On the one hand, it cannot be denied that property rights are enforced, and limited, by the
power of government. Hanging on to the idea of dominion, then, necessarily forces us to embrace
also the idea that dominion is never absolute. In this way, the theory may serve as a conceptual
basis for arguing in favour of a relaxed approach to state interference. If property rights are not
absolute to start with, why worry about interfering in them for the common good? But, of course,
this story too may be turned on its head. Indeed, a libertarian can use the image of limited
dominion to argue that property is being ripped apart at its seams. If we want to maintain our
grasp of what property is, such a person might argue, we better enhance the level of protection
offered to property owners, to restore true dominion.
The upshot is that the differences between common law and civil law theorising about property
do not appear to be very relevant to the question of legitimacy in the context of state interference.
In particular, the differences between the bundle theory and the dominion idea do not appear to
speak decisively in favour of any particular approach to economic development takings.
In terms of descriptive content, both theories appear oversimplified. They provide a manner of
speech, but they do not really get us very far towards uncovering the reality of property rights in
modern society. In particular, they do not provide a functional account of what role property plays
in relation to the social, economic and political structures within which it resides.57
In terms of normative content, on the other hand, both the bundle theory and the dominion
theory appear rather bland. They simply do not offer much clear guidance as to what norms and
values the institution of property is meant to promote. They give neat ways of presenting what
property can look like, but do not tell us why it should be protected.58
57 A similar point is made in Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo Pen˜alver, An Introduction to Property Theory (Cam-
bridge University Press 2012) 2-6.
58 For a similar criticism, see Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘A theory of property’ (2005) 90(3) Cornell
Law Review 531, 535-536 (proposing an instrumental theory of property, with both descriptive and normative
implications, based on the idea that property exists to protect the value of stable ownership).
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2.3.2 Broader Theories
Based on the discussion so far, I conclude that a theory of economic development takings needs to
start from a property theory with a wider scope than both the bundle account and the dominion
theory. There are many candidates that could be considered. In a recent monograph on property,
Alexander and Pen˜alver present five key theoretical branches:59
• Utilitarian theories, focusing on property’s role in helping to maximize utility or welfare with
respect to individual preferences and desires.
• Libertarian theories, focusing on property’s role in furthering individual autonomy and liberty,
as well as the importance of protecting property against state interference, particularly at-
tempts at redistribution.
• Hegelian theories, focusing on the importance of property to the development of personhood
and self-realisation, particularly the expression and embodiment of free will through control
and attachment to one’s possessions.
• Kantian theories, focusing on how property arises to protect freedom and autonomy in a
coordinated fashion so that everyone may potentially enjoy it, through the development of
the state.
• Human flourishing theories, focusing on property’s role in facilitating participation in a com-
munity, particularly as a template allowing the individual to develop as a moral agent in a
world of normative plurality.
It it beyond the scope of this thesis to give a detailed presentation and assessment of all these
theoretical branches. Suffice it to say that the utilitarian approach has been by far the most
59 See chapters 1 to 5 of Alexander and Pen˜alver, An Introduction to Property Theory (n 57).
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influential.60 The basic tenet of this paradigm is that means-end analysis on the basis of exogenous
preferences and utility measures provide a sound foundation on which to reason about law and
policy.
In this thesis, I reject such a starting point. Instead, I approach property as an integral part
of social structures. On this view, property can no longer be seen neither as an end in itself nor
as a means to maximise some utility measure. Instead, property is understood in light of how it
functionally relates to other building blocks of life, such as sustenance, economic activity, social
interaction, interpersonal responsibility, preference change, deliberation, and democratic decision-
making.
With such a starting point, I believe the human flourishing theory has more to offer than any
of the other theoretical branches mentioned above. In section 2.5 below, I will emphasise how this
theory suggests a range of new policy recommendations regarding how the law should approach
the question of economic development takings.
Before I get to this, I will explore descriptive aspects of property theory in some more depth.
Indeed, a potential objection against all the theories summarised above is that they are overly
normative; they are largely used to argue for particular values associated with property, not to
clarify the descriptive core of the notion. This is a challenge, since one of my main aims in this
thesis is to argue for a descriptive proposition, namely that economic development takings make
sense as a conceptual category for legal reasoning. Hence, before I move on to consider normative
aspects, I first need a theoretical framework that allows me to pinpoint what makes economic
development takings unique. I would like to do so, moreover, without thereby committing myself
to any particular stance on how to normatively assess such takings.
60 See Alexander and Pen˜alver, An Introduction to Property Theory (n 57) 11 (noting that there are many varieties of
utilitarianism, including some law-and-economics theories for which the appropriateness of that label is contentious).
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To arrive at a suitable foundation in this regard, I will rely on the so-called social function
theory of property.61 This theory is often thought of as a normative theory as well, in some sense a
precursor to more overtly normative theories such as the human flourishing theory. However, I will
argue that the social function theory has a descriptive core that can serve as a common ground for
debate among scholars that do not necessarily share the same normative outlook. Crucially, the
descriptive core of the social function theory also points towards a descriptive argument in favour
of studying economic development takings.
2.4 The Social Function of Property
As an empirical observation, the fact that property has social functions is beyond doubt. For
instance, it is clear that ownership of property gives rise to social obligations, not just rights.
Hardly anyone would protest that in practical life, what an owner will do with their property is as
much constrained by the expectations of others as it is by law. Moreover, the law of nuisance and
rules relating to adverse possession both serve as simple examples that such expectations can also
have a bearing on the legal status of property and its owners.62
Still, many property scholars have surprisingly little regard for social functions when they
theorise about ownership. According to Alexander, the classical theories of property convey the
impression that “property owners are rights-holders first and foremost; obligations are, with some
61 See generally Foster and Bonilla (n 3); MC Mirow, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and
Others’ (2010) 22 Floridal Journal of International Law 191; Alexander and others (n 3). Be aware that some
authors, particularly in the US, also speak of the social obligation theory, using it more or less as a synonym for the
social function theory.
62 See Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Private Property?’ (1985) 5(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 313, 314 (invoking
social obligations as well as the notion of nuisance to explain what ownership is, at the conceptual level); Peter
M Gerhart, Property Law and Social Morality (Cambridge University Press 2013) 197-198 (proposing an abstract
distinction between trespass and nuisance in US law based on the concept of duty, which, it is argued, is always
symmetric in nuisance cases but not in case of trespass); Eduardo Moises Pen˜alver and Sonia K Katyal, ‘Property
Outlaws’ (2007) 155(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1095, 1169-1172 (analysing adverse possession on
the basis of a social functions understanding of property). See also JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom ECHR
2007 5559 (the ECtHR deciding to regard a UK case of adverse possession in bad faith as legitimate under the
ECHR).
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few exceptions, assigned to non-owners”.63 Theorists who emphasise property’s social function
attempt to redress this conceptual imbalance. As Alexander explains, “social obligation theorists
do not reverse this equation so much as they balance it. Of course property owners are rights-
holders, but they are also duty-holders, and often more than minimally so”.64
I remark that what Alexander and others sometimes refer to as the social obligation theory of
property is covered by the social function theory as I understand it. However, the social function
theory is broader in that it asks us to consider the legal relevance of social dependencies rooted in
property more generally, not just obligations. Specifically, the social function theory as it is used in
this thesis should be understood as a cross-jurisdictional reference point for a set of abstract ideas
about property that includes the ideas of theorists such as Alexander, who also argue specifically
for a social obligation norm in US property law.65 As I discuss in the next subsection, the idea
that property serves important social functions is not new. Moreover, it often plays an important
implicit role in shaping how property is understood in the law, also in Europe.
2.4.1 Historical Roots and European Influence
The first expression of the social function theory has been attributed to Leo´n Duguit, a French
jurist active early in the 20th century.66 In a series of lectures he gave in Buenos Aires in 1911, Du-
guit challenged the classic liberal idea of property rights by pointing to their context dependence,
adopting a line of argument strikingly similar to how recent scholars have criticized utilitarian dis-
courses about property.67 In particular, Duguit also pointed to the notion of obligation, stressing
the fact that individual autonomy only makes sense in a social context where people are dependent
63 Gregory S Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (2011) 80 Fordham Law Review 1017, 1023.
64 Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (n 63) 1023.
65 For a similar understanding of the social function theory, see Foster and Bonilla (n 3).
66 See generally Foster and Bonilla (n 3).
67 See Foster and Bonilla (n 3) 1004-1008. For more details about Duguit’s work and the contemporaries that inspired
him, see generally Mirow, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others’ (n 61).
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on each other as members of communities. Hence, depending on the social circumstances of the
owner, their property could entail as many obligations as entitlements. This, according to Duguit,
was not only the inescapable reality of property ownership, it was also a normatively sound ar-
rangement that should inspire the law, more so than individualistic, ‘liberal’, visions of property
as entitlement protection.68 The social function perspective has since become widespread in Latin
America, as reflected for instance in the property clause in Article 21 of the American Convention
of Human Rights.69
Related ideas have also been influential in Europe, particularly during the rebuilding period
after the Second World War. For instance, the constitution of Germany – her Basic Law – contains
a property clause stating explicitly that property entails obligations as well as rights.70 As argued
by Alexander, this has had a significant effect on German property jurisprudence, creating a clear
and interesting contrast with US law.71
A social perspective on property was also influential during the debate among the European
states that first drafted the property clause in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European
68 See Foster and Bonilla (n 3) 1005 (“The idea of the social function of property is based on a description of social
reality that recognizes solidarity as one of its primary foundations”, discussing Duguit’s work). It should also be
noted that Duguit was particularly concerned with owners’ obligations to make productive use of their property,
to benefit society as a whole. This raises the question of who exactly should be granted the power to determine
what counts as “productive use”. In this way, Duguit’s work also serves to underscore one of the main challenges of
regulatory frameworks that seek to incorporate and draw on property’s social dimension: how should decisions be
made in such regimes?
69 American Convention on Human Rights, Organization of American States [1978], 1144 UNTS 123. See Theo RG
van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Intersentia 2002) 61-62. See also Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, ‘Social
Function of Property in Brazilian Law’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1171; MC Mirow, ‘Origins of the Social
Function of Property in Chile’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1183; Daniel Bonilla, ‘Liberalism and Property
in Colombia: Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1135.
70 See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany in the revised version published in the Federal Law Gazette
Part III, classification number 100-1, as last amended by the Act of 21 July 2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p 944)
1949, art 14.
71 See Gregory S Alexander, ‘Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example’ (2003) 88
Cornell Law Review 733, 738 (“The German Constitutional Court has adopted an approach that is both purposive
and contextual, while the U.S. Supreme Court has not.”). See also AJ van der Walt, Constitutional Property
Law (3rd edn, Juta 2011) 476-483 (noting that the German property clause also imposes a strict public purpose
requirement which has been used by the Constitutional Court to strike down illegitimate takings that benefit
commercial enterprises).
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Convention of Human Rights (P1(1) of the ECHR).72 The article was eventually formulated as
follows:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.
I will return to this clause in more depth in section 3.4 of chapter 3. Here I note how it
emphasises both the private right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions and the state’s right to
interfere with property in the general/public interest.73 Moreover, it does not explicitly introduce an
absolute compensation requirement in case of expropriation by the state, setting it apart from many
other property clauses, including that contained in the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution.
Arguably, this reflects a recognition of the social aspects of property.74
72 See Tom Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (2010) 59(04) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1055, 1063-1065. Allen argues that the liberal
conception of property has since gained ground in Europe, as reflected in jurisprudential developments at the ECtHR.
73 As argued by Allen, there is no real difference between “general interest” and “public interest” as used in P1(1)
of the ECHR; both terms are understood very broadly, with the Court in Strasbourg emphasising the considerable
“margin of appreciation” awarded to the states in this regard, see Tom Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act
1998 (Hart Publishing 2005) 29-30.
74 See generally Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on
Human Rights’ (n 72). For completeness, I mention that a human right to property is also included in Article 17
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA (10th December 1948) UN Doc A/810 (1948). However,
its inclusion was controversial and no corresponding right was included in either of the two subsequent covenants
containing binding provisions, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Res 2200A (XXI)
[1966]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNGA Res 2200A (XXI) [1966]. In light
of this, the property clause in the UDHR appears to have limited practical significance. Similarly, a property clause
is included in Article 14 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1520 UNTS 217, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 1986). However, this property clause has apparently not been given much attention
from the African Court, see Walt, Constitutional Property Law (n 71) 83. However, it has been proposed that an
internationally binding right to property should be introduced through a new international Covenant, a proposal
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However, it also fits within a traditional narrative of private property, where social responsibil-
ities attaching to property are regarded as arising from state objectives and policies, not ownership
as such. Indeed, the chosen formulation in P1(1) appears to suggest that social aspects are external
to private property, vested in the regulatory power of the state.
This marks a possible tension with the social function theory, which asks us to recognise that
social obligations are inherent in private property, attaching to owners directly. The importance
of this in the present context is that a social function perspective can occasionally suggest stricter
limits on state interference, not out of greater concern for individual entitlements, but out of
concern for property’s proper role as a building block of social and political life.
Despite the conventional formulation used in P1(1), such a perspective does in fact appear to
play a role at the ECtHR. A series of cases involving hunting rights provide an example of this.75 In
these cases, the Court in Strasbourg has explicitly granted stronger property protection to owners
who oppose hunting on ethical grounds, compared to owners who want to retain exclusive hunting
rights for themselves.
For the former group of owners, it has been held that the state may not compulsorily transfer
hunting rights to hunting associations for collective management.76 For the latter group of owners,
by contrast, the Court held in Chabauty v France that such transfers must be tolerated.77
For owners opposing hunting on ethical grounds, an interference with their hunting right is an
interference with their moral duty to act in accordance with their beliefs. The belief that hunting
is unethical gives the owners a personal obligation to prevent their hunting rights from being used.
that appears to be firmly based on a social function understanding of property, see generally Rhoda E Howard-
Hassmann, ‘Reconsidering the Right to Own Property’ (2013) 12(2) Journal of Human Rights 180 (including a draft
formulation of a property clause that states, among other things, that the human right to property does not apply
to corporations).
75 See Chassagnou and Others v France ECHR 1999–III 22; Hermann v Germany ECHR 2010 1110; Chabauty v
France ECHR 2012 1784.
76 See Chassagnou and Others v France (n 75); Hermann v Germany (n 75).
77 See Chabauty v France (n 75).
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If owners are deprived of their opportunity to fulfil this obligation, it changes the social function
of their property because it severs the link between the owners’ value system and the use that is
made of their property.
In Chassagnou and others v France, the Court regarded this as a particularly severe interference
in property, which could not be upheld despite the fact that it had been carried out in the public
interest to secure sustainable management of hunting rights. The Court concluded that “compelling
small landowners to transfer hunting rights over their land so that others can make use of them in
a way which is totally incompatible with their beliefs imposes a disproportionate burden which is
not justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.78
Clearly, the Court is not expressing an opinion on the ethical status of hunting. However, it
is recognised that owners are entitled to have unconventional personal convictions in this regard.
Moreover, managing one’s property in accordance with one’s convictions is recognised as part of
what it means to be an owner. Protecting this aspect of ownership appears to be more important
to the Court in Strasbourg than protecting the right of exclusion for owners who wish to keep the
fruits of the land to themselves, as demonstrated by the ruling in Chabauty.
The hunting cases also demonstrate that even when the legal system does not explicitly recognise
the value of a social function inherent in property, such a function can still come to play a role
when the Court assesses the legitimacy of interference against P1(1). This is reassuring since, as
I argue in the next section, the law of property invariably involves prioritising between different
social functions, also in situations when this is not openly acknowledged by policy makers and
judges.
78 See Chassagnou and Others v France (n 75) para 85.
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2.4.2 The Impossibility of a Socially Neutral Property Regime
Property both reflects and shapes relations of power among members of a society.79 Moreover, it
does not act uniformly in this way – the effect depends on the circumstances. Consider, for instance,
a fairly typical scenario leading to depopulation of rural areas: first, impoverished farmers and other
locals sell homes to holiday dwellers, causing house prices to soar. As a result, local people with
agrarian-related incomes cannot afford local homes, causing even more people to sell their land to
the urban middle class. In this way, a causal cycle is established, the social consequences of which
can be vicious, particularly to the low-income people who are displaced.80 This gives rise to the
following theoretical contention: setting out to regulate property in a situation like this – when
property rights pull in different directions depending on your vantage point – requires a principled
stance on whose property, and which of property’s functions, one is aiming to prioritise. Should
the law emphasise the property rights of local people who face displacement, or should it protect
the property rights of outsiders wishing to invest in holiday homes?
Some may shy away from this way of posing the question, arguing instead that it would be
better to rely on neutral rules that treat all owners the same way. In a gentrification scenario, for
instance, such an appeal to neutrality could be the first step in an argument against regulating the
property market to prevent the displacement of local people. But would that truly be a socially
neutral approach to residential property? Presumably, it would threaten the property interests of
79 This aspect of property’s social function was stressed in a recent “statement of purpose” made by leading property
scholars in support of the social function theory, see Alexander and others (n 3). For a sociological perspective on
this, see Bruce G Carruthers and Laura Ariovich, ‘The Sociology of Property Rights’ (2004) 30 Annual Review of
Sociology 23, 23 (“The right to control, govern, and exploit things entails the power to influence, govern, and exploit
people.”).
80 The general mechanism described here is well-documented and known as gentrification in human geography (often
qualified as rural gentrification when it happens outside urban areas). See generally Jan van Weesep, ‘Gentrification
as a research frontier’ (1994) 18(1) Progress in Human Geography 74; Martin Phillips, ‘Rural gentrification and
the processes of class colonisation’ (1993) 9(2) Journal of Rural Studies 123; Tom Slater, ‘The Eviction of Critical
Perspectives from Gentrification Research’ (2006) 30(4) International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 737.
For a case study demonstrating the role that state regulation can play (perhaps inadvertently) in causing rural
gentrification, see Eliza Darling, ‘The city in the country: Wilderness gentrification and the rent gap’ (2005) 37(6)
Environment and Planning A 1015, 1027-1030.
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local owners, particularly those not wishing to sell their properties.81 Hence, if their property rights
are to be protected, regulation should be put in place.
Importantly, both sides of a conflict like this are in a position to adopt a property narrative
to argue for their interests. Hence, it is also inappropriate to think that the law of property can
remain neutral. Moreover, a traditional narrative of property might fail to make sense of the ensuing
tension. Consider again the conflict between Donald Trump and the Balmedie locals, as discussed
in section 2.2. As long as Trump threatened to use compulsory purchase, the local people could
adopt a traditional “pro-property” stance against Trump. But as soon as Trump decided to fence
them in by relying on his own property rights, they had to adopt a seemingly contradictory view
on property, whereby Trump’s property rights should be limited out of concern for the community.
A traditionally minded observer might use this as an opportunity to accuse the locals of having
an unprincipled attitude towards private property.
The social function approach suggests a very different picture. The locals sought to protect
property, but not just any property. The property they wanted to protect was the property which
served the social function of sustaining the existing community. The property they wanted to
protect was the property that meant something to them.82
Trump and his supporters might well have entertained similar feelings about their property
rights, and the development they wanted to carry out. Hence, in conflicts such as these the law
will invariably have to take a stand regarding which property interests it wishes to promote. The
social function theory asks us to be upfront about this, so that policy making and adjudication in
hard cases can proceed on the basis of substantive arguments about social functions rather than
81 The threat might be more or less direct. For instance, a weakened community could reduce the values that make
the properties attractive to their current owners, while rising property prices could give rise to rising property taxes
that render this ownership unaffordable as well.
82 This is more than merely observing that they wanted to protect their property. In their desire to regulate the use
of Trump’s property, the locals also wanted to protect certain social functions inherent in that property, against
Trump’s own actions.
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unconvincing appeals to neutrality and deference.
While the law is forced to prioritise in case of conflict, social functions can also work together
in a way that promotes certain property uses and decision-making structures for property man-
agement. This can even alleviate the pressure for top-down government regulation, with desirable
consequences for both owners and the public interest.
Again, this function of property is highly dependent on context. Small business owners, by
virtue of being members of the local community, might be socially discouraged from becoming a
nuisance to their neighbours, with no need for state interventions through detailed legislation or
planning.83 However, if local owners go out of business and a non-local commercial owner replaces
them, the regulatory effect of property can change dramatically.
Indeed, if we imagine that the new owner hopes to raze the local community in order to build
a new shopping center, we are at once reminded of the stark contrasts that can arise between
various social functions of property. The property rights of small shop owners can be the lifeblood
of a community, while the exact same rights in the hands of a large enterprise can give rise to its
destruction.
Mechanisms like these can have important ramifications, not only for property, but also for the
regulatory regime surrounding its use. For instance, if a new and more commercially aggressive
owner is to be deterred from becoming a nuisance to neighbours, stricter forms of regulation might
have to be put in place.84 The social responsibility that was previously anchored in the community
must now be protected more forcefully by the state. In turn, this can cause the institution of
property to weaken further, as the government assumes greater power to interfere.85 A feedback
83 See, e.g., Robert C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press 1991)
282-283.
84 It has been argued that such a mechanism explains the advent of zoning and land use planning in the US, particularly
the Supreme Court’s willingness to accept it even though it limited the freedom of property owners. See Nadav
Shoked, ‘The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of
Property’ (2011) 28(1) Yale Journal on Regulation 91, 99-100.
85 For an early criticism of zoning in the US, pointing to the merits of a more flexible and highly decentralised approach
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effect might result, as increased regulation in turn threatens to make property ownership too
burdensome or expensive for low-income, or even average-income, community members.86 Hence,
the most resourceful actors, those who are able to deal effectively with the government, gain more
property, while the government gains more regulatory power.
The social function theory tells us that mechanisms of this kind need to be taken seriously
by legal theorists and practitioners. The broader point at stake here can also be brought out in
relation to the famous “tragedy of the commons”.87 In his seminal article, Hardin describes how
individually rational users of a commons can eventually cause the depletion of that resource. The
problem arises, according to Hardin, because individuals have no proper incentive to refrain from
over-exploitation; the damage will be distributed among all resource users, so it will not outweigh
the benefit of individual over-use in the short term.
In response, it has been typical to regard either state management or stronger individual ex-
clusion rights as the answer.88 State management is supposed to prevent over-exploitation through
regulation, while individual exclusion rights are supposed to make it more difficult for resource
users to shift the cost of over-exploitation onto other individuals.
Both of these strategies can potentially result in the sort of feedback effect discussed above,
based in large part on the law of nuisance, see Robert C Ellickson, ‘Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls’ (1973) 40(4) The University of Chicago Law Review 681.
86 In the US, the term “exclusionary zoning” is used to describe such a mechanism when zoning contributes to pushing
low-income people out of suburban, and increasingly also urban, areas. Since the zoning framework in the US is quite
decentralised, the process is often pushed forward by locally based aﬄuent home-owners who capture the zoning
power of local governments to enhance their property values, e.g., by preventing intrusive development projects
that could otherwise attract low-income people by increasing the demand for cheap labour and the supply of cheap
housing. Due to this dynamic, the feedback mechanism is amplified: the standard proposals for reform to deal with
exclusionary zoning involve further inflating the power of the government or the markets to impose large-scale
development projects against the will of local communities. See, e.g., John Mangin, ‘The new exclusionary zoning’
(2014) 25(1) Stanford Law & Policy Review 91, 117-120 (referring favourably to the standard reform suggestion,
but noting that it seems politically unrealistic to implement in the US). For a more subtle analysis, resulting in the
proposal that home-value insurance should be introduced to make home-owners less likely to pursue exclusionary
zoning, see William A Fischel, ‘An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary Effects’ (2004) 41(2)
Urban Studies 317.
87 See Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243.
88 See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge University
Press 1990) 8-13.
63
where the inadequacies of states and markets combine to make it necessary for both of them to
inflate their power at the expense of local communities. However, a cycle of dispossession is not
the inevitable outcome of the tragedy of the commons. Indeed, as Elinor Ostrom and others have
shown, the traditional narrative overlooks the fact that commons tend to come with community
structures that provide appropriate checks and balances through locally grounded management
arrangements.89 As long as external forces do not threaten them, such arrangements can be more
robust than either individual exclusion regimes or state control. Moreover, they can be anchored
in the law of property.90 I will return to this point in the next chapter, when I discuss possible
alternatives to eminent domain in economic development situations.91
2.4.3 The Descriptive Core of the Social Function Theory
Social function theorists have been criticised for making too far-reaching normative claims. Eric
Claeys, in particular, argues forcefully against normative fundamentalism and what he regards as
normative naivety among social function scholars.92 Indeed, some of these scholars have gone very
far in presenting the social function account of property as a normative theory, attaching specific
political commitments to it along the way.
Hanoch Dagan, for instance, is a self-confessed liberal who argues for a social function un-
89 See generally Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 88).
90 For the connection between property law and governance theories for common pool resources generally, see Carol
Rose, ‘Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal academy’ (2011)
5(1) International Journal of the Commons 28; Lee Ann Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’
(2011) 5(1) International Journal of the Commons 9. It is worth emphasising that this link is not only relevant
in relation to natural resources. Indeed, common pool theories have been much discussed also in the context of
intellectual property, see Rose, ‘Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American
legal academy’ (n 90) 38-43. That being said, in this thesis the focus will be on property forms that are moulded
out of land and related resources. The special questions that might arise when the theoretical framework is applied
to other forms of property will not be addressed.
91 See chapter 3, section 3.6.
92 Eric R Claeys, ‘Virtues and Rights in American Property Law’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law Review 889, 945. (“Judges
might think they are doing what is equitable and prudent. In reality, however, maybe they are appealing to a
perfectionist theory of politics to restructure the law, to redistribute property, and ultimately to dispense justice in
a manner encouraging all parties to become dependent on them.”)
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derstanding on the basis that it is morally superior. “A theory of property that excludes social
responsibility is unjust”, he writes, and goes on to argue that “erasing the social responsibility of
ownership would undermine both the freedom-enhancing pluralism and the individuality-enhancing
multiplicity that is crucial to the liberal ideal of justice”.93
If this is true, then it is certainly a persuasive argument for those who believe in a “liberal idea
of justice”. But for those who do not, or believe that property law is – or should be – as neutral
as possible on this point, a normative argument along these lines can only discourage them from
adopting a social function approach. Such a reader would be understandably suspicious that the
content of the social function theory – as Dagan understands it – is biased towards a liberal world
view. Such a reader might agree that property continuously interacts with social structures, but
reject the theory on the basis that it seems to carry with it a normative commitment to promote
liberalism.
Dagan is not alone in proposing highly normative social function theories. Indeed, most contem-
porary scholars endorsing a social function view on property base themselves on highly value-laden
assessments of property institutions.94 By contrast, the discussion in this chapter so far has aimed
to demonstrate that the theory has significant merit already as a descriptive theory. In my opin-
ion, this is also demonstrated by much of the normatively oriented work that has been done in
the social function tradition. When this work focuses on making abstract normative assertions it
threatens to overshadow what is arguably the most important insight, namely that considerations
related to social functions are already important in many areas of property law, in many different
93 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Social Responsibility of Ownership’ (2007) 92 Cornell Law Review 1255, 1259.
94 See, e.g., Gregory S Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell
Law Review 745; Colin Crawford, ‘The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish’ (2011)
80(3) Fordham Law Review 1089; Nestor M Davidson, ‘Sketches for a Hamilton Vernacular as a Social Function of
Property’ (2011) 80(3) Fordham Law Review 1053; Joseph William Singer, ‘Democratic Estates: Property Law in a
Free and Democratic Society’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell Law Review 1009; Eduardo M Pen˜alver, ‘Land Virtues’ (2009)
94(4) Cornell Law Review 821.
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jurisdictions.95 Moreover, the social functions of property, and normative assertions about them,
often play a role behind the scenes, where they do unacknowledged work among policy makers and
judges alike. As Laura Underkuﬄer puts it:
Property rules, as they now exist, are contingent rules, complex rules, and normatively
charged rules. They are crafted and applied in response to the politics of power, security,
stability, greed, and a myriad of other aspects of human life.96
Because it embraces this crucial insight, the core of the social function theory, rather than being
“good, period” as Dagan suggests, is simply more accurate than other proposals, irrespective of
one’s ethical or political inclinations.97 The theory provides the foundation for a discussion where
different values and norms can be presented in a way that is conducive to meaningful debate, on
the basis of a minimal number of hidden assumptions and implied commitments. Thus, the first
reason to accept the social function theory is epistemic, not deontic.
That is not to say that theories can ever be entirely value-neutral, nor that this should be
a goal in itself. However, a good theory is one that can at least serve as a common ground for
further discussion based on disagreement about values and priorities. Making room for normative
divergences, moreover, can hopefully diminish the worry that a broader theoretical outlook is the
first step towards unchecked state power and rule by “judicial philosopher-kings”, as Claeys puts
it.98 At the same time, the new descriptive dimensions uncovered by the social function view can
95 See, e.g., Kevin Gray, ‘Equitable Property’ (1994) 47(2) Current Legal Problems 157; Mirow, ‘Origins of the Social
Function of Property in Chile’ (n 69); Santos Cunha (n 69); Bonilla (n 69).
96 Laura S Underkuﬄer, ‘The Politics of Property and Need’ (2010) 20 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 363,
376.
97 Dagan, ‘The Social Responsibility of Ownership’ (n 93) 1259.
98 See Claeys, ‘Virtues and Rights in American Property Law’ (n 92) 944. There is further evidence to suggest that
this is a real worry. Specifically, in a recent article, Anna di Robilant discusses how the Italian fascists were happy
to embrace a social function perspective on property, because it helped them make the case that property should be
made to answer to one core collective value: the interests of the state. As a form of resistance, many Italian property
scholars agreed that the social function view was in order, but emphasised the plurality of values associated with this
vision, values that have little or nothing to do with the interests of a Fascist state. See Anna di Robilant, ‘Property:
A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?’ (2013) 66(3) Vanderbilt Law Review 869.
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also inspire novel normative perspectives, as explored in the next section.
2.5 Human Flourishing
Taking the social function theory seriously forces us to recognise that a person’s relation to property
can be partly constitutive of that person’s social and personal capabilities, both in a political and
an economic context.99 Moreover, property influences people’s preferences, as well as what paths
lie open to them when they consider their life choices.100 This effect is not limited to the owner,
it comes into play for anyone who is socially or economically connected to property in some way,
including a potentially large group of non-owners.101
Hence, there is great potential for making wide-reaching normative claims on the basis of the
social function theory. But which such claims should we be making? According to some, we should
adjust our moral compass by looking to the overriding norm of human flourishing as a guiding
principle of property law. In a recent article, Alexander goes as far as to declare that human
flourishing is the “moral foundation of private property”.102
Human flourishing has a good ring to it, but what does it mean? According to Alexander,
several values are implicated, both public and private.103 Importantly, Alexander stresses that
human flourishing is value pluralistic.104 There is not one core value that always guarantees a
99 I will explore some specific capabilities in more depth later on, when discussing economic and social rights, and
the value of participation in democracy. For the notion of a capability more generally, proposed as a foundational
concept for economic theory, see Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (North-Holland 1985). For a discussion
on the import of this work to property theory, see Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law’ (n 94) 105.
100 See generally Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 94).
101 Gregory S Alexander and Eduardo M Pen˜alver, ‘Properties of Community’ (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law
127, 128-129.
102 Gregory S Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (2014) 99(3) Iowa Law Review 1257,
1261.
103 See generally Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (n 102); Alexander, ‘Pluralism
and Property’ (n 63).
104 Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 94) 750-751.
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rewarding life. To flourish means to negotiate a range of different impulses, both internal and
external. Importantly, these act together in a social context that influences their meaning and
impact.105
In the following, I consider some values that I regard as particularly important for the study
of economic development takings. I start by the values enshrined in economic and social rights,
which should arguably also inform our understanding and application of property law.
2.5.1 Property as an Anchor for Economic and Social Rights
The so-called “second generation” of human rights consists of basic economic, social and cultural
rights that complement the better known civil and political rights.106 This includes rights such as
the right to housing, the right to food, and the right to work.107 Economic and social rights of
this kind often involve property. Specifically, they often involve interests in property that are not
recognised as ownership, e.g., housing rights for squatters or rights to food and work for landless
rural people.
If the notion of property is conceptualised in the traditional way, as an arrangement to protect
individual entitlements, the relationship between private property and economic and social rights
appears to be one filled with tension.108 In particular, if economic and social rights require owners to
give up some property entitlements, it becomes natural to portray property protection as standing
in the way of social justice.
However, the human flourishing theory can be used to tell a very different story, namely one
105 Alexander, ‘Pluralism and Property’ (n 63) 1035-1052.
106 See generally Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action
(Oxford University Press 2007) 1-14 (arguing that the “second-generation” terminology is unfortunate since it can
give rise to the misconception that ESC rights are second-class).
107 See ICESCR (n 74) art 6.
108 See, e.g., Namita Wahi, ‘The tension between property rights and social and economic rights: A case study of
India’ in Alviar Garc´ıa, Karl Helena Klare and Lucy A Williams (eds), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and
Practice: A Critical Assessment (Routledge 2014) 138.
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where economic and social rights are anchored in the notion of property itself. Importantly, the
human flourishing theory compels us to take into account the interests and needs of property
dependants other than owners. As Colin Crawford puts it, the purpose of property should be to
“secure the goal of human flourishing for all citizens within any state”.109 Consider, for instance,
the right to housing. If the interests of a property owner come into conflict with the housing rights
of a property dependant, the human flourishing theory encourages us to approach this as a tension
within property, between different property functions.
With such a starting point, we should also acknowledge that the appropriate way to approach
the rights of non-owners in relation to property might well depend on who the owner is and the
choices they make in managing their property.110 For instance, if owners live on their land and do
not own much more than they need themselves, it becomes hard to maintain the criticism that
their private property is somehow an affront to the housing rights of the landless. Moreover, from a
practical point of view, squatting is unlikely to occur in these settings unless accompanied by severe
trespass or dispossession. Similarly, the owner of a commercial building can discourage squatting
by managing the property well. Arguably, this too can undercut potential criticism on the basis
of housing rights, especially if the owner uses the building to engage in a commercial activity that
contributes to sustaining the local community.
On the other hand, if owners mismanage their properties, for instance because they seek to
obtain demolition licenses or simply wish to await an expected rise in land values, squatters might
take opportunity of this and feel encouraged to occupy the property. If private property is thought
of merely as entitlement-protection, a property-protecting state might feel obliged to respond in a
way that offends against the social and economic rights of the squatters. If this is considered an
109 Crawford (n 94) 1089.
110 See, e.g., Walt, Constitutional Property Law (n 71) 43 (commenting on the principle of “scaling” of social obligations
in German property law, whereby what can be demanded of owners depends on the context).
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undesirable outcome, the government or its critics might in turn come to regard strong property
protection as an affront to housing rights, even though the real problem is that property does
not function as it should within society. Hence, the result can be that property structures are
damaged further, as the state pursues policies of interference and centralised management, without
addressing how private property as such can promote human flourishing.
By contrast, the human flourishing narrative suggests that both owners and non-owners might
appropriately be viewed as victims if the state fails to protect property’s proper functions. This
perspective might even suggest itself when owners and non-owners would otherwise appear to be
adversaries. For a concrete example, I mention the South African case of Modderklip East Squatters
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd.111
The case dealt with squatting on a massive scale: some 400 people had initially taken up resid-
ence on land owned by Modderklip Farm, believing that it belonged to the city of Johannesburg.112
The owner attempted to have them evicted and obtained an eviction order, but the local author-
ities refused to implement it. Eventually, the settlement grew to 40 000 people and Modderklip
Farm complained that its constitutional property rights had not been respected.113
The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that Modderklip’s property rights had indeed been
violated, but noted that the housing rights of the squatters were also (in danger of) being violated;
the squatters needed a place to go before they could be evicted.114 Hence, the appropriate response
was not to evict the squatters, but to pay compensation to Modderklip, for an ongoing violation
of its property rights, caused by the state’s failure to protect housing rights.
111 See Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (2005) 5 SA 3 (CC). For two commentaries focusing
specifically on its implications for property law and theory, see Alexander and Pen˜alver, ‘Properties of Community’
(n 101); AJ van der Walt, ‘The state’s duty to protect property owners v the state’s duty to provide housing:
thoughts on the Modderklip case’ (2005) 21(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 144.
112 See Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (n 111) 4.
113 See Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (n 111) 8.
114 See Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (2004) 8 BCLR 821 (SCA) 21-26.
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This outcome is consistent with a social function understanding of property, but the rationale
behind it builds on a narrative that takes the perceived tension between property and housing
rights as its point of departure.115 The Constitutional Court, by contrast, focused on the state’s
failure to “assist Modderklip” in dealing with the “burden imposed on it to provide accommodation
to such a large number of occupiers”.116 This was a failure of governance, and the state was ordered
to pay compensation, not for a violation of property, but as an appropriate form of assistance to
Modderklip.117
This shift of perspective can arguably be understood as a reflection of the Court’s willingness
to regard the needs of the squatters as giving rise to a social obligation for Modderklip qua owner.
Effectively, the circumstances of the case meant that Modderklip’s ownership entailed an obligation
to respect the housing needs of a community of 40 000 people; the duty-bearer first in line was the
owner, not the state.
With such an approach, private property can be a potential source of justice for anyone, includ-
ing squatters. The role of the state, meanwhile, becomes that of assisting those who are directly
responsible for delivering justice on the ground, including owners such as Modderklip. In a de-
tailed analysis of the case, Alexander and Pen˜alver also argue in this direction. They suggest, in
particular, that Modderklip serves as an illustration of how property owners themselves can have
responsibilities towards property dependants, obligations that endure as long as private property
115 See Walt, ‘The state’s duty to protect property owners v the state’s duty to provide housing: thoughts on the
Modderklip case’ (n 111) 152-156. However, as van der Walt notes, the Supreme Court of Appeal took the traditional
narrative in an interesting direction when it held that the failure of the state to protect the housing rights of the
squatters was the cause of its failure to protect property. As van der Walt notes, the conflict between rights then
became less important than the observation that the state had failed in its duty to protect both rights. This is an
improvement on a narrative focused on the question of which right to prioritise, but still arguably over-emphasises
the role of the state.
116 See Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (n 111) 49.
117 For a more detailed presentation of the Court’s decision, including references to the relevant governance provision of
the South African constitution (guaranteeing access to court with suitable and efficient enforcement procedures), see
Walt, ‘The state’s duty to protect property owners v the state’s duty to provide housing: thoughts on the Modderklip
case’ (n 111) 156-158.
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remains in place.118
This normative turn makes property owners addressees of obligations arising from the economic,
social and cultural rights of non-owners, not by direct horizontal application of these rights, but
through the law of property.119 In this way, the human flourishing theory points towards a novel
way to address the rights of marginalised group.
The theory also strengthens the institution of property, highlighting why it might be appropriate
to grant it extensive protection against interference. In particular, a human flourishing approach
might serve as a bulwark against the idea that the ultimate expression of public interests can
be found in the actions taken by the state. Instead, the theory directs attention at how public
interests are expressed at their point of origin; values often associated with the public sphere, such
as those pertaining to the economic and social rights of marginalised groups, are in fact legally
relevant already at the level of private law.120 As a consequence, the human flourishing account
bolsters the view that public interests and obligations can acquire some justiciable relevance even
in the absence of explicit international treaties, legislation or equitable decision-making within
(inter)national institutions.
Perhaps the most important structural aspect of this insight concerns the mechanisms used
to resolve tensions between different property values. Importantly, it might not be necessary to
118 Alexander and Pen˜alver, ‘Properties of Community’ (n 101) 157 (“The courts’ unwillingness to ratify Modderklip’s
desire to remove the squatters from its land illustrates the courts’ willingness to take seriously the obligations of
owners, not only as they concern owners’ direct relationship with the state but also in relation to the needs of
other citizens.”). It should be noted, moreover, that Modderklip was eager to sell the land to the government. See
Modderklip East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (n 111) 61.
119 In this way, it arguably strengthens such rights, while potentially circumventing problems and objections associated
with the idea of making such rights directly justiciable in disputes among private parties. For the question of
horizontal application more generally, see Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘Non-State Actors and Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights’ in Mashood Baderin and Robert McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action
(Oxford University Press 2007). As the case of Modderklip demonstrates, embedding the duty of non-state actors
in property will serve to ensure that the state is responsible for providing assistance in cases when the burdens of
ownership become disproportionate. The duty of the state in these circumstances will be formally directed towards
the owners, even if the beneficiaries of state action will be those property dependants with respect to whom the
owners have obligations. This might prove conducive to more effective action also at the state level; presumably, the
owners as a group would make a valuably ally for the landless squatters, in cases of failed governance.
120 See also Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (n 102) 1295-1296.
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introduce intermediaries between owners and other rights holders and property dependants. To
introduce such intermediaries, whether they are state bodies, international institutions, NGOs, or
commercial enterprises, carries with it the risk that the decision-making process can be captured
by forces that either have ulterior motives or are simply too far removed from local conditions to
deliver results on basic rights.121 It might be better, therefore, if basic rights are (also) anchored
and implemented using private law solutions that target the local level, for instance by relying on
the law of property.
2.5.2 Property as an Anchor for Democracy
It is often argued that property is a crucial building block of democracy, as it both empowers and
encourages owners to participate in the political process.122 However, the notion of participation
used is often narrow, pertaining primarily to individual owners, and only to their engagement with
the formal affairs of the polity.123 By contrast, the human flourishing theory gives participation a
broader meaning, involving also the value of being included in a community. Alexander writes:
We can understand participation more broadly as an aspect of inclusion. In this sense
participation means belonging or membership, in a robust respect. Whether or not one
actively participates in the formal affairs of the polity, one nevertheless participates in
121 See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, ‘Governing the Environment without CoPs – The Case of Water’ (2013) 15 International
Community Law Review 123 (describing how non-state actors and developed countries increasingly capture the
agenda in international water policy, to the detriment of people and states in the developing part of the world);
Michael Levien, ‘Regimes of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones’ (2013) 44(2) Development
and Change 381 (analysing state-led processes of rural dispossession in India, arguing that states now often act as
land brokers for private enterprises); Lyla Mehta and others, ‘Global environmental justice and the right to water:
The case of peri-urban Cochabamba and Delhi’ (2014) 54 Geoforum 158 (two case studies, from India and Bolivia
respectively, demonstrating that elite bias and other democratic deficits at the state level have frustrated efforts to
deliver on water rights for marginalised groups in peri-urban areas).
122 See generally Rose, ‘Property as the keystone right?’ (n 24) (critically examining common arguments to support
the claim that property is the most fundamental right, including the argument that it gives rise to, facilitates,
and protects democracy). For an exposition of the converse link, explaining how property law is constrained and
determined by the values and principles associated with democracy, see Joseph William Singer, ‘Property as the
Law of Democracy’ (2014) 63 Duke Law Journal 1287.
123 Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (n 102) 1275.
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the life of the community if one experiences a sense of belonging as a member of that
community.124
Participating in a community can have a crucial influence also on people’s preferences and
desires.125 Therefore, for anyone adhering to welfarism, rational choice theory, or some other util-
itarian dogma, neglecting the importance of communities is not only normatively undesirable, it
is also unjustified in an epistemic sense. In particular, it should be recognised as a descriptive
fact that the idea of community is highly relevant to any normative theory that attempts to take
into account the preferences and desires of individuals. But Alexander and Pen˜alver go further,
by arguing that participation in a community should also be seen as an irreducibly social value,
not merely as a determinant of individual preferences and a precondition for rational choice. They
write:
Beyond nurturing the individual capabilities necessary for flourishing, communities of
all varieties serve another, equally important function. Community is necessary to create
and foster a certain sort of society, one that is characterized above all by just social
relations within it. By “just social relations”, we mean a society in which individuals
can interact with each other in a manner consistent with norms of equality, dignity,
respect, and justice as well as freedom and autonomy. Communities foster just relations
with societies by shaping social norms, not simply individual interests.126
124 Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (n 102) 1275.
125 For a more in depth discussion of this, see Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 94)
140. Here, Alexander and Pen˜alver draw on the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, see generally Amartya
Sen, Resources, Values and Development (Harvard University Press 1984); Sen, Commodities and Capabilities
(n 99); Amartya Sen, Development as freedom (1st edn, Oxford University Press 1999); Martha C Nussbaum,
Women and human development: the capabilities approach (Cambridge University Press 2000); Martha Nussbaum,
‘Capabilities and Social Justice’ (2002) 4(2) International Studies Review 123.
126 Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (n 94) 140.
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This, I believe, is a crucial aspect of participation. Moreover, it is a notion that invariably
leads us to recognise that other property dependants should also have a voice, as they form part
of the “just social relations” within the community to which the owners belong. In addition, this
is a notion of participation that it is hard, if at all possible, to incorporate in theories that take
preferences and other attributes of individuals as the basis upon which to reason about their legal
status. Instead, the human flourishing perspective asks us to consider how property serves as an
anchor for participation that shapes and influences community norms and preferences.
Protecting the function that property plays in this regard can at times require protecting it also
against the actions of owners and their communities. This can happen, for example, in a community
where people have come under pressure to sell their homes and their land to make way for large
enterprises. If owners are offered generous financial compensations, or if they are threatened by
eminent domain, economic incentives might trump the value of social inclusion and participation.
As a consequence, the community might decide to sell.
Even so, in light of the value of community, it would be in order for planning authorities, maybe
even the judiciary, to view such an agreement as an attack on their property. It is clear that by the
sale of the land, the “just social relations” inhering in the community will come under pressure.
Property rights that once contributed to sustaining these relations will be transformed into property
rights that serve a very different purpose, namely that of aiding the concentration of power and
wealth in the hands of the commercially powerful. Such a change in the social function of property
might have to be regarded – objectively speaking – as a threat to participation, community and
democracy. Therefore, it is arguable that our property institutions should protect against it, even
if this implies limiting the freedom of owners and communities to do as they please.
In Norway, a range of such rules are in place to protect agricultural property, by limiting the
owners’ right to sell parcels of their land without local government consent, as well as by compelling
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them to reside on their property and to make use of it for agricultural production.127 In addition,
there are rules in place that guarantees certain principles of non-exclusion for outfield land; the
owner of such land cannot prevent anyone from travelling over it, camping on it, and must even
tolerate that visitors pick berries and roots for their own consumption.128 This is the so-called
“allemannsretten” – the right to roam – which has been recognised in Norway since ancient times.
Importantly, the human flourishing perspective suggests that even when provisions to promote
egalitarian ownership and community commitment are appropriate, provisions that inflate the
state’s authority might not be. The case study from Norway will illustrate that strict property
rules to protect and promote self-governing agrarian communities can work well, but only as long
as they are applied consistently and coupled with strong institutions of local democracy and strict
limits on state power.129
This raises the question of what kind of institutions we need to enable local communities and
owners to flourish and make democratically legitimate decisions about how to use their properties.
Plainly, there cannot be a universal answer to this question, since institutions for participatory
decision-making are successful only when they match local conditions.130 In the final chapter of
the thesis, I reiterate this point when discuss the Norwegian institution of land consolidation.
In the next section, I apply the theory developed so far to economic development takings.
Specifically, I introduce this category of takings in more depth and present Kelo in further detail,
drawing on the social function theory to carry out an assessment of the controversy that resulted.
127 See Land Act 1995, s 8 and Land Concession Act 2003, s 4.
128 See generally Inge Lorange Backer, ‘Allemannsretten i dag’ (2007) 46(08) Lov og Rett 451.
129 I discuss the role of agrarian property to the development of Norwegian democracy in more depth in chapter 4.
130 See also the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.6 (discussing the design principles for self-governance first presented
by Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 88)).
76
2.6. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
2.6 Economic Development Takings
The notion of an economic development taking is in some sense self-explanatory: it targets situ-
ations when property is taken for economic development. However, the obvious follow-up question
is a difficult one: what is meant by “economic development”? In the literature on economic devel-
opment takings, no clear answer has been provided.131 Rather, one tends to rely on an intuitive
understanding to classify takings as being for economic development, where typical cases are those
where the decision-makers themselves emphasise the value of economic progress as a reason for
authorising eminent domain.132 The lack of clarity about what the category covers might seem like
a theoretical challenge, possibly even a weakness. However, it can also be argued that the ambi-
guity of the notion of economic development forms part of the reason why economic development
takings merit special attention in the first place.133
Some scholars still prefer not to use the notion, choosing instead to speak of “private takings”
when they discuss the legitimacy issues that arise in cases such as Kelo.134 The notion of a private
taking is very easy to define: such a taking occurs when the legal person taking title to the property
is a non-governmental actor.135 Arguably, however, this categorisation is quite unhelpful when the
aim is to get at the legitimacy issues that arise specifically in economic development situations. For
instance, it might well be that a private organisation, say a tightly regulated charity, functionally
131 See, e.g., Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Devel-
opment Takings’ (n 2) 558-567 (Cohen proposes a ban on economic development takings, comments on the difficulty
of defining the notion precisely, before proceeding to pursue his stated aim indirectly, through a ban on takings
benefiting private parties, with exceptions for certain non-profit undertakings).
132 See, e.g, Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (n 2); James W Ely,
‘Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?’ (2009) 17(1) Supreme Court Economic Review 127 (both
authors also discuss how economic development, or even commercial profit, can be an unacknowledged motive, for
instance when property is taken on the pretext of combating “blight”).
133 See Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (n 2) (arguing for a complete
ban on the “economic development rationale”, citing its vagueness as a reason why it should never be used to justify
a taking).
134 See, e.g., Abraham Bell, ‘Private Takings’ (2009) 76(2) The University of Chicago Law Review 517.
135 See Bell (n 134) 519.
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mimics a quintessential “public” taker. A public body, on the other hand, can well be functionally
equivalent to a private enterprise, particularly if there is a lack of political oversight and democratic
accountability. Imagine, for instance, a case involving a publicly owned limited liability company.
According to the simple definition of a private taking, a taking by such a company would not
meet the definition. This would be the conclusion even if the company’s interests are completely
or predominantly commercial, directed at maximising profit for the shareholders, not at providing
a public service.136
By contrast, the notion of an economic development taking points to the purpose of the taking,
not the outward legal appearance of the taker. As such, it provides a less sharp distinction between
different kinds of takings, but also seems more relevant to the question of legitimacy. Specifically,
the category performs an important function in that it directs attention at the fact that there
might be inappropriate motives influencing the decision to take private property. Moreover, the
main reason for paying particular attention to economic development takings is clear enough: the
presence of strong economic incentives, often of a commercial nature, appears to increase the risk
of eminent domain abuse.
The benefit of using a comparatively neutral and open-ended designation seems especially clear
in mixed economies, where the influence of public-private partnerships can cause a general blurring
of lines between private and public sectors.137 In such contexts, it seems particularly appropriate to
devote special attention to cases where commercial interests stand to benefit – directly or indirectly
– from a taking of private property. The presence of commercial incentives among the beneficiaries
136 Some might argue that the distinction between private and public ownership is still significant. However, such an
argument seems difficult to make independently of the social context. If a public company operates for profit and
is insulated from political decision-making and principles of administrative law, it is hard to see why takings to
benefit such a company should be regarded as a priori different from other kinds of economic development takings.
In particular, it is hard to see why it should matter in such cases whether the associated public benefit is ensured
through the payment of dividends, taxes, or some other mechanism. In any event, the public benefit will be indirect
in these cases, arising from ordinary commercial activity.
137 For the growing importance of public-private partnerships to the world economic order, see generally Ste´phane
Saussier, ‘Public–private partnerships’ (2013) 89 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 143.
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or their partners might contrast with the public spirited rationale provided to legitimise the taking.
An important advantage of a categorisation based on the notion of economic development is that it
can be used to flag cases where this contrast is present, suggesting that we should further scrutinize
the legitimacy of the undertaking as a whole.
If we broaden our perspective even further and consider commercially motivated changes in
property structures on the global stage, this perspective suggests itself with even greater force. In
fact, it seems appropriate to speak of a crisis of confidence in property, particularly in relation
to land rights, arising from how powerful commercial interests usurp proprietary power over an
increasingly large share of the world’s resources. This is the phenomenon known as land grabbing,
which has received much critical attention in recent years.138
So far, most research on land grabbing has looked at how commercial interests, often cooperating
with nation states, exploit weaknesses of local property institutions, to acquire land voluntarily, or
from those who lack formal title. However, the similarity between economic development takings
and state-aided land grabbings in favour of large commercial companies is striking. Specifically,
it has been noted that the purported public interest in economic development can be used to
justify massive land grabs that would otherwise appear unjustifiable. In a recent article, Smita
Narula cites Kelo directly and warns that procedural safeguards alone might not provide sufficient
protection against abuse. She writes:
Procedural safeguards, however, can all too easily be co-opted by a state because its
claims about what constitutes a public purpose may not be easy to contest. Partic-
ularly within the context of land investments, states could use the very general and
under-scrutinized language of “economic development” to justify takings in the public
138 See generally Saturnino M Borras and others, ‘Towards a better understanding of global land grabbing: an editorial
introduction’ (2011) 38(2) Journal of Peasant Studies 209.
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interest.139
This underscores the broader relevance of the study of economic development takings. In addi-
tion, it asks us to keep in mind that the question of what can be justified in the name of “economic
development” is a general one, not confined to particular systems for organizing property rights.140
In India, for example, people have been displaced and dispossessed on a massive scale in the
name of economic development.141 Furthermore, the state has actively used eminent domain to
enable such processes. It has been argued that the scope of eminent domain in India has become
so wide that it allows for a “complete assertion of power” by the state.142 Interestingly, the scope
of eminent domain has expanded alongside a judicial re-creation of property as a fundamental
right (the right to property was removed from the Constitution in 1978).143 However, as argued
by Allen, “the Supreme Court’s emphasis on liberal entitlement, rather than solidarity or social
obligation, is likely to deny the new right to property of relevance in cases where social justice is
paramount.”.144
139 Smita Narula, ‘The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics of Food’ [2013] (1) Stanford Journal of
International Law 140, 157.
140 To address this, and to restore confidence in the institution of property more generally, some academics and policy
makers have proposed a novel concept of property as a human right. It has been argued, in particular, that a human
right to land should be recognised on the international stage, a right that would apply even when those affected by
a land grab lack formal title. If successful, this approach promises to deliver basic protection against interference in
established patterns of property use independently of how particular jurisdictions approach property. Specifically, it
would establish an important link needed to make the kinds of property protections discussed in this thesis justiciable
in the context of land grabbing when those adversely affected lack formal title. See generally Olivier De Schutter,
‘The Emerging Human Right to Land’ 12(3) International Community Law Review 303; Olivier De Schutter, ‘The
Green Rush: the Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users’ (2011) 52(2) Harvard International
Law Journal 503; Rolf Ku¨nnemann and Sof´ıa Monsalve Sua´rez, ‘International Human Rights and Governing Land
Grabbing: A View from Global Civil Society’ (2013) 10(1) Globalizations 123.
141 See generally Levien (n 121).
142 See Philippe Cullet, Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India (Oxford University
Press 2009) 43. See also Usha Ramanathan, ‘A word on eminent domain’ in Lyla Mehta (ed), Displaced by Devel-
opment: Confronting Marginalisation and Gender Injustice (Sage 2009). For a concrete example of a case involving
displacement on a very large scale, see Philippe Cullet, ‘Human Rights and Displacement: The Indian Supreme
Court Decision on Sardar Sarovar in International Perspective’ (2001) 50(4) The International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 973.
143 See generally Tom Allen, ‘The Revival of the Right to Property in India’ [2015] Asian Journal of Comparative Law
1 (forthcoming).
144 See Allen, ‘The Revival of the Right to Property in India’ (n 143) 30.
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This underscores the broader relevance of the theoretical framework developed in the first part
of this thesis, especially the importance of emphasising the social functions of property. Moreover,
while this thesis focuses on cases when those adversely affected by the use of eminent domain have
recognised property interests, the social function perspective makes it natural to emphasise the
wider societal effects of takings, including effects on non-owners. I return to this point in chapter 3
when I present a concrete proposal for a heuristic to test the legitimacy of economic development
takings.
In the next section, I consider Kelo in more depth, to argue that strict judicial deference to
legislative and executive decision-makers is inappropriate in this regard. I focus especially on Justice
O’Connor’s dissent, which I believe suggests a stricter standard of judicial review for economic
development takings, without unduly undermining the value of deference to political decision-
makers and the executive branch.
2.6.1 Kelo: Casting Doubts on the Narrow Approach to Judicial Review
In many jurisdictions, constitutional property rules indicate, with varying degrees of clarity, that
eminent domain should only be used to take property either for “public use”, in the “public
interest”, or for a “public purpose”.145 Such a restriction can be regarded as an unwritten rule of
constitutional law, as in the UK, or it can be explicitly stated, as in the basic law of Germany.146
In some jurisdictions, for instance in the US and in Norway, explicit takings clauses exist, but do
not provide much information about the intended scope of protection.147
The question arises to what extent these clauses give the judiciary a duty and a right to
145 For instance, a “public use” formulation is used in the takings clause of the US constitution, as well as in the
Norwegian constitution, while both the “public interest” and the “public purpose” formulations (but not “public
use”) are used in the South African Constitution. See Walt, Constitutional Property Law (n 71) 462 (arguing that
while “public purpose” would traditionally have been understood more narrowly, there is no generally observed
difference between the two notions as they are now understood in South African law).
146 See JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), Expropriation Law in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 3-4.
147 See chapter 3, section 3.3 and chapter 5, section 5.2.
81
restrict the state’s power to take property. In the US, most scholars agree that some judicial
review based on the public use requirement is warranted, but there is great disagreement about
its extent.148 In Norway, on the other hand, a consensus has developed whereby the notion of
public use is interpreted so widely that it hardly amounts to a justiciable restriction on the takings
power.149 Indeed, the courts defer almost completely to the assessments made by the executive
branch regarding the purposes that may be used to justify a taking.150
As I discuss in more depth in chapter 3, section 3.3, the debate in the US has its roots in case
law developed by state courts – the federal property clause was for a long time not applied to state
takings. This has changed, and today the Supreme Court has a leading role in this area of US
law. It has developed a largely deferential doctrine, at times approaching the dismissive attitude
towards the public use limitation seen in Norway.151 The difference is that in the US, cases raising
the issue still regularly arise and prove controversial. As mentioned in the introduction to this
thesis, the most important such case in recent times was Kelo, decided by the Supreme Court in
2005.152 This case saw the public use question reach new heights of controversy in the US.153
As mentioned in the introduction, Kelo centred on the legitimacy of taking property to im-
plement a redevelopment plan that involved the construction of research facilities for the drug
company Pfizer. The homes of Suzanne Kelo and eight other home-owners stood in the way of
this plan and the city decided to use the power of eminent domain to condemn them. Kelo and
148 Compare Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Uselessness of Public Use’ (2006) 106(6) Columbia Law
Review 1412; Bell (n 134); Eric R Claeys, ‘Public-use limitations and natural property rights’ [2004] (4) Michigan
State Law Review 877; Timothy Sandefur, ‘Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path’ (2006) 10
Chapman Law Review 1.
149 See, e.g., Eirik Holmøyvik and Jørgen Aall, ‘Grunnlovsfesting av menneskerettane’ (2010) 123(2) Tidsskrift for
eiendomsrett 327, 368.
150 Holmøyvik and Aall (n 149) 368.
151 See Berman v Parker 348 US 26; Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984); Kelo v City of New
London 545 US 469 (2005).
152 Kelo (n 151).
153 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (2009) 93 Minnesota Law
Review 2100.
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the other owners protested, arguing that making room for a private research facility was not a
permissible “public use”. The owners were represented by the libertarian legal firm Institute for
Justice, which had previously succeeded in overturning similar instances of eminent domain at the
state level.154 Kelo and the other owners lost the case before the state courts, but the Supreme
Court decided to hear it and assessed its merits in great detail.
The precedent set by earlier federal cases such as Berman and Midkiff was clear: as long as the
decision to condemn was “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”, it was to be regarded
as consistent with the public use restriction.155 Moreover, the role of the judiciary in determining
whether a taking was for a public purpose was regarded as “extremely narrow”.156 It had even
been held that deference to the legislature’s public use determination was required “unless the use
be palpably without reasonable foundation” or involved an “impossibility”.157
Despite this, in the case of Kelo, the court hesitated. Part of the reason was no doubt that
takings similar to Kelo had been heavily criticised at state level, with an impression taking hold
across the US that eminent domain abuse was becoming a real problem.158 A symbolic case that
had contributed to this worry was the infamous case of Poletown.159 In this case, General Motors
had been allowed to raze a town to build a car factory, a decision that provoked outrage across the
political spectrum.160 The case was similar to Kelo in that the taker was a powerful commercial
actor who wanted to take homes. This, in particular, served to set the case apart from Midkiff,
which involved a taking in favour of tenants, and to some extent also Berman, which involved a
154 See ‘Institute of Justice’ 〈https://www.ij.org/cases/privateproperty〉 accessed 10th September 2015.
155 See Midkiff (n 151) 241; Berman v Parker (n 151).
156 Berman v Parker (n 151) 32.
157 See Old Dominion Land Co v US 269 US 55, 66 (1925); US v Gettysburg Electric R Co 160 US 668, 680 (1896).
158 See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, ‘A gleeful obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit’ (2005) 28(2) Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 651, 667-669.
159 Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit 410 Mich 616 (1981).
160 See generally Sandefur, ‘A gleeful obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit’ (n 158).
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taking of businesses (and homes) in the interest of removing blight.161 Moreover, the Michigan
Supreme Court had recently decided to overturn Poletown in the case of Hatchcock.162 Hence, it
seemed that the time had come for the Supreme Court to re-examine the public use question.163
Eventually, in a 5-4 vote, the court decided to apply existing precedent, leading it to uphold
the taking of Kelo’s home. The majority also made clear that economic development takings were
indeed permitted under the public use restriction, also when the public benefit was indirect and a
private company would benefit commercially.164 This resulted in great political controversy in the
US. According to Ilya Somin, the Kelo case ranks among the most disliked decisions in the history
of the Supreme Court.165
Importantly, many commentators emphasised that Kelo was an economic development tak-
ing.166 This category had no clear basis in the property discourse before Kelo. Indeed, in terms
of established legal doctrine, it would be more appropriate to say that the case revolved entirely
around the notion of “public use”. However, when considering the most common reasons given for
condemning the outcome in Kelo, it becomes clear why many felt it was natural to classify the case
along additional dimensions. A survey of the literature shows that many made use of a combination
of substantive and procedural arguments to paint a bleak picture of the context surrounding the
decision to take Kelo’s home. Important aspects of this include the imbalance of power between the
commercial company and the owners, the incommensurable nature of the opposing interests, the
close relationship between the company and the government, and the feeling that the public bene-
161 Berman v Parker (n 151); Midkiff (n 151).
162 Wayne County v Hatchcock 684 NW2d 765 (Michigan Supreme Court 2004).
163 See, e.g., Sandefur, ‘A gleeful obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit’ (n 158); Claeys, ‘Public-use
limitations and natural property rights’ (n 148).
164 Kelo (n 151) 469-470.
165 Ilya Somin, ‘The judicial reaction to Kelo’ (2011) 4(1) Albany Government Law Review 1, 2.
166 See, e.g., Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (n 2); Cohen, ‘Eminent
Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings’ (n 2).
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fit – while perhaps not insignificant – was made conditional on, and rendered subservient to, the
commercial benefit that would be bestowed on a commercial beneficiary.167 Plainly, the decision
to condemn in Kelo appeared to suffer from what I will refer to here as a democratic deficit.
The social function theory of property makes it natural to emphasise the worry that economic
development takings can lack democratic merit. Moreover, the theory inspires reasoning that can
justify a departure from the established doctrine of extreme deference, in favour of more substantial
judicial review. It seems to me that such a perspective was indeed adopted by the minority of the
Supreme Court in Kelo, particularly Justice O’Connor.168 She wrote a strongly worded dissent,
characterising the majority’s decision as follows:
Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the
fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those
citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including
large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has
license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The
Founders cannot have intended this perverse result.169
As demonstrated by this quote, the overarching concern raised by Justice O’Connor was that
allowing takings such as Kelo could legitimise a form of governmental interference in property that
would systematically favour the rich and powerful to the detriment of the less resourceful. In this
way, the power of eminent domain could become a tool for establishing and sustaining patterns
of inequality, under the pretence of providing an economic benefit. Hardly anyone would openly
167 See, for instance, Laura S Underkuﬄer, ‘Kelo’s moral failure’ (2006) 15(2) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
377; Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ (n 2); Sandefur, ‘Mine and
Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path’ (n 148); Cohen, ‘Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New
London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings’ (n 2); Daniel S Hafetz, ‘Ferreting out favoritism:
Bringing pretext claims after Kelo’ (2009) 77(6) Fordham Law Review 3095; Zachary D Hudson, ‘Eminent domain
due process’ (2010) 119(6) Yale Law Journal 1280.
168 Kelo (n 151) 494-505.
169 Kelo (n 151) 505.
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regard this as desirable. Indeed, one of the justices who voted with the majority, Justice Kennedy,
formulated a separate concurring opinion to emphasise that detailed, albeit deferential, judicial
scrutiny is appropriate in cases like Kelo. According to Justice Kennedy, this is needed to rule out
that the public interest in economic development is used merely as a pretext to bestow benefits on
private companies.170
The main difference between his opinion and that of Justice O’Connor does not appear to
hinge on how they interpret the meaning of public use. Rather, the crucial difference seems to
arise from the fact that Justice O’Connor is more willing to address injustices associated with
economic development takings at the systemic level. Her perspective is clearly a powerful one, at
least partially responsible also for the wide disapproval of Kelo among the public. Indeed, if Justice
O’Connor’s predictions about the systemic fallout of Kelo are correct, most would probably agree
that the result would be “perverse”.
The crucial question therefore becomes whether her predictions are warranted. In fact, the
main importance of her dissent might be that it flags this issue as a crucial one in relation to very
typical uses of eminent domain in the modern world. In light of its high level of generality, Justice
O’Connor’s dissent becomes a call for empirical work, to shed light on how economic development
takings actually come about, and how they affect political, social and bureaucratic processes. In
addition, her dissent raises the question of how to avoid negative effects, that is, how to design
rules and procedures that can help bring about desirable economic development without creating
a democratic deficit. These will be the main themes that I discuss in the remainder of this thesis.
170 See Kelo (n 151) 490-493. The form of judicial review Justice Kennedy proposes is rather weak, admitting only that
the courts have a role to play in cases when the government decision does not appear to be rationally related to a
legitimate purpose (known as rational basis review in US constitutional law).
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed a theoretical foundation for approaching the question of economic
development takings. Specifically, I suggested that a social function perspective on property is an
appropriate starting point for an analysis of such takings. Furthermore, I argued that the notion
of human flourishing provides a good template for carrying out a normative analysis of when
economic development takings are legitimate. This approach, in turn, led to an argument in favour
of a broader style of judicial review of such takings, namely one that embraces considerations based
on social justice and the ideal of democracy.
On this basis, I went on to give a preliminary analysis of economic development takings. To
make the discussion concrete, I considered the case of Kelo, which propelled the notion of an
economic development taking to the front of the takings debate in the US. I focused particularly
on the dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor, and I argued that she approached the issue in a
way that is consistent with the theoretical basis proposed in this chapter.
In the next chapter, I will continue my analysis of economic development takings, by considering
the legitimacy question in more depth. Specifically, I ask what role the law can and should play in
ensuring that the state’s power to take property is not used improperly in the context of economic
development. This will lead to two sets of broad policy recommendations for dealing with the ills
of economic development takings, targeting the diagnosis and the cure respectively.
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3 Possible Approaches to the
Legitimacy Question
3.1 Introduction
There are many ways of thinking about the legitimacy of takings. Moreover, how one chooses to
think about it is likely to depend not only on legal training, but also on more overarching visions of
society. Specifically, it seems that one’s approach to the legitimacy question will invariably depend
also on a view of the relationship between the government, the law, and the institution of private
property. To ask what imbues an act of taking with legitimacy, is to ask how this relationship
should be regulated.
This chapter considers the question of legitimacy of economic development takings on the basis
of a social function understanding of property inspired by the norm of human flourishing. To
move towards a justiciable legitimacy standard on this basis, the chapter first considers existing
approaches to judicial review, based on evidence from England and Wales, the United States, and
the European Court of Human Rights.
Specifically, the chapter starts by considering the idea that the legislature itself imbues each
instance of a taking with legitimacy, as the result of a decision made in a legitimate manner within
a democracy. This narrative has long held sway in England and Wales, giving rise to a focus on
procedural aspects, leaving little room for substantive judicial scrutiny of takings. The doctrine of
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deference has developed as an overarching norm that guide the courts when faced with controversial
takings.
The sheer size and complexity of the modern state, with its ever growing presence in the private
sphere, puts this perspective on legitimacy under strain. To some extent, it can be upheld by a
well-organised executive, compelled to remain faithful to Parliament and the ideas of democracy.
However, a threat to the stability and success of such a procedural approach can arise from the
lack of clear safeguards to protect against institutional failure and substantive abuse. If property
as an institution begins to falter, for instance because takings for profit become too prevalent,
the courts might find themselves unable to intervene on behalf of those democratic ideals that
motivate the principle of deference in the first place. This chapter will argue that recent cases of
economic development takings in England illustrate this worry, suggesting the need for substantive
approaches to legitimacy in the law.
Following up on this, the chapter goes on to consider the US, where the public use restriction is
considered to be an important substantive limitation on the government’s power to take property.
I argue that a contextual approach to the public use requirement, sensitive to local conditions and
social functions, was prevalent among the state courts in early public use cases. Moreover, I note
that there has been a resurgence of more extensive public use scrutiny after Kelo, particularly at
the state level. However, this change appears to have been largely ineffective at curbing dubious
uses of eminent domain. Specifically, it has been argued that recent reforms have been largely
symbolic: hidden within the complex arrangements of modern government, it is business more or
less as usual.1
This in turn raises the issue of how to combine the procedural and the substantive perspective
on legitimacy, to ensure that quality standards translate into effective protection. This brings me to
1 See generally Ilya Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (2009) 93 Minnesota
Law Review 2100.
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the third approach to legitimacy, which I call the institutional fairness approach. I argue that this
approach has been adopted recently by the ECtHR in Strasbourg, as the Court has developed a
system of pilot judgements to deal with its vastly increasing case load. The idea of such judgements
is that they will give the Court an opportunity to address systemic problems, to determine whether
it should order the state to take general measures to improve national institutions.
Quite apart from the practical motivation behind this development, I argue that the institu-
tional path is the way forward towards better testing for legitimacy in takings cases. It should work
well because it allows courts to adopt a middle ground between the procedural and the substantive
approach. The chapter elaborates on this claim by giving a more detailed presentation of the case
of Hutten-Czapska v Poland.2
Following up on this, the chapter considers the question of how the courts should proceed to
assess the legitimacy of economic development takings against a standard of institutional fairness.
Building on a list of conditions due to Kevin Gray, I propose a concrete heuristic for this purpose.
In addition to the original points made by Gray, I add three of my own, inspired by the discussion
in this and the previous chapter.
Admittedly, a legitimacy test can never provide more than a partial solution to the legitimacy
problem. Specifically, if the desire for economic development is a genuine reflection of democratic
decision-making, the follow-up question should be how to better enable the collective to commu-
nicate this desire to private owners, preferably without resorting to eminent domain. I address
that question by looking to the governance theory of common pool resources, developed by Elinor
Ostrom and others. I argue that the connection between their theories and property law suggests a
need for new institutions that will allow the collective to push for economic development on private
land without negating property rights.
Such a proposal has already been made by Heller and Hills, who recommends that so-called
2 See Hutten-Czapska v Poland ECHR 2006–VIII 628.
91
Land Assembly Districts should be used to replace eminent domain in many economic development
scenarios.3 I analyse the proposal in some depth and argue that Land Assembly Districts are not
the final answer to the legitimacy question for economic development takings. Specifically, I note
the underlying tension between the ideal of self-governance and the fear of abuse by local elites,
highlighting the need for institutions that are more closely matched to local conditions.
3.2 England and Wales: Legitimacy through Parliament
In England and Wales, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the lack of a written constitu-
tional property clause has led to expropriation being discussed mostly as a matter of administrative
law and property law, not as a constitutional issue.4 Moreover, the use of compulsory purchase –
the term used to denote takings in the UK – is not restricted to particular purposes as a matter of
principle.5 The uses that can justify taking property by compulsion are those uses that Parliament
regard as worthy of such consideration.6 However, as private property has typically been held in
high regard, the power of compulsory purchase has traditionally been exercised with caution.7
In his Commentaries, William Blackstone famously described property as the “third absolute
right, inherent in every Englishman”.8 Moreover, Blackstone expressed a very restrictive view
3 See Michael Heller and Rick Hills, ‘Land Assembly Districts’ (2008) 121(6) Harvard Law Review 1465.
4 See generally Michael Taggart, ‘Expropriation, Public Purpose and the Constitution: Essays on public law in honour
of Sir William Wade’ in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord
(Oxford University Press 1998).
5 See Tom Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (Cambridge University Press 2000) 201;
Emma JL Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (PhD Thesis, 2009) 48-49.
6 According to Reynolds, the idea that Parliament (as opposed to various local authorities) was the key legitimising
force behind takings gained ground in England from the 16th century onwards, see Susan Reynolds, Before Eminent
Domain: Toward a History of Expropriation of Land for the Common Good (Studies in Legal History, University
of North Carolina Press 2010) 41-42.
7 See Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 15; Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact
of Private Takings’ (n 5) 47-48. However, there has never been anything like a complete aversion to expropriation, see
Reynolds, Before Eminent Domain (n 6) 34-46; Julian Hoppit, ‘Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights
in Britain, 1688–1833’ (2011) 210(1) Past & Present 93, 126-128 (pointing out that compulsory purchase grew
dramatically in scope after the glorious revolution in 1688).
8 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1: A Facsimile of the First Edition of
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on the appropriateness of expropriation, pointing out that it was only the legislature that could
legitimately interfere with property rights. He warned against the dangers of allowing private indi-
viduals, or even public tribunals, to be the judge of whether or not the common good could justify
takings. Blackstone went as far as to say that the public good was “in nothing more essentially
invested” than the protection of private property.9
In terms of historical accuracy, Blackstone’s claims about the sanctity of property in England
and Wales appear questionable. Specifically, it has been argued that his description of property
might be shaped not so much by evidence as by political values gaining ground among the bour-
geoisie after the decline of the feudal system.10 That said, it should not be forgotten that the
conferral of compulsory purchase powers did require parliamentary involvement on a case-by-case
basis, often through so-called private Acts, granting compulsory purchase powers to specific legal
persons.11 Arguably, this practice reflects that takings of private property, although far from un-
heard of, were indeed considered draconian.12
Interestingly, the procedure followed by Parliament in takings cases often resembled a judicial
procedure; the interested parties were given an opportunity to present their case to Parliament
committees that would then effectively decide whether or not compulsion was warranted.13 On
the one hand, the direct involvement of Parliament in the decision-making arguably marks a fun-
1765–1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979) 134-135. The first right, according to Blackstone, is security, while
the second is liberty.
9 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume 1: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765–1769 (n 8)
134-135.
10 See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 34-35 (describing Blackstone’s account as
giving rise to a “myth”); Hoppit (n 7) 121 (noting the tension in Blackstone’s own account of property, which also
acknowledged that parliament frequently interfered with private property).
11 See William D McNulty, ‘The Power of “Compulsory Purchase” under the Law of England’ (1912) 21(8) The Yale
Law Journal 639, 43-46; Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 204; Waring, ‘Aspects
of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 104-116.
12 Moreover, it is noteworthy how much weight was consistently placed on the right to compensation, also when
Parliament sanctioned the taking, see Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 15.
13 See Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 13-16; Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The
Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 105-106.
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damental, albeit conditional, respect for property rights.14 But at the same time, parliamentary
sovereignty meant that the question of legitimacy was rendered mute as soon as compulsory pur-
chase powers had been granted. The courts were not in a position to scrutinize takings at all, much
less second-guess Parliament as to whether or not a taking was for a legitimate purpose.15
During the late 18th and and early 19th century, as an industrial economy developed, private
Acts grew massively in scope and importance.16 Railway companies, in particular, regularly be-
nefited from such Acts.17 During this time, the expanding scope of private-to-private transfers for
economic development led to high-level political debate and controversy.18 There would often be
particular opposition coming from the House of Lords. This opposition was not only based on a
desire to protect individual property owners, but also tended to reflect concerns about the cultural
and social consequences of changed patterns of land use.19
Hence, the early political debate on economic development takings in the UK shows some
reflection of a social function approach to property protection. At the same time, as society changed
following increasing industrialisation, a more expansive approach to compulsory purchase would
eventually emerge as the norm.20 The idea that economic development could justify takings became
less controversial.
Today, the law of compulsory purchase is regulated in statute. Hence, Parliament rarely gets
14 See Hoppit (n 7) 103.
15 See, e.g., McNulty (n 11) 643; Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 107.
16 See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 108-112; Hoppit (n 7) 100-101.
17 See RW Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism (Clarendon Press 1994) 144.
18 See Kostal (n 17) 144; Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 204.
19 Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 204-205.
20 Arguably, the social function perspective helps explain why this happened. Indeed, the expanded use of private
takings in England during the 19th century, particularly in connection with the railways, might have served a more
easily justifiable social function than that commonly associated with economic development takings today. Waring,
in particular, notes how railway takings tended to affect aristocratic landowners rather than marginalised groups
(“unlike private takings today, the railway legislation was most likely to affect those who could best defend their
property rights from attack”), see Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 111.
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involved on a case-by-case basis and the role of the courts is largely limited to the application and
interpretation of statutory rules.21 With respect to the question of legitimacy, the starting point
for the courts is that this is a matter of ordinary administrative law.22 More recently, the Human
Rights Act 1998 adds to this picture, since it incorporates the property clause in P1(1) into the
law. Even so, the usual approach in England and Wales is to judge objections against compulsory
purchase orders on the basis of the statutes that warrant them, rather than constitutional principles
or human rights provisions that protect property.23 It is typical for statutory authorities to include
standard reservations to the effect that some societal benefit must be identified in order to justify
a compulsory purchase order, but the scope of what constitutes a legitimate purpose can be very
wide. For instance, to justify a taking under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, it will
generally suffice to argue that it will “facilitate the carrying out of development, redevelopment or
improvement on or in relation to the land”.24
While various governmental bodies are authorised to issue compulsory purchase orders (CPOs),
a CPO typically has to be confirmed by a government minister.25 The affected owners are given
a chance to comment, and if there are objections, a public inquiry is typically held. The inspector
responsible for the inquiry then reports to the relevant government minister, who makes the final
decision about whether or not it should be granted, and on what terms. The CPO may later be
challenged in court, but then on the basis of the statute authorising it, not on the basis of whether
21 See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 116-121. Some common law rules still play
an important role, such as the Pointe Gourde rule, which stipulates that changes in value due to the compensation
scheme itself should be disregarded when calculating compensation to the owner. The rule takes it name the case of
Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago)
[1947] UKPC 71. See also the discussion in chapter 5, section 5.5.3.
22 See Taggart (n 4).
23 See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 121-132.
24 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 226.
25 See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 48.
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or not the purpose is legitimate as such.26
That said, the idea that property may only be compulsorily acquired when the public stands to
benefit permeates the system.27 Indeed, this has also been regarded as a constitutional principle,
for instance by Lord Denning in Prest v Secretary of State for Wales.28 Moreover, in R v Secretary
of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild, Slade LJ spoke of “a warning that, in cases where a
compulsory purchase order is under challenge, the draconian nature of the order will itself render
it more vulnerable to successful challenge”.29
In keeping with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, this warning targets judicial review
of administrative decision-making, not legislation. Despite this limitation, the English approach
to legitimacy has traditionally proved quite effective in preventing controversy from arising with
respect to the use of eminent domain.30 An underlying respect for private property, superseded
only by respect for the authority of Parliament, appears to have influenced the decision-making
framework and the surrounding administrative practices. Specifically, legitimacy has been pur-
sued through legislation, regulation, and administrative practice, leaving less room for substantive
judicial scrutiny.31
However, England and Wales have also seen controversial economic development takings chal-
26 See Waring, ‘Aspects of Property: The Impact of Private Takings’ (n 5) 48-49. The typical way to launch an attack
on a taking would be to argue that it serves a purpose that falls outside the scope of the statute authorising it, or,
more subtly, that the administrative decision-maker took irrelevant purposes into account when granting the power.
27 It should be emphasised that this idea is not traditionally anchored in any fixed interpretation of terms like “public
interest” or “public purpose”, much less “public use”. The starting point is statutory interpretation, not independent
judicial scrutiny of whether the purpose of compulsory purchase is sufficiently “public” according to some general
standard, see Allen, The Right to Property in Commonwealth Constitutions (n 5) 20-24.
28 See Prest v Secretary of State for Wales (1982) 81 LGR 193, 198 (“I regard it as a principle of our constitutional law
that no citizen is to be deprived of his land by any public authority against his will, unless it is expressly authorised
by Parliament and the public interest decisively so demands.”).
29 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p de Rothschild (1989) 1 All ER 933 (CA) 938.
30 See generally Tom Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention
on Human Rights’ (2010) 59(04) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1055.
31 For a more detailed analysis of how this works, noting, among other things, that higher levels within the executive
are also meant to act as safeguards of private property, filling – to some extent – the possible role of courts in this
regard, see Tom Allen, ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative View’ in
Robin Paul Malloy (ed) (Ashgate 2008) 85-100.
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lenged in the courts. Indeed, such cases appear to have become more frequent.32 For instance, in
the case of Alliance, many properties were taken in order to facilitate the construction of a new
stadium for the football club Arsenal.33 Some owners who stood to lose their business premises
protested on the basis that the purpose was dubious, pointing also to the fact that the inspector
in charge of the public inquiry had recommended against the takings.34 Their arguments also in-
voked P1(1) of the ECHR, to overcome the limitations of traditional judicial review in England
and Wales. However, these argument were all quite summarily rejected by the Court.35
Arguably, the Alliance case reflects a weakness of the English approach to legitimacy. This
weakness, moreover, appears to go beyond whatever doubts one might have about the principle
of parliamentary sovereignty applied to property as a constitutional and human right. Specifically,
if the framework laid down by Parliament greatly empowers the administrative branch, while
failing to appropriately regulate administrative practices, the deference due to Parliament might
effectively become undue deference to the executive branch. If the practice of using compulsory
purchase continues to expand in relation to for-profit undertakings, there appears to be a significant
risk of abuse associated with broad powers granted to the executive to take property for economic
development. If there is also a change of perspective on the role of private property in society,
moving away from the reverent attitude expressed by Blackstone, there appears to be a lack of
other sources for legitimacy in a system so reliant on a narrative of pure procedure.
To some extent, it would be possible for the Supreme Court to develop a more restrictive
stance on compulsory purchase to address this, within the established constitutional order. In fact,
there are some signs that this might be about to happen, specifically with respect to the broad
32 See generally Kevin Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ in Susan Bright (ed), Modern studies in property law: Volume 6
(Hart Publishing 2011).
33 Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State [2005] EWHC 18 (Admin).
34 Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State (n 33) 6-7.
35 See Alliance Spring Co Ltd v The First Secretary of State (n 33) 6-7. For a critical discussion, describing the Court’s
assessment against P1(1) as “worryingly brief”, see Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 26.
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powers granted under section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. In the case of R
(Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council, Lord Walker cited Kelo and went
on to comment that “economic regeneration brought about by urban redevelopment is no doubt a
public good, but “private to private” acquisitions by compulsory purchase may also produce large
profits for powerful business interests, and courts rightly regard them as particularly sensitive”.36
However, the outcome of Sainsbury also underscores the weaknesses of an indirect approach
to legitimacy through administrative law. Instead of relying on Lord Walker’s observations about
the sensitivity of economic development takings, the majority of the Court quashed the CPO on
the basis of a more conventional approach to statutory interpretation. Specifically, the majority
found that the local government had erred when it took into account promises that the taker
had made regarding a regeneration project in a different part of town. This was regarded as
contravening section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which only directs attention
at the potential for improvements on or in relation to “the land”, i.e., the land that is subject to
compulsory purchase. The reasoning behind the decision, therefore, rests largely on a technicality,
not any substantive assessment of legitimacy.
On a more purposive assessment, the taking in Sainsbury should arguably have been upheld:
the owner and the taker were both large commercial companies, they had shared ownership of
the disputed development site, they both wanted to develop at the expense of the other party,
and the taker appeared to have the best overall plan for the community. Ironically, the English
approach resulted in such a taking being struck down as illegitimate, while the taking in Alliance,
involving the displacement of local people in favour of a football club, received little or no scrutiny
at all. In light of this, it seems that alternatives to the traditional idea of legitimacy should be
considered, at least if one agrees with Lord Walker’s characterisation of economic development
36 See R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council [2010] UKSC 20, (2010) 1 AC 437, 82.
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takings as “particularly sensitive”.37
3.3 The US: Legitimacy through Public Use
By contrast to the situation in England and Wales, the US Constitution is a basis for judicial
review also with respect to the federal and state legislatures. Considering its status as a basis for
potentially extensive review, the Constitution is remarkably terse. The takings clause, arriving as
the final clause of the Fifth Amendment, reads simply “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation”.38
The compensation requirement is clearly stated, if embryonic, but the takings clause is also
understood to include the requirement that property may only be taken for “public use”. This is
the aspect of the clause that interests me in this thesis, since it provides an anchor for legitimacy
that is particularly relevant – and contentious – in relation to economic development takings.39
Specifically, the question is to what extent such takings offend against the clause: is a taking for
economic development by a commercial company really a taking for “public use”?
Going back to the time when the Fifth Amendment was introduced, there is not much historical
evidence explaining why the takings clause was included in the Bill of Rights. Moreover, there is
little in the way of guidance as to how the takings clause was originally understood. James Madison,
who drafted it, commented that his proposals for constitutional amendments were intended to be
uncontroversial.40 Hence, it is natural to regard the takings clause as a codification of an existing
37 See R (Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd) v Wolverhampton City Council (n 36) 82.
38 See the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution 1791.
39 At least this is so on a social function understanding of legitimacy. For an in-depth discussion of the compensation
requirement applied to economic development takings, arguing that the compensatory viewpoint does not get to the
heart of the legitimacy question, see Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘On the compensatory approach to economic development
takings’ in Bjo¨rn Hoops and others (eds), The Context, Criteria, and Consequences of Expropriation (forthcoming,
Ius Commune 2016).
40 See letters from Madison to Edmund Randolph dated 15 June 1789 and from Madison to Thomas Jefferson dated
20 June 1789, both included in James Madison, The papers of James Madison, vol. 12, 2 March 1789–20 January
1790 and supplement 24 October 1775–24 January 1789 (Charles F Hobson and Robert A Rutland eds, University
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principle, not a novel proposal. Indeed, several state constitutions pre-dating the Bill of Rights also
included takings clauses, seemingly based on codifying principles from English common law.41
Just like English scholars at the time, early American scholars emphasised the importance of
private property. James Kent, for instance, described the sense of property as “graciously implanted
in the human breast” and declared that the right of acquisition “ought to be sacredly protected”.42
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself expressed similar sentiments early on, when it spoke of the
impossibility of passing a law that “takes property from A and gives it to B”.43
However, just as in England, this early US attitude changed in response to industrial advances
and a desire for economic development. As the 19th century progressed, eminent domain was used
more frequently, now also to benefit (privately operated) railroad operations, hydroelectric projects,
and the mining industry.44 During this time, it also became increasingly common for landowners
to challenge the legitimacy of takings in court, undoubtedly a consequence of the fact that eminent
domain was used more widely, for new kinds of projects.45
Controversy over the public use requirement arose particularly often with respect to the so-
called mill Acts.46 Such Acts were found throughout the US, many of them dating from pre-
industrial times when mills were primarily used to serve the farming needs of agrarian communit-
ies.47 Following economic and technological advances, provisions originally enacted to serve local
Press of Virginia 1979).
41 See Emily A Johnson, ‘Reconciling Originalism and the History of the Public Use Clause’ (2011) 79 Fordham Law
Review 265, 299.
42 See see James Kent, Commentaries on American law (1st edn, Commentaries on American Law, vol 2, O Halsted
1827) 257.
43 This was a de dicta in Calder v Bull 3 US 386, 388 (1798). See also Vanhorne’s Lessee v Dorrance 2 US 304, 310
(1795).
44 Errol Meidinger, ‘The ’Public Uses’ of Eminent Domain: History and Policy’ (1980) 11 Environmental Law 1, 23-33.
45 Meidinger (n 44) 24.
46 Meidinger (n 44) 24. See also Johnson (n 41) 306-313 and Morton J Horwitz, ‘The Transformation in the Conception
of Property in American Law, 1780-1860’ (1973) 40 University of Chicago Law Review 248, 251-252.
47 A total of 29 states had passed mill Acts, with 27 still in force, when a list of such Acts was compiled in Head
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farming purposes were now being used by developers wishing to harness hydropower for manufac-
turing and hydroelectric plants.48
It is important to note, however, that mill Acts could not be used to authorise large-scale
compulsory transfers of natural resources from owners to non-owners.49 Rather, mill Acts provided
management tools that could be used to ensure that owners of water resources could make better
use of their rights. This would sometimes involve allowing riparian owners to interfere with, or take
a necessary part of, the property of their neighbours, e.g., by constructing dams that would flood
neighbouring land.50 However, the primary purpose was to facilitate rational coordination among
owners, to the benefit of their community as a whole. This point was frequently made by courts
that upheld mill Act takings, also when such takings would benefit the manufacturing industry.51
More generally, case law on public use from the state courts at this time was characterised by a
highly contextual understanding of property protection and the meaning of public use.52 Arguably,
the case law on public use from the states even deserves to be categorised as an early example of
a legitimacy approach based on a social function understanding of property. Initially, it was also
well received by the Supreme Court, as discussed below.
v Amoskeag Mfg Co 113 US 9, 17 (1885). According to Justice Gray, at pages 18-19 in the same, the “principal
objects” for early mill Acts had been grist mills typically serving local agrarian needs at tolls fixed by law, a purpose
which was generally accepted to ensure that they were for public use.
48 See, e.g., Head (n 47) 18-21 and Minnesota Canal & Power Co v Koochiching Co 97 Minn 429, 449-452 (1906).
49 See the discussion in Head (n 47).
50 See, e.g., Abram P Staples, ‘The Mill Acts’ (1903) 9(4) The Virginia Law Register 265, 265.
51 See, e.g., Fiske v Framingham Mfg Co 12 Pick 68 (1831). See also the discussion (including references to other cases)
in Head (n 47).
52 See, e.g, Scudder v Trenton Delaware Falls Co 1 NJ Eq 694 (1832) (taking upheld, but said that “the great principle
remains that there must be a public use or benefit. That is indispensable. But what that shall consist of, or how
extensive it shall be to authorize an appropriation of private property, is not easily reducible to a general rule.”);
Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co v Seawell 11 Nev 394, 409 (1876) (taking for a mineral company upheld on the
basis that mining was the “greatest of the industrial pursuits” in the state of Nevada and that the benefits of the
industry were “distributed as much, and sometimes more, among the laboring classes than with the owners of the
mines and mills.”); Ryerson v Brown 35 Mich 333, 337 (1877) (taking struck down, by a state court that was “not
disposed to say that incidental benefit to the public could not under any circumstances justify an exercise of the
right of eminent domain.”. See also Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) (with many references to state courts
striking down takings as impermissible).
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3.3.1 Legitimacy as Discussed by the Supreme Court
With respect to takings ordered by the federal government, the Supreme Court never showed much
willingness to enforce a strict public use requirement.53 In United States v Gettysburg Electric
Railway Co, a case from 1896, deference to the legislature in federal takings cases was referred
to as a principle that should be observed unless the judgement of the legislature was “palpably
without reasonable foundation”.54
Importantly, however, such a deferential stance was not adopted in cases originating from the
states.55 In Cincinatti v Vester, a case from 1930, the Supreme Court commented that “it is
well established that, in considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of
expropriation of private property, the question what is a public use is a judicial one”.56
In the earlier case of Hairston v Danville & W R Co, from 1908, the same was expressed by
Justice Moody, who surveyed the state case law and declared that “the one and only principle in
which all courts seem to agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately
a judicial question.”57 Justice Moody continued by describing in more depth the typical approach
of the state courts in determining public use cases:
The determination of this question by the courts has been influenced in the different
states by considerations touching the resources, the capacity of the soil, the relative
53 However, for a long time, federal takings were of limited practical significance since the common practice was that
the federal government would rely on the states to condemn property on its behalf, see Meidinger (n 44) 30. This
changed towards the end of the 19th century, particularly following the decision in Trombley v Humphrey, where
the Supreme Court of Michigan struck down a taking that would benefit the federal government, see Trombley v
Humphery 23 Mich 471 (1871).
54 US v Gettysburg Electric R Co 160 US 668, 680 (1896).
55 Originally, the Supreme Court had held that the takings clause in the US Constitution did not apply to state takings
at all, see Barron v City of Baltimore 32 US 243 (1833). However, this changed after the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was introduced after the Civil War, see, e.g., Head (n 47). Later, in 1897, the Supreme
Court held that state takings could be scrutinized directly against the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, see
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co v City of Chicago 166 US 226 (1897).
56 City of Cincinnati v Vester 281 US 439, 447 (1930).
57 Hairston v Danville & W R Co 208 US 598, 606 (1908).
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importance of industries to the general public welfare, and the long-established methods
and habits of the people. In all these respects conditions vary so much in the states
and territories of the Union that different results might well be expected.58
Justice Moody goes on to give a long list of cases illustrating this aspect of state case law,
showing how assessments of the public use issue had been inherently contextual.59 Following up
on this, he points out that “no case is recalled” in which the Supreme Court overturned “a taking
upheld by the state court as a taking for public uses in conformity with its laws” (my emphasis).
After making clear that situations might still arise where the Supreme Court would not follow
state courts on the public use issue, Justice Moody goes on to conclude that the cases cited “show
how greatly we have deferred to the opinions of the state courts on this subject, which so closely
concerns the welfare of their people”.60
Hairston is important for three reasons. First, it makes clear that initially, the deferential stance
in cases dealing with state takings was primarily directed at state courts rather than legislatures
and administrative bodies. Second, it demonstrates federal recognition of the fact that a consensus
had emerged in the states, whereby scrutiny of the public use determination was consistently
regarded as a judicial task.61 Third, it provides a valuable summary of the contextual approach to
the public use test that had developed at the state level.
The Hairston Court clearly looked favourably on the case law from state courts. Importantly,
when a deferential stance was adopted, this was clearly contingent on the assumption that state
courts would continue to administer the public use test with the required vigour. Despite this,
Hairston would later be cited as an early authority in favour of almost unconditional deference to
58 Hairston v Danville & W R Co (n 57) 606.
59 Hairston v Danville & W R Co (n 57) 607.
60 Hairston v Danville & W R Co (n 57) 606.
61 Indeed, Hairston provides the authority for Vester on this point. See City of Cincinnati v Vester (n 56) 606.
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legislators.62
This happened in US ex rel Tenn Valley Authority v Welch, concerning a federal taking.63
The Court first cited US v Gettysburg Electric R Co as an authority in favour of deference with
regards to the public use limitation.64 The Court then paused to note that Vester later relied on
a conflicting view, namely that the public use test was a judicial responsibility.65 The Court then
attempts to undercut this by setting up a contrast between Vester and Hairston, by selectively
quoting the observation made in the latter case that the Supreme Court had never overruled the
state courts on the public use issue.66 Hence, Hairston is effectively used to argue against judicial
scrutiny, in a manner that is quite incommensurate with the full rationale behind the Court’s
decision in that case.
Later, Welch was used as an authority in the case of Berman v Parker.67 This case concerned
condemnation for redevelopment of a partly blighted residential area in the District of Colombia,
which would also condemn a non-blighted department store. In a key passage, the Court states
that the role of the judiciary in scrutinizing the public purpose of a taking is “extremely narrow”.68
The Court provides only two references to previous cases to back up this claim, one of them being
Welch.69
62 In fact, it was cited in this way also by the majority in Kelo, see Kelo v City of New London 545 US 469, 482-483
(2005).
63 US ex rel Tenn Valley Authority v Welch 327 US 546, 552 (1946).
64 US v Gettysburg Electric R Co (n 54).
65 City of Cincinnati v Vester (n 56).
66 See US ex rel Tenn Valley Authority v Welch (n 63) 552.
67 Berman v Parker 348 US 26.
68 Berman v Parker (n 67) 32.
69 The other case, Old Dominion Land Co v US, concerned a federal taking of land on which the military had already
invested large sums in buildings. The Court commented on the public use test by saying that “there is nothing
shown in the intentions or transactions of subordinates that is sufficient to overcome the declaration by Congress
of what it had in mind. Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility. But the
military purposes mentioned at least may have been entertained and they clearly were for a public use”, see Old
Dominion Land Co v US 269 US 55, 66 (1925). A partial quote, to the effect that deference to the legislature is
in order except when it involves an “impossibility”, was used to justify the decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v
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Moreover, both of the cases cited were concerned with federal takings, while in Berman the
Court explicitly says that deference is due in equal measure to the state legislature.70 It is possible
to regard this merely as a dictum, since the District of Columbia is governed directly by Congress.
However, Berman was to have a great impact on future cases. In effect, it undermined a large body
of case law on judicial review of takings without engaging with it at all.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, the Supreme Court further entrenched the principle
expressed in Berman.71 Here the state of Hawaii had made use of eminent domain to break up an
oligopoly in the housing sector. Given the circumstances of the case, it would have been natural
to argue in favour of this taking on the basis that it served a proper public purpose.
However, the Court instead decided to rely on the doctrine of deference, shunning away from
scrutinizing the takings purpose. Justice O’Connor, in particular, observed that “judicial deference
is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public
purposes should be advanced by an exercise of eminent domain”.72
Effectively, what had been a doctrine of deference to state courts had now transformed into a
doctrine of deference to state legislatures. In light of this, it had to be expected that Kelo would
be decided in favour of the taker.73 However, the history of the public use requirement tells us
that this was not inevitable. Hence, the question arises whether legitimacy can be increased by
reviving the public use test. The next section sheds some light on this, on the basis of legislative
developments in the US after Kelo.
Midkiff 467 US 229, 240 (1984).
70 Berman v Parker (n 67) 32.
71 Midkiff (n 69).
72 Midkiff (n 69) 244.
73 In fact, as pointed out by Somin, the Kelo case represents a slight tightening of the earlier line on public use. See Ilya
Somin, ‘Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’ English (2007) 15(1) Supreme
Court Economic Review 183.
105
3.3.2 Economic Development Takings after Kelo
Following Kelo, much attention was directed at the danger of eminent domain abuse in the US.74
Moreover, the Kelo decision itself proved extremely unpopular. Surveys suggest that about 80-90
% of the general population believe that it was wrongly decided, an opinion widely shared also
among members of the political elite.75
Many states responded by introducing reforms aimed at limiting the use of eminent domain
for economic development.76 Within two years, 44 states had passed post-Kelo legislation in an
attempt to achieve this.77 Various legislative techniques were adopted. Some states, including
Alabama, Colorado and Michigan, enacted explicit bans on economic development takings and
takings that would benefit private parties.78 In South Dakota, the legislature went even further,
banning the use of eminent domain “(1) For transfer to any private person, nongovernmental entity,
or other public-private business entity; or (2) Primarily for enhancement of tax revenue”.79
In other states, more indirect measures were taken, such as in Florida, where the legislature
enacted a rule whereby property taken by the government could not be transferred to a private
party until 10 years after the date it was condemned.80 Many states also introduced lists of uses
that were to count as public, designed to restrict the room for administrative discretion while
74 See generally Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1).
75 Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2109.
76 For an overview and critical examination of the myriad of state reforms that have followed Kelo, I point to Steven J
Eagle and Lauren A Perotti, ‘Coping with Kelo: A potpourri of legislative and judicial responses’ (2008) 42(4) Real
Property, Probate and Trust Journal 799. See also Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo’ (n 1).
77 See ‘50 State Report Card’ (Castle Coalition, 2015) 〈http://castlecoalition.org/50- state- report- card〉 accessed
17th July 2015.
78 See Eagle and Perotti (n 76) 107-108.
79 South Dakota Codified Laws § 11-7-22-1, amended by House Bill 1080, 2006 Leg, Reg Ses (2006).
80 Eagle and Perotti (n 76) 809.
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allowing condemnations for purposes that were regarded as particularly important.81
These reforms show that Kelo had a great effect on the discourse of eminent domain in the
US. However, the effect on the law has been less clear. According to Somin, most state reforms
have been ineffective.82 Even when seemingly strict rules have been introduced, it is typically
easy for the government to carry out economic development takings as before, provided these
takings are not referred to as economic development takings, but described in some other vague
manner, e.g., as removal of “blight”.83 At the same time, property lawyers report a greater feeling
of unease regarding the correct way to approach the public use requirement, expressing hope that
the Supreme Court will soon revisit the issue.84
Why have legislative reforms proved inadequate? Part of the reason, according to Somin, is that
people are “rationally ignorant” about the economic takings issue.85 For most people, it is unlikely
that eminent domain will come to concern them personally or that they will be able to influence
policy in this area. Hence, it makes little sense for them to devote much time to learn more about
it. This, in turn, helps create a situation where experts can develop and sustain a system based on
practices that a majority of citizens actually oppose.86 To back up this analysis, Somin points out
that surveys seem to show that people generally overestimate the effectiveness of eminent domain
reform, by mistaking symbolic measures for materially significant changes in the law.87
Arguably, this also shows that the legislative approach so far, which has focused on introducing
81 Eagle and Perotti (n 76) 804.
82 Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2170-2171.
83 See Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2170-2171.
84 See MM Murakami, BCK Ace and RH Thomas, ‘Recent developments in eminent domain: Public use’ (2013) 45(3)
Urban Lawyer 809 (“Until the Supreme Court revisits the issue, we predict that this question will continue to plague
the lower courts, property owners, and condemning authorities.”).
85 See Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2170.
86 Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2163-2171.
87 Somin, ‘The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ (n 1) 2155-2157.
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more elaborate and detailed versions of the public use restriction, need to be supplemented by
different kinds of proposals. Specifically, it seems important to also target the structural processes
that result in the taking of private land for economic development. After all, it is when we direct
attention at the decision-making involved in bringing about actual takings that we will locate those
stakeholders who cannot afford to remain rationally ignorant about eminent domain.
This points towards another perspective on legitimacy, whereby focus shifts towards the insti-
tutional setting where the relevant decisions are made. Importantly, cases such as Kelo suggest
that this needs to involve more than administrative law and ideas about procedural due process.
Specifically, institutional legitimacy appears to have an important substantive component whereby
a decision is legitimate only in so far as it results from democratically legitimate decision-making
within an administrative framework that is generally conducive to fair and proportional outcomes.
Arguably, recent developments at the ECtHR point towards a perspective on legitimacy that em-
phasises this interconnectedness between substantive and procedural aspects of fairness at the
institutional level.
3.4 The ECtHR: Legitimacy as Institutional Fairness
It is often said that the P1(1) of the ECHR consists of three rules. The first rule guarantees a right
to ‘peaceful enjoyment of possessions’, the second rule regulates the legitimacy of ‘deprivation’ and
the third rule regulates how the states can legitimately ‘control the use of property’.88
When dealing with complaints pertaining to P1(1), the Court in Strasbourg will typically first
consider which of these three rules it should apply.89 However, as noted by Allen, it is not clear
that this choice has any great significance for the outcome.90 In practice, the evaluation proceeds
88 See Sporrong and Lo¨nnroth v Sweden (1982) Series A no 52, para 61.
89 See Tom Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Hart Publishing 2005) 102-104.
90 See Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (n 89) 104-105.
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in much the same way regardless of which rule is used, with an emphasis on the requirement that
a fair balance must be struck between the opposing interests in cases when states interfere with
private property rights.91 The Court has gradually adopted a more active role in assessing whether
or not this requirement is met. As argued by Allen, this has caused P1(1) to attain a wider scope
than what was originally intended by the signatories.92
In the early case law behind this development, the focus was predominantly on the issue of
compensation, with the Court gradually developing the principle that while P1(1) does not entitle
owners to full market value in all cases of interference, the fair balance will typically be upset when
less than market value is paid, especially if the reduction is significant or inadequately justified.93
However, the fair balance test encompasses more than the issue of compensation. In partic-
ular, the hunting cases discussed in chapter 2 show that the Court in Strasbourg is willing to
reflect broadly on the context and purpose of interference, to critically assess the social function
of takings.94 Moreover, institutional aspects of fairness have come to play an important role in
the Court’s reasoning in some other recent cases involving property.95 This is particularly clearly
demonstrated by the case of Hutten-Czapska v Poland.96
91 See Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (n 89) 103. It is also typically assumed that an interference is
only legitimate when it takes place for an appropriate purpose, but here the ECtHR has consistently maintained a
deferential stance, pointing to the ‘wide margin of appreciation’ that the member states enjoy in this regard. See,
e.g., James and others v United Kingdom (1986) Series A no 98, para 54.
92 Allen, ‘Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights’
(n 30) 1055.
93 See Scordino v Italy ECHR 2006–V 276, para 103.
94 See chapter 2, section 2.4.1.
95 See Hutten-Czapska (n 2); Lindheim and others v Norway ECHR 2012 985.
96 See Hutten-Czapska (n 2).
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3.4.1 Legitimacy Erga Omnes
The striking conclusion in Hutten-Czapska v Poland, underscoring the institutional turn at the
ECtHR, was that the case demonstrated “systemic violation of the right of property”.97 The
case concerned a house that had been confiscated during the Second World War. After the war,
the property was transferred back to the owners, but in the meantime, the ground floor had
been assigned to an employee of the local city council.98 The state implemented strict housing
regulations during this time, which eventually led to the applicant’s house being placed under
direct state management.99 Following the end of communist rule in 1990, the owners were given
back the right to manage their property, but it was still subject to strict regulation that protected
the rights of the tenants.100 In addition to rent control, rules were in place that made it hard to
terminate the rental contracts.101
After an in-depth assessment of the relevant parts of Polish law and administrative practice, the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of P1(1). Importantly,
they did not reach this conclusion by focusing on the owners and the interference that had taken
place with respect to their individual entitlements. Rather, they focused on the overall character
of the Polish system for rent control and housing regulation, as exemplified by the applicant’s
situation.
Specifically, the consequences for the owners were considered not in isolation, but in order to
shed light on a broader question of sustainability.102 The Court was particularly concerned with the
97 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 239.
98 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) paras 20-31.
99 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) paras 20-31.
100 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) paras 31-53.
101 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) paras 20-53.
102 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) paras 60-61.
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fact that the total rent that could be charged for the house in question was not sufficient to cover
the running maintenance costs.103 In particular, it was noted that the consequence of this would be
“inevitable deterioration of the property for lack of adequate investment and modernisation”.104
In the end, the Court highlighted how three factors combined to bring both owners and their
properties to a precarious position. First, the rigid rent control system made it hard to sustainably
manage rental property. Second, tenancy regulation made it hard for owners to terminate tenancy
agreements. Third, the Court noted that the state itself had set up many tenancy agreements
during the days of direct state management, shedding doubt on the fairness of the obligations that
these contracts imposed on owners.105
The Court’s reasoning in Hutten-Czapska is also interesting because of how the ‘social rights’
of the tenants is placed on an equal footing to the property rights of the owners.106 Arguably,
property rights and social rights are not considered merely as separate sets of entitlements, locked
in opposition to one another. In the reasoning of the Court they also appear as mutually dependent
social functions, both hampered by an unsustainable approach to property and housing during the
communist era and beyond.107
In this regard, the Court places considerable weight on the precarious situation of the owners.
Specifically, the Court notes the “absence of any legal ways and means making it possible for them
either to offset or mitigate the losses incurred in connection with the maintenance of property or
103 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 224.
104 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 224.
105 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) paras 224-225.
106 Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 225.
107 Specifically, the Court attached great significance to the finding that rents were too low to cover maintenance costs,
see Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 224. A lack of incentives for maintenance is clearly a threat to tenants as much as to
owners, illustrating the interdependence between the two groups. Despite this, when summing up their reasoning in
broad strokes, the Court itself reverts back to a traditional narrative when it speaks about the “conflicting interests
of landlords and tenants”. See Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 225.
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to have the necessary repairs subsidised by the State in justified cases”.108 Moreover, the Court
comments that the “burden cannot, as in the present case, be placed on one particular social group,
however important the interests of the other group or the community as a whole”.109 Importantly,
however, the Court does not censor the political reasoning that motivated the rent control scheme,
but rather focuses on the fact that it had not been implemented properly.110
On this basis, the Court concludes that there had been a systemic violation of P1(1), and orders
Poland to take measures to rectify the “malfunctioning of Polish housing regulation”.111 Hence,
the lack of legitimacy was pronounced with a kind of erga omnes (towards all) effect, establishing
an obligation for Poland directed at all its citizens in equal measure, not merely the applicant.112
Judgements of this kind, known as ‘pilot judgements’, have now gained formal recognition as a
distinct procedural form that the ECtHR can use to address systemic problems.113
The institutional approach conditioned by the introduction of pilot judgements might point to
the core function that the ECtHR is likely to serve in the future.114 Indeed, the ECtHR will hardly
be able to protect human rights in Europe on a case-by-case basis. Nor would it seem appropriate for
it to do so, given its remoteness to local conditions and its relative lack of democratic accountability.
However, when the Court is able to identify systemic failures that look set to systematically give
108 See Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 224.
109 See Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 225.
110 See Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 224.
111 See Hutten-Czapska (n 2) para 237. The basis originally relied on for formulating such an order was Article 41 in
the ECHR, first used in this way in the case of Broniowski v Poland ECHR 2005 647.
112 There was some dissent as to whether or not this was an appropriate response, with Judge Zagrebelsky in particular
arguing against it on the grounds that it would see the Court “entering territory belonging specifically to the realm
of politics.”. See Hutten-Czapska (n 2).
113 In 2011, the pilot procedure was explicitly incorporated and regulated in the Rules of Court, see Philip Leach, Taking
a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2011) 87. For pilot judgements generally,
see P Leach and others, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the
European Court of Human Rights and Their Impact at National Level (Intersentia 2010).
114 See, e.g., Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about ‘Constitutionalising’ the European
Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 655 (arguing that a “constitutional pluralism”
approach to adjudication – better filtered, more principled, yet still context sensitive – is the way ahead for the
ECtHR).
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rise to imbalances and unfairness, it seems appropriate that it should take action.
This is particularly clear when, as in the case of Hutten-Czapska, the Court notes that the
applicants have insufficient options available for achieving a fair balance by appealing to institutions
within the domestic legal order. In such cases, it seems appropriate for the Court to demand a
change at the level of the state’s own institutions, giving rise to a broad duty for the state to
improve those institutions. Moreover, by scrutinizing the procedures and principles that the states
apply when fulfilling this duty, it is likely that the Court will still be able to steer and unify the
development of the case law on human rights, at least to the extent that this is required to meet
minimum standards.
Against the deferential implications of this shift of attention, it could be argued that the
judicial or administrative bodies of the signatory states can easily circumvent their obligations by
providing superficial reforms or biased assessments of the facts in human rights cases, to avoid
embarrassment for the state’s political or bureaucratic elites. However, this might then be raised
as a more procedurally oriented complaint before the ECtHR, perhaps also against Articles 6 (fair
trial) and 13 (effective remedy).115
In this way, the Court can streamline its functions, by always aiming to direct attention at
issues that arise at a higher level of abstraction.116 This, in my view, seems highly desirable. The
ECtHR should not aim to micromanage the signatory states, particularly not in relation to a norm
such a P1(1), which the Court itself regards as highly dependent on context. By shifting attention
towards institutional fairness, the Court can avoid getting stuck in deference to the states without
115 I note that this also fits with recent developments at the ECtHR, toward somewhat broader scrutiny under Article
6, see Khamidov v Russia ECHR 2007 928.
116 A similar argument was given by Judge Zupanc˘ic˘ in Hutten-Czapska (n 2) (“Is it better for Poland to be condemned
in this Court 80,000 times and to pay all the costs and expenses incurred in 80,000 cases, or is it better to say to
the country concerned: ‘Look, you have a serious problem on your hands and we would prefer you to resolve it at
home...! If it helps, these are what we think you should take into account as the minimum standards in resolving
this problem...’? Which one of the two solutions is more respectful of national sovereignty?”).
113
overstepping its bounds with regards to the democratic process.117
Indeed, the case of Hutten-Czapska is highly suggestive of the merits of such a perspective, not
only because of the special measures ordered, but also because the Court reasoned on the basis of
institutional information to identify systemic weaknesses of Polish housing regulation.118 Another
example is the recent case of Lindheim and others v Norway.119 Here the applicants complained
that their rights had been violated by a Norwegian Act that gave lessees the right to demand
indefinite extensions of ground leases on pre-existing conditions.120
The Court agreed that this was a breach of P1(1). Moreover, it engaged in the same form of
assessment as it had adopted in Hutten-Czapska. Specifically, it concluded that the Ground Lease
Act 1996 as such was the underlying source of the violation. The problem was not merely that
this Act had been applied in a way that offended the rights of the applicants. In light of this, the
Court did not only award compensation, it also ordered that general measures had to be taken by
the Norwegian state to address the structural shortcomings that had been identified.121
The Court also commented that its decision should be regarded in light of “jurisprudential
developments in the direction of a stronger protection under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.122
However, in light of the change in perspective that accompanies this development, it is interesting
to ask in what sense exactly the protection is stronger. In particular, it is not prima facie clear
117 Getting this balancing act right is a key challenge for any system of judicial review, especially in cases with socio-
economic and political overtones. I will not provide a discussion of previous work on this issue, but mention specific-
ally that the Constitutional Court in South Africa has moved in an interesting direction that also appears conducive
to an institutional fairness perspective, particularly through its recent emphasis on “meaningful engagement” in
cases where social and economic rights are at stake, see Anashri Pillay, ‘Toward effective social and economic rights
adjudication: The role of meaningful engagement’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 732.
118 Specifically, it seems that the shift signalled by recent cases on property at the ECtHR does not end with a new
take on remedies, but also signals some changes in the way the Court approaches the fair balance determination
under P1(1). This seems natural; if the Court looks for systemic violations, not (only) individual transgressions, its
substantive assessments of fairness will naturally be influenced.
119 See Lindheim and others v Norway (n 95).
120 See Lindheim and others v Norway (n 95) para 119 (the Act in question was the Ground Lease Act 1996).
121 See Lindheim and others v Norway (n 95).
122 Lindheim and others v Norway (n 95) para 135.
114
3.4. THE ECTHR: LEGITIMACY AS INSTITUTIONAL FAIRNESS
that the Court’s remark should be read as a statement expressing a change in its understanding of
the content of individual rights under P1(1). Rather, it may be read as a statement to the effect
that the Court has assumed greater authority to address structural problems under that provision.
If this is true, it could make a big difference in cases involving takings for economic development.
As illustrated by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, a main concern is that such takings are likely
to have “perverse” consequences at the structural level, because they lack democratic merit. 123 In
light of cases such as Hutten-Czapska and Lindheim, I think the ECtHR would have been likely to
approach Kelo in a manner consistent with Justice O’Connor’s approach.
Whether they would reach the same conclusion seems more uncertain, particularly since confid-
ence in the states’ ability and willingness to regulate private-public partnerships might be higher in
Europe than in the US.124 However, it seems unlikely that the ECtHR would follow the majority
in Kelo, by simply deferring to the determinations made by the granting authority. Rather, Justice
O’Connor’s predictions about the fallout of the Kelo decision would likely have been of significant
interest also to the justices at the Court in Strasbourg.
To conclude, I think notions of institutional fairness can help us locate a welcome middle ground
between largely procedural notions of justiciable legitimacy, such as those found in England and
Wales, and substantive notions, such as those found in the US. The question remains how Courts
adopting such a middle ground should proceed when presented with a concrete case of alleged
eminent domain abuse. In the next section, I present a possible heuristic.
123 To quote Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, see Kelo (n 62).
124 For a discussion from the point of view of English law, arguing that the prevailing regulatory regime limits the risk
of eminent domain abuse largely through regulation of the takings power rather than strict property protection, see
Allen, ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative View’ (n 31).
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3.5 The Extended Gray Test
Pointing to early US case law on public use as a “laboratory of elementary proprietary ideas”, Kevin
Gray builds on the evidence found there to provide a set of conditions for recognising what he calls
“predatory takings”. 125 His work is clearly relevant to any theory of economic development takings
inspired by the notion of human flourishing. Below, I present his main contribution, a collection of
abuse indicators that I will refer to as the Gray test. I then present three addenda inspired by the
discussions presented in this and the previous chapter. This gives rise to the extended Gray test,
my proposed heuristic for assessing the legitimacy of takings, especially suited to situations when
there are strong commercial interests present on the side of the taker.
Several combinations of conditions might be sufficient to justify designating a taking as eminent
domain abuse. The purpose of the extended Gray test is not to produce a definite set of such
conditions that provide a final answer in all cases. Rather, the aim is to provide a heuristic to
facilitate concrete assessment against the social, economic and political circumstances surrounding
the taking in question. If an economic development taking represents an abuse of power, one would
expect it to run afoul with regard to some, and probably several, of the criteria set out in the
following points.
Balance of Power among the Parties
In a typical case of eminent domain abuse, the parties that stand to benefit will be more econom-
ically and politically powerful than those from whom property is taken.126 For example, this can
be reflected in the takers’ ability to solicit legal assistance and other services to defend the taking,
125 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 28-30.
126 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 30-31. Gray himself omits any explicit mention of political power, but it is
present in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, and in my view clearly belongs here.
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as well as in the owners’ inability to launch a coordinated defence.127 If there is an imbalance of
power, this is particularly likely to be noticeable early on, during the planning stages, before the
decision to condemn has actually been made.
After the decision has been made, the procedural position of the owners might improve. How-
ever, this can be insufficient to restore an appropriate balance between the parties; when special
procedural protections kick in, it will often be too late for the owners to launch an effective defence
against the taking. For instance, strict rules concerning cost reimbursement for costs incurred after
the decision to take has already been made, is not a sufficient response to an imbalance of power,
especially not in legal systems that offer limited opportunity for judicial review of takings purposes.
More generally, a possible imbalance of power should be assessed against the decision-making
process as a whole, going back to the first initiative made for taking the property in question. A
critical assessment of what role the owners have played in the decision-making process is a good
way to uncover more information about imbalances of power, and whether or not such imbalances
could have unduly influenced the outcome.
The Net Effect on the Parties
As Gray notes, a hallmark of eminent domain abuse is that the net effect of the taking is a
“significant transfer of valued resource from one set of owners to another”128 In itself, this is not a
conclusive sign of abuse, but it directs us to ask two important questions. First, we should inquire
critically into the main purpose of the taking. Is the transfer of resources between the parties an
acknowledged motive or an unacknowledged side-effect of some ostensibly distinct public purpose?
In the latter case, it might be that the public purpose is only a pretext for benefiting the taker,
in which case it counts as clear evidence of abuse. In less obvious cases, if the transfer of resources
127 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 30-31.
128 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 31.
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arising from the fulfilment of the public purpose was not properly discussed and critically examined
by the decision-maker, this too can point towards predation.
The assessment will be different if redistribution of (control over) resources is openly acknow-
ledged as part of the rationale justifying eminent domain. In such cases, it is pertinent to ask
further questions about the economic and social status of the parties, and the structure of the
decision-making process, to shed light on whether the redistributive motive itself appears demo-
cratically legitimate. If there is eminent domain abuse, one would expect the taking to fail to stand
up to scrutiny in this regard.
In some cases, it might be debatable whether a taking passes the net effect test. However, the
scrutiny is still significant, since it helps bring the crucial questions into the open, thereby ensuring
higher quality of the decision-making regarding the taking. Indeed, if the extended Gray test is
applied at an early stage of the proceedings, this in itself might help increase acceptance of the
decisions reached. Making room for more extensive legitimacy tests in takings law might well end
up bolstering the government’s power to take property, as long as the power is used faithfully.
Initiative
In many suspicious economic development takings, the party benefiting commercially from the tak-
ing is the party that initially made the suggestion for using eminent domain.129 In uncontroversial
cases, on the other hand, the initiative tends to come from some government body that seeks to
pursue a specific policy goal, e.g., to provide a public service or bestow a benefit on a particular
group that is found to be in need of support. The contrast between this and cases when the initiat-
ive lies with the commercial beneficiaries themselves point to a disturbance of the decision-making
underlying the decision to use eminent domain. As such, it is an important hallmark of abuse.
To investigate further under this point, one should take into account the wider social and
129 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 32.
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political context of the taking, particularly the position of the parties involved. If the beneficiary is
both more powerful and privileged than the owners and takes the initiative for the taking, this is
clearly a sign pointing towards predation. On the other hand, if the beneficiaries are marginalised
groups who could only expect any consideration if they were to take the initiative themselves, the
situation might have to be viewed differently.
Location
The location, in a broad sense of the word, of the property that is taken, can be a strong indicator
that eminent domain is inappropriate.130 For instance, cases involving the taking of dwellings
are naturally more suspect than cases involving the taking of barren or unused plots of land.
Similarly, the taking of property that is important to the subsistence of the current owner should
raise the bar for when a taking may be considered legitimate. Moreover, if the taker’s choice of
location appears to be one of convenience rather than necessity, this points towards predation. It
is particularly telling if alternative locations would be less intrusive, or obviate the need for using
eminent domain altogether.
On the other hand, the location of the property can sometimes point towards increased legit-
imacy of a taking that would otherwise appear suspect. This might be the case, for instance, if the
property that is taken has special value to the taker or the community specifically because of its
strategic importance with respect to the taker’s own property or the rights of non-owners.131 The
proper balance of burdens and benefits might still be upset, but a taking that fits smoothly into a
‘special value’ narrative will be less suspect than one that does not.
130 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 33-34.
131 For instance, if riparian owners cannot make rational use of the water flowing over their land without intruding on
the land of their neighbours, using eminent domain to resolve this might be considerably less suspect than other
kinds of economic development takings. This particular scenario was much discussed in the US during the 19th
century, in relation to mill Acts which authorised neighbour-to-neighbour takings of limited property rights needed
for development. See the discussion in section 3.3.
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Social Merit
As Gray notes, a taking that is hard to justify on the basis of its social merits is more likely to
be predatory.132 This asks for closer scrutiny of the kinds of purposes that can be used to justify
a taking. If the justification narrative surrounding a taking revolves solely around ‘trickle-down’
effects and the successful business ventures that the taking will facilitate, there is reason to be
suspicious. Specifically, if the taking cannot sustain a social merit narrative, whereby attention is
shifted away from purely economic considerations, this is a strong independent indication that the
taking might count as predation.
The point here is not that the language of social merit should replace the language of public use
or public interest as some kind of conclusive test of legitimacy. Rather, the point is that one should
always be encouraged to analyse takings specifically in terms of non-economic, social, effects. This
is particularly important in difficult cases, because it can help us to arrive at a better understanding
of where exactly the taking sits on the gray scale between admissible governance and predatory
exploitation.
Environmental Impact
According to Gray, a typical feature of eminent domain abuse is that it has an adverse environ-
mental impact. Moreover, a typical feature of eminent domain abusers is that they show disregard
for such adverse affects.133 This is an additional element that pertains specifically to the status of
the taker, asking us to consider whether it is appropriate to grant their activities public interest
status. It is not primarily a question of how the development stands with regard to environmental
132 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 34. Gray writes of lap-dancing clubs and cigarette factories as examples
of purposes that are suspect. Importantly, such purposes might well fulfil a public interest requirement via the
economic development narrative, yet still fail a social merit test that focuses rather on the social dimensions of the
use to which the property will be put.
133 See Gray, ‘Recreational Property’ (n 32) 34 (“predatory takers tend to be relatively unperturbed if they lay waste
to the earth.”).
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regulation. Rather, what is at stake is whether or not the characteristics of the taker and the
development plans make it appropriate to use the power of eminent domain.
It might be appropriate to use environmental law as a starting point, but the relevant envir-
onmental standard with regard to the legitimacy question should be drawn up more strictly than
the standards generally applied to the type of development in question. Indeed, one should be
entitled to expect heightened environmental awareness from a developer and a development plan
that benefits from the power of eminent domain.
Arguably, the mere fact that takers engage in active lobbying for leniency in relation to envir-
onmental standards can be enough to shed doubt on the claim that they act in the public interest.
What might otherwise be considered natural and admissible behaviour for a common commercial
company can be improper or inadmissible behaviour for one that benefits from eminent domain
powers. I note that this particular observation has general import, pertaining to a potentially wider
set of obligations that takers may be expected to take on, not only environmental ones. This brings
me to the first addendum that I propose to add to Gray’s original evaluation points.
Addendum 1: Regulatory Effects
As discussed in chapter 2, property has an important regulatory effect, also outside the realm
of positive law. This effect typically changes following a taking, sometimes quite dramatically.
For instance, if locally owned property is taken by external commercial actors for high-intensity
commercial use, the post-taking regulatory status of the property will most likely be completely
different to its status prior to the interference. Moreover, the changed status might have as much
to do with informal social functions as it has to do with positive regulation.
It might be, for instance, that the property in question is found in a jurisdiction that emphasises
the freedom of owners to do as they please without state interference. In this case, the fallout of
allowing external commercial actors to take locally owned property can be particularly severe, as
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the new owner is likely to be unconstrained by locally grounded systems for sustainable resource
management. In these cases, there is a risk that there will be a ‘tragedy of the taken’, arising from
how the taking undermines an important building block of sustainability.
A different regulatory concern is that the legal status of the property can change, for instance
because the development in question brings it under the scope of different rules. A concrete example
of this mechanism will be encountered in Part II of the thesis, when we consider expropriation of
water rights for hydropower development in Norway. As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis,
water rights in Norway are typically held in common by local smallholders, arising from their co-
ownership of the surrounding outfields. Water rights are then typically classified as agricultural
property, meaning that special rules apply, including rules that protect the local community and
identifies the municipalities and other democratic institutions at the local level as the primary
regulatory bodies. As soon as water rights are expropriated, the connection with land rights and
local agriculture is severed, resulting in an almost complete transfer of regulatory authority from
democratic institutions at the local level to the national-level water directorate. This serves as
an example of how the regulatory framework can change dramatically when property rights are
expropriated. When assessing the legitimacy of a taking, it will then be especially relevant to
consider whether the new framework offers better or weaker protection for the local community,
the environment, or the general public. If the effects appear to be largely negative in these respects,
it will reflect badly on the decision to use eminent domain.
Addendum 2: Impact on Non-Owners
Following up on the theoretical arguments made in chapter 2, it is appropriate to direct special
attention at the status of non-owners directly affected by economic development takings. It is of
particular importance to ascertain whether or not the interests of such non-owners were given
due consideration prior to the decision to use eminent domain. If their interests appear to have
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been neglected, or have not been considered at all, there is additional reason to be sceptical of the
justification provided for the taking. Indeed, just as disregard for the environment is a typical sign
of predation, a general disregard for local non-owners is also an indicator of abuse.
Moreover, if directly affected non-owners enjoyed little or no influence over the decision-making
or if they will be made to suffer severe adverse effects, this should be counted as an indication of
predation irrespective of mitigating procedural arrangements, e.g., measures to ensure ‘consulta-
tion’ or the like. If these measures have little or no material significance, they cannot hope to restore
legitimacy. Importantly, awarding compensation is also not sufficient to excuse shortcomings in this
regard. If people are displaced, for instance, the fact that new opportunities are provided for them
somewhere else should not be allowed to detract from the fact that a community has been des-
troyed.134 It is possible that the needs of the public necessitate such a drastic interference with
property’s proper function, but this should then at once give rise to a more in-depth scrutiny of
legitimacy. Moreover, the bar to pass the legitimacy test should be raised considerably in such
cases.
It should also be noted that the position of non-owners is largely determined by the regulatory
framework surrounding the property in question. Hence, the evaluation of legitimacy of takings
with respect to non-owners is closely related to the evaluation with respect to regulatory effects,
considered in the previous point. For instance, if property taken under eminent domain is simultan-
eously removed from the ambit of democratic decision-making at the local level, this can weaken
the position of non-owners. Moreover, if the property is re-classified and brought under the scope
of different rules, for instance because its status changes from agricultural to industrial property,
this can leave the non-owners with weaker substantive rights. With a social function perspective on
property, such effects should be looked at more closely when considering the legitimacy of takings.
134 See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, ‘Human Rights and Displacement: The Indian Supreme Court Decision on Sardar Sarovar
in International Perspective’ (2001) 50(4) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 973.
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Addendum 3: Democratic Merit
Perhaps the most important characteristic to consider when assessing the legitimacy of a taking
is its democratic merit. In an important sense, putting a taking to the test against this measure
serves to encapsulate all the other points raised above. Specifically, it asks us to consider the
totality of these factors in order to judge whether good governance standards have been observed
within a system based on democratic decision-making. The inquiry made in this regard should not
be focused on second-guessing government policies, but should compel us to take seriously the idea
that a commitment to democracy places real constraints on the exercise of government power.135 In
this way, an overarching focus on democratic merit can render the principles of scrutiny expressed
by the extended Gray test as a possible template for courts across different jurisdictions, with
respect to both constitutional and human rights provisions.
The main question that arises with respect to democratic merit is whether the taking in question
can be said to arise from a legitimate process of decision-making, in the pursuit of a fair and
equitable outcome. It bears emphasising that the relevant assessment under this point involves
both procedural and substantive elements. Fairness in itself is a constraint on the democratic
process, particularly when fundamental economic and social rights are involved. At the same time,
the notion of democratic merit rightly brings procedural questions to the foreground. Indeed, it
might be a weakness of Gray’s original proposal that it does not single out procedural issues for
special consideration.
A commitment to property as a social institution requires us to take into account that the
owners generally make up the group of people who will be most directly affected by any decision
involving the future of their property. As such, they should normally be granted a decisive voice
in decision-making processes leading up to economic development. At the same time, the social
135 See the discussion in chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.5.
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function account leaves room for recognising that this presumption in favour of emphasising the
rights of owners can be defeated by the context. It is clear, for instance, that the substantive
interests of absentee landlords might be limited compared to the substantive interests of local non-
owners who depend more directly on the property for their livelihoods. In these cases, the social
function approach allows us to recognise that a taking might have significant democratic merit,
even if it is based on a form of decision-making that prioritises the interests and participation
rights of non-owners.
Nevertheless, within a system based on private property rights it will always be appropriate to
show caution in this regard. The presumption should always be, within such a system, that the own-
ers are the primary stakeholders in decision-making processes involving their property. Moreover, if
this presumption is defeated, it would usually point to a structural weakness of property’s function
within society, a weakness that should arguably be addressed by more general reforms of property,
not by inflating the state’s power to undermine it. If caution is not observed here, property can soon
become a less secure basis on which to support local communities, including those marginalised
groups that are most in need of protection from predators.
By itself, however, a legitimacy test cannot make property a more secure basis for promoting
good outcomes in cases when the public desires economic development. What the extended Gray
test provides is a list of possible symptoms to look our for when attempting to diagnose a suspected
case of eminent domain abuse. Hopefully, this can help flag problems and limit the prevalence of
abuse, but it can not be regarded as a solution, especially not in cases when the public’s apparent
desire for economic development is a genuine reflection of a democratic commitment.
In short, after diagnosing a lack of legitimacy, the question becomes how to find a cure. In the
next section, I consider this challenge in more depth, premised on the idea that there is a need
for alternatives to eminent domain in cases when the collective wishes to take decisive steps to
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promote economic development on privately owned land.136
3.6 Alternatives to Takings for Economic Development
As mentioned briefly in chapter 2, the work of Ostrom and others on common pool resources
suggests that sustainable resource management can often be better achieved through local self-
governance than through markets or states.137 The connection between this work and property
theory is highly interesting, and has been explored in some recent work, particularly by US legal
scholars.138 As these scholars have observed, the connection can be made at a very high level of
generality. Indeed, in a democracy, property as such has a kind of (partial) commons structure,
since property as an institution depends on the collective choices we make regarding the legal
order.139 In cases when property is made subject to eminent domain, this perspective becomes
particularly salient, since then the collective explicitly withdraws its backing for the rights of the
owner, in favour of collective decision-making about the future of the property in question.140
136 If this premise is rejected as too radical, an institutional fairness perspective on legitimacy can still inspire other
kinds of reform proposals, e.g., in the context of good governance. For an example, consider the Committee on World
Food Security, ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in
the Context of National Food Security’ (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 11th May 2012)
〈http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf〉 accessed 14th September 2015. These guidelines contain
a section on expropriation which elaborates greatly on typical property clauses by going into more detail about
the meaning of fairness, especially in relation to the expropriation procedure as such. Hence, the guidelines appear
to embody a perspective on legitimacy that is quite close to the one I have put forth in this thesis. However,
the question is whether a “soft” law mechanism, such as that of the Guidelines, will be strong enough to keep
powerful commercial interests in check. For a more in-depth assessment of the expropriation provisions in the
guidelines, see Bjo¨rn Hoops, ‘The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure: Distilling Good
Governance Standards for Expropriation Procedures’ in Ann Apers and others (eds), Property Law Perspectives III
(Ius Commune: European and Comparative Law Series, Intersentia 2015) vol 132.
137 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge
University Press 1990). For a recent exposition of the main ideas, placing the work in a broader academic context, see
the revised version of Ostrom’s Nobel Lecture, Elinor Ostrom, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance
of Complex Economic Systems’ (2010) 100(3) The American Economic Review 641.
138 See generally Carol Rose, ‘Ostrom and the lawyers: The impact of Governing the Commons on the American legal
academy’ (2011) 5(1) International Journal of the Commons 28; Lee Ann Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights
in the Commons’ (2011) 5(1) International Journal of the Commons 9.
139 For similar observations, see Carol M Rose, ‘Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory’ (1990) 2(1) Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 37, 51; Hanoch Dagan and Michael A
Heller, ‘The Liberal Commons’ (2001) 110(4) Yale Law Journal 549, 577.
140 A common pool resource is typically identified by the fact that exclusion is difficult or costly, while use can cause
depletion (and hence should be limited), see, e.g., Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, ‘Private and Common Property’
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Moreover, in case of an economic development taking, the property in question typically pertains
to land or some other natural resource, which invariably form part of a larger resource system with
some common pool characteristics.141
Importantly, to designate something as a common pool resource does not in any way imply that
the resource in question is open-access or that it is held as a form of common property, a public
trust, or under some other legal construction moving away from the sphere of private property.142
Perhaps more controversially, designating something as a common pool resource does not in any
way imply that the resource should be removed from this sphere.143 According to Ostrom and
Hess, the appropriate property regime for a given common pool resource is a pragmatic question
that depends on the circumstances.144
It should be noted, however, that this neutral position on the relationship between property
and common pool resources is premised on a bundle of rights understanding.145 Potentially, a more
ambitious theory of property could suggest a different perspective. Specifically, the question arises
as to how theories of common pool resource management relates to the social function account.
This is a particularly interesting avenue for future work, as it could shed light on the normative
stance that private property can be a good basis for sustainable self-governance, at least when
in Boudewijn Bouckaert (ed), Property Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2010) 57. Hence, the mere fact that
some property is apt to be regulated, or taken, by the collective, demonstrates that property has common pool
characteristics (although these might be imposed by the polity, rather than arising from the nature of the underlying
good).
141 See, e.g., Fennell, ‘Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons’ (n 138) 16 (“we are always operating at least
partially within a commons of some sort.”). I also mention Smith’s notion of a “semicommons”, used to describe
settings where common pool arrangements for resource management interact with individual property rights, see
generally Henry E Smith, ‘Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields’ (2000) 29(1) The Journal
of Legal Studies 131; Henry E Smith, ‘Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights’
(2002) 31(S2) The Journal of Legal Studies S453.
142 See, e.g., Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 58.
143 See Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 58 (“there is no automatic association of common-pool resources with common-property
regimes – or, with any other particular type of property regime.”).
144 See Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 58.
145 See Ostrom and Hess (n 140) 59.
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backed up by a human flourishing account of what private property should be.
In this thesis, I limit myself to noting that the link between property and theories of commons
governance provides a possible route towards an institutional perspective on how to solve legitimacy
problems associated with economic development takings. To make progress in this regard, it will
be useful to first briefly consider one of the most important theoretical legacies of Ostrom’s work,
namely a list of eight design principles that she formulated on the basis of empirical studies.146
These principles were formulated because they seemed to be particularly crucial in ensuring good
governance at the local level, and have since been supported by a growing body of empirical
evidence.147 In brief, the so-called CPR (common pool resources) design principles are the following:
1. Well-defined boundaries: There should be a clearly defined boundary around the resource
in question, and a clear distinction should exist between members of the user community,
who are entitled to access the resource, and non-members, who may be excluded. This will
internalise the costs of resource exploitation and other externalities, ensuring that proper
incentives for sustainable management arise within the community of resource users.148
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: Man-
agement principles should be flexible and responsive to changing local conditions. Moreover,
management practices should be anchored in the economic, social, and cultural practices
prevalent at the local level. In addition, the individual benefits should generally exceed the
individual costs associated with membership in the community of users, and collectively
146 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 90.
147 See M Cox, G Arnold and SV Tomas, ‘A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource
Management’ (2010) 15(4) Ecology And Society 38 (the authors also suggest splitting some of the original principles
in two parts, resulting in a slightly more fine-grained list, not needed in this thesis).
148 Importantly, the possibility of excluding non-members marks a distinction between open-access resources and com-
mon pool resources, where the latter appears much less susceptible to a commons tragedy than the former, because
externalities are internalised to a clearly defined community. See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of
institutions for collective action (n 137) 91-92.
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managed benefits should be distributed fairly among community members.149
3. Collective-choice arrangements: The individual members of the user community should
have an opportunity to participate in decision-making processes regarding the rules that
govern the user community and the resource management. In addition to securing fairness
and legitimacy, this will enhance the quality of the decision-making, as the users themselves
have first-hand knowledge and low-cost access to information about their situation and the
state of the resource in question.150
4. Monitoring: There should be mechanisms in place to ensure that the behaviour of users is
monitored for violations of management rules. To increase efficiency, monitoring should be
locally organised. Moreover, to ensure local responsiveness and legitimacy, individuals acting
as monitors should themselves be members of the user community or in some way answerable
to this community.151
5. Graduated sanctions: There should be an effective system in place for penalising violations
of user community rules. These penalties should be graduated so that more severe or repeated
violations are sanctioned more severely than minor or one-time transgressions.152
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: The user community should be endowed with low-cost
procedures for conflict resolution. These procedures should be sensitive to local conditions,
to ensure local legitimacy.153
7. Minimum recognition of rights: The user community should be protected from interfer-
149 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 92.
150 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 93.
151 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 94-100.
152 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 94-100.
153 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 100-101.
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ence by external actors, including government agencies. As a minimum, the existence of local
institutions and the right to self-governance should be recognised and respected by external
government authorities.154
8. Nested enterprises: There should be vertical integration between local, small-scale, man-
agement institutions and larger institutions aimed at protecting and furthering non-local
interests. This integration should be based on the minimum recognition of rights mentioned
in the previous point. Furthermore, it should provide a template for integrated decision-
making about larger scale issues, where local competences are employed incrementally in
more general settings, involving also institutions working on behalf of municipalities, regions,
states and the international community. Local institutions for resource management should
not only be respected by such larger scale structures, they should also feed into larger scale
decision-making and be called to respond to greater community needs.155
There are at least two interesting connections between the CPR principles and the issue of
economic development takings. First, one may observe that when economic development takings
appear to lack legitimacy with respect to social functions, this is typically also an indication that
the surrounding framework for resource management is not well-designed. In particular, it appears
that the extended Gray test closely tracks many of the design principles proposed by Ostrom.
For instance, consider the balance of power between the owners and beneficiaries of a taking,
the first point to consider according to the Gray test. When a taking fails on this point, doubts
naturally arise also with regard to the underlying framework for resource management, particularly
aspects pertaining to the recognition of local rights, the adequacy of collective-choice arrangements,
and the congruence between appropriation, provision and local conditions. If property is taken
154 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 101.
155 See Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (n 137) 101-102.
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by powerful actors, chances are that these actors are not representative of community interests.
Moreover, takings characterised by an imbalance of power typically indicate that the government
is unwilling to respect the rights of local people, even when these rights are formally recognised as
property rights.
By contrast, the situation might be different if it involves a taking that is not suspect according
to the extended Gray test. For instance, if property is taken from absentee landlords and given to
local land users in order to facilitate development, this might be an honest attempt at setting up
a management framework that complies with CPR principles. In such a case, one would also not
expect the balance of power between owners and takers to point towards abuse.
The second link between CPR design and economic development takings is arguably even
more relevant. This link becomes apparent as soon as we shift attention away from diagnosing a
lack of legitimacy towards coming up with alternative management principles that can restore it.
Specifically, work done on local governance of common pool resources point to an alternative way
of approaching the goal of economic development in cases that might otherwise result in the use of
eminent domain. Specifically, one could instead try to design institutions for self-governance that
can promote economic development in justified cases, without dispossessing local owners and their
communities.
When thinking about how to design such institutions, it is important to notice an implicit
tension in the CPR principles, between the right to self-governance and the need to integrate local
decision-making into non-local institutional structures. As pointed out by much CPR research,
finding the right balance can be a challenge, especially when building institutions for local decision-
making in communities where such institutions have not formed naturally.156 Finding the right
156 See ‘The promise of common pool resource theory and the reality of commons projects’ (2014) 8(2) International
Journal of the Commons 636 (reviewing empirical work on CPR design and criticising some policy makers and
scholars for underestimating the risk of failure when trying to impose institutions for self-governance from the
outside).
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balance between local autonomy and integration into the greater institutional order is important
not only to protect the interests of the public, but also to protect minorities and weaker parties
within the local community. A major concern associated with self-governance, especially if it is
imposed by design, is that elites will capture the decision-making at the local level.
It is well-documented that elite capture can occur at all levels of institutional decision-making,
from the local to the international stage.157 There is also ample evidence that self-governing
communities can succeed in creating and sustaining healthy environments for collective decision-
making; there is no reason to think that self-governance will necessarily lead to abuse by local
elites.158 Still, there is no automatic guarantee that decentralisation leads to better governance;
decentralisation policies themselves can be captured. This points to the importance of setting up a
framework for appropriate nesting of institutions, where legal guarantees serve as safeguards both
for weaker groups and the greater public.
The question of how to design such a framework for institutions that can replace eminent
domain for economic development in western democracies has not received much attention. One
notable exception, discussed in depth in the following subsection, is the work of Heller, Hills, and
Dagan.159 Looking at their work will serve to make the abstract discussion above more concrete,
and will set the stage for a comparison between their proposal and solutions that can be facilitated
157 See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, ‘Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels’ (2000)
90(2) The American Economic Review 135; Jean-Philippe Platteau, ‘Monitoring Elite Capture in Community-
Driven Development’ (2005) 35(2) Development and Change 223; Philippe Cullet, ‘Governing the Environment
without CoPs – The Case of Water’ (2013) 15 International Community Law Review 123; Michael Levien, ‘Regimes
of Dispossession: From Steel Towns to Special Economic Zones’ (2013) 44(2) Development and Change 381; Lyla
Mehta and others, ‘Global environmental justice and the right to water: The case of peri-urban Cochabamba and
Delhi’ (2014) 54 Geoforum 158.
158 See Krister P Andersson and Elinor Ostrom, ‘Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspect-
ive’ (2008) 41(1) Policy Sciences 71, 72-75 (with many further references to empirical studies).
159 The work of Lehavi and Licht also deserves a brief mention, even though it focuses on compensation rather than
alternatives to eminent domain. The reason is that this work relies on proposing a novel institution that also touches
on issues related to self-governance. In particular, Lehavi and Licht propose that collective price bargaining should
be carried out on behalf of owners by a Special Purpose Development Company, in an effort to give them a chance
to get a share of the commercial benefit arising from development, see Amnon Lehavi and Amir N Licht, ‘Eminent
Domain, Inc.’ (2007) 107(7) Columbia Law Review 1704.
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by the system of land consolidation presented in chapter 6.
3.6.1 Land Assembly Districts
In an article from 2001, Heller and Dagan considered the connection between CPR design and
overarching (liberal) property values.160 From this, they arrived at a proposal for what they call
a “liberal commons”, which adds some design constraints rooted in a desire to protect individual
autonomy and minority rights. In particular, they emphasise the value of exit, the opportunity for
rights holders to alienate their share in the commons resource (conceived of as a property right).161
The right of owners to leave the collective is thought of as a safety mechanism, to prevent failing
institutions from trapping its members in a state of oppression. This is argued to be an important
overarching design constraint, described as a “liberal” idea, that should complement the other
design principles for local management of common pool resources.162
In a later article, responding to the Kelo controversy, Heller and Hills build on the idea of the
liberal commons by proposing a novel approach to the takings issue, consisting of a new institutional
framework to facilitate land assembly for economic development. The key innovation is that of the
Land Assembly District (LAD), an institution that is meant to be set up on demand, whenever
the property owners in a specific area need to make a collective decision about whether or not to
sell their land to a developer or a municipality.163 The idea is that while anyone will be able to
propose and promote the formation of a LAD, the planning authorities and the owners themselves
must consent before it is formed.164 Clearly, some kind of collective action mechanism is required
160 See Dagan and Heller (n 139).
161 See Dagan and Heller (n 139) 567-572.
162 Despite their commitment to protect the right of exit, Heller and Dagan are also aware of the destabilising effect
exit can have on an otherwise well-functioning institution. To address this, they discuss additional mechanisms, such
as rights of first refusal, that can ensure that exit does not prove too disruptive to the local collective, as long as a
sufficient number of members choose to remain. See Dagan and Heller (n 139) 596-702.
163 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1469-1470.
164 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1488-1489.
133
to allow the owners to make such a decision.
Heller and Hills suggest that voting under the majority rule will be adequate in this regard,
at least in most cases.165 How to allocate voting rights in the LAD is given careful consideration,
with Heller and Hills opting for the proposal that they should in principle be given to owners in
proportion to their share in the land belonging to the LAD.166 Owners can opt out of the LAD,
but in this case, eminent domain can be used to transfer the land to the LAD using a conventional
eminent domain procedure.167
Heller and Hills envision an important role for governmental planning agencies in approving,
overseeing and facilitating the LAD process. Their role will be most important early on, in approv-
ing and spelling out the parameters within which the LAD is called to function.168 While it is not
discussed at any length, the assumption appears to be that the planning authorities will define the
scope of the LAD by specifying the nature of the development it can pursue in quite some depth.
Hence, the powers of the planning authority appear likely to remain quite extensive.
If the owners do not agree to forming a LAD, or if they refuse to sell to any developer, Heller
and Hills suggest that the government should be precluded from using eminent domain to assemble
the land.169 This is a crucial aspect of their proposal that sets the suggestion apart from other
proposals for institutional reform that have appeared after Kelo. A LAD will not only ensure
that the owners get to bargain with the developers over compensation, it will also give them an
opportunity to refuse any development to go ahead. Hence, the proposal shifts the balance of power
165 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1496. However, when many of the owners are non-residents who only see their land as an
investment, Heller and Hills note that it might be necessary to consider more complicated voting procedures, for
instance by requiring separate majorities from different groups of owners, see Heller and Hills (n 3) 1523-1524. For a
criticism of the LAD proposal focusing on the shortcomings of majority voting, see Daniel B Kelly, ‘The Limitations
of Majoritarian Land Assembly’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review Forum 7.
166 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1492. For a discussion of the constitutional one-person-one-vote principle and a more
detailed argument in favour of the property-based proposal, see Heller and Hills (n 3) 1503-1507.
167 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1496.
168 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1489-1491.
169 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1491.
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in economic development cases, giving owners a greater role also in preparing the decision whether
or not to develop, and on what terms. Hence, the LAD proposal promises to address the democratic
deficit of economic development takings, without failing to recognise that the danger of holdouts
is real and that institutions are needed to avoid it.
There are some problems with the model, however. For one, planning authorities might have an
incentive to refuse granting approval for LAD formation. After all, doing so entails that they give
up the power of eminent domain for the land in question. For this reason, Heller and Hills propose
that a procedure of judicial review should exist whereby a decision to deny approval for LAD
formation can be scrutinized.170 However, the question then arises as to how deferential courts
should be in this regard, echoing the conundrum that engulfs the safeguard intended by the public
use restriction. Presumably, one would want the courts to strictly scrutinise LAD rejections, to
instil that LADs should normally be promoted. However, would the courts be comfortable providing
such scrutiny, also against a government body claiming that the “public interest” speaks against
LAD formation? This would likely depend on the exact formulation and spirit of the LAD-enabling
legislation. To work as intended, some sort of presumption in favour of LAD approval appears to
be in order, but this in turn can have the effect of making it easier for powerful landowners to
abuse the LAD system, e.g., by pushing through LADs that enable them to impose their will on
other community members.
This worry is related to a second possible objection against the LAD proposal, concerning the
practicalities of the process leading up to the LAD’s decision on whether or not to accept a given
offer. Is it possible to organise such a process in a manner that is at once efficient, inclusive and
informative, without making it too costly and time consuming? Here Heller and Hills envision a sys-
tem of public hearings, possibly organised by the planning authorities, where potential developers
170 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1490.
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meet with owners and other interested parties to discuss plans for development.171 The process
envisioned here would resemble existing planning procedures to such an extent that additional
costs could hopefully be kept at a minimum.
The significant difference would concern the relative influence of the different actors, with the
owners as a group receiving a considerable boost as a result of the LAD. Rather than being sidelined
by a narrative that sees the use of eminent domain as the culmination of planning, the owners are
now likely to occupy center stage throughout, as they now will have the final say on whether or
not the development will go ahead.
This raises the question of how the interests of other locals, without property rights, will be
protected. Heller and Hills assume that local non-owners will also be represented during the stages
leading up to the LAD’s final decision, but their role in the process is not clarified in any detail.172
This raises the worry that LADs might undermine local democracy by giving property owners a
privileged position with respect to policy questions that should be decided jointly by all members
of the community.
If property rights are distributed evenly among community members, the risk of abuse in this
regard might be limited. Moreover, the local anchoring that LADs provide should also benefit
non-owners, by bringing the decision-making process closer to the people most directly affected,
including non-owners. If some members of the local community remain marginalised, this should
arguably be regarded as a regulatory failure or a reflection of underlying inequality in society, not
a shortcoming of the LAD proposal. In these cases, a reasonable approach might even be to expand
the function of LADs, by granting voting rights to a larger class of local property dependants, not
only formally titled owners.
171 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1490-1491. It might also be necessary for the planning authorities or other government
agencies to take on some responsibilities with respect to providing guidance and assistance to less resourceful
members among the owners.
172 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1490-1491.
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The ideal of the LAD proposal is clearly stated and highly attractive. LADs should help to
establish self-governance for land assembly and economic development. In particular, Heller and
Hills argue that LADs should have “broad discretion to choose any proposal to redevelop the
neighbourhood – or reject all such proposals”.173 As they put it, two of the main goals of LAD
formation is to ensure “preservation of the sense of individual autonomy implicit in the right of
private property and preservation of the larger community’s right to self-government”.174 The
problem is that these ideals turn out to be at odds with some of the concrete rules that Heller and
Hills propose, particularly those aiming to ensure good governance of the LAD itself.
In relation to the governance issue, Heller and Hills emphasise, in direct contrast to their
comments about “broad discretion” and “self-governance”, that “LADs exist for a single narrow
purpose – to consider whether to sell a neighborhood”.175 This is a good thing, according to
Heller and Hills, since it provides a safeguard against mismanagement, serving to prevent LADs
from becoming battle grounds where different groups attempt to co-opt the community voice to
further their own interests. As Heller and Hills put it, the narrow scope of LADs will ensure
that “all differences of interest based on the constituents’ different activities and investments,
therefore, merge into the single question: is the price offered by the assembler sufficient to induce
the constituents to sell?”.176
This means that there is a significant internal tension in the LAD proposal, between the broad
goal of self-governance on the one hand and the fear of neighbourhood bickering, or even majority
tyranny, on the other. Indeed, it is hard to see how LADs can at once have both a “narrow purpose”
as well as enjoy “broad discretion” to choose between competing proposals for development. If
173 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1496.
174 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1498.
175 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1500.
176 Heller and Hills (n 3) 1500.
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a LAD is tightly regulated, required to offer the land on an open auction, and obliged to only
look at the price, this will limit the risk of abuse. But it will not give owners broad discretion to
consider the social functions of property when choosing among development proposals. In my view,
therefore, it is undesirable to restrict the operations of LADs in this way. It is easy to imagine cases
where competing proposals, perhaps emerging from within the community of owners themselves,
will be made in response to the formation of a LAD. Such proposals may involve novel solutions
that are superior to the original development plans, in which case it is hard to see why they should
be disregarded simply because they are less commercially attractive, or because the developer
interested in pursuing such a proposal cannot offer the highest payment to the owners. In the end,
the decision that the LAD makes concerns the future of the community as a whole. This is not an
exercise in profit-maximization, and there are good reasons to believe that LAD regulation should
encourage a broad perspective, not enforce a narrow one.
How to best organise a LAD seems to remain an open problem. The challenge is to ensure
that LADs deliver a real possibility of self-determination, while also ensuring good governance and
protection against abuse. Hiller and Hills themselves point out that further work is needed in this
regard, and that the proposal should be fine-tuned based on empirical work.177 Later in the thesis,
I will address this challenge when I consider the Norwegian framework for land consolidation.
This framework provides a sophisticated institutional embedding of many of the central ideas of
LADs. In particular, I will discuss how Norwegian land consolidation can be employed in cases of
economic development, and how it is increasingly used as an alternative to expropriation in cases
of hydropower development. This will allow me to shed further light on the issues that are left
open by Heller and Hills’ important article.
177 See Heller and Hills (n 3) 1498.
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3.7 Conclusion
The legitimacy issue is at the heart of this thesis. There are many ways of approaching it, catering
to different ideas about the appropriate role that the courts should play in safeguarding private
property. This chapter has tried to distil an approach that is particularly suited in cases when
property is taken for economic development.
This led to a proposal for an institutional fairness approach that combines procedural and
substantive standards, to arrive at a template for assessing the democratic quality of the decision-
making as such, not merely the outcome. This is appropriate because it helps address a key worry
associated with an economic development taking: that the decision to take represents an abuse of
power, reflecting badly on the institutions that gave rise to it.
On this basis, the chapter went on to provide a possible heuristic for assessing the legitimacy
of economic development takings. This heuristic was based on six legitimacy indicators provided
by Gray, with three new ones added, based on the work done in this and the previous chapter.
The resulting heuristic, the extended Gray test, should be able to identify cases of eminent domain
abuse, particularly those that offend against social functions of property at the institutional level,
rather than merely the financial entitlements of owners.
Testing for failure is only the first step towards increased legitimacy, to be followed up by
proposals for structural improvements. The question is how to respect property and its social
functions without giving up on the idea that the collective has an overarching responsibility to
regulate property and its uses, in keeping with the principle of democracy. This chapter proposed
looking to the work done by Elinor Ostrom and others on common pool resources. Specifically,
some key design principles for local self-governance was presented, along with an argument that
these could be used as a starting point for coming up with institutions to replace eminent domain
for economic development.
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Heller and Hills’ proposal for Land Assembly Districts represents a first pass at such a solution
to the legitimacy problem in the US. However, I argued that the proposal is marked by a severe
tension between the overarching goal of self-governance and the need to prevent abuses of power
at the local level. In the end, the proposal did not appear to deliver on the initial promise of
self-governance, because there were simply too many limits placed on the authority of the local
decision-makers.
Arguably, this points to the need for adapting a less abstract perspective on legitimacy, to
encourage flexible mechanisms that can be adapted to the circumstances. Limitations and safe-
guards against abuse that might be reasonable in an inner city neighbourhood with many poor
tenants might be entirely misplaced in a village of equally positioned home-owners. This insight
also echoes one of the key design principles formulated by Ostrom, concerning the need to maintain
congruence with local conditions. According to the empirical evidence available regarding common
pool resource management, a one-size-fits-all approach to legitimacy at the local level is not going
to work.178 In light of this, I believe the critical examination of Land Assembly Districts marked
a natural end to this chapter, as well as to the theoretical part of this thesis as a whole.
178 See Cox, Arnold and Tomas (n 147).
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Part II
A Case Study of Norwegian
Waterfalls
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4 Norwegian Waterfalls and
Hydropower
4.1 Introduction
Norway is country of many mountains, fjords and rivers, where around 95 % of the annual domestic
electricity supply comes from hydropower.1 The right to harness energy from rivers, streams and
waterfalls generally belongs to local landowners under a riparian system whereby many water
rights are derived from ownership of a riverbed.2 Historically, waterfalls were very important to
local communities, particularly as a source of power for grist and saw mills.3
Following the industrial revolution, local ownership and management came under increasing
pressure. At the beginning, this pressure was exerted by private commercial interests, often foreign
investors, who saw the industrial potential in hydropower and started speculating in Norwegian
water resources.4 Later, the pressure was exerted mainly by the government, following the intro-
1 See ‘Electricity, annual figures, 2013’ (Statistics Norway 25th March 2015) 〈http://www.ssb.no/en/elektrisitetaar/〉
accessed 12th September 2015.
2 This arrangement is rooted in the first known legal sources in Norway, the so-called “Gulating” laws, thought to
have been in force well before AD 1000. See Knut Robberstad (ed), Gulatingslovi (4th edn, An edition of the old
“Gulatingsloven”, a collection of the first known legal principles used by a Norwegian court (the Gulating), dating
back to before AD 1000, Det Norske Samlaget 1981) 111-112,120.
3 See Terje Tvedt, A Journey in the Future of Water (IB Tauris 2013) 121.
4 See NOU 2004:26 (Report to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy from a special committee appointed by the
King in Council on 04 April 2003) 30-31.
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duction of new legislation to regulate the development of hydroelectric power.5 This legislation set
up a system that gave highly preferential treatment to public utilities over private actors, including
local owners.6 At first, the motivation behind this reform was to facilitate a decentralised form of
government control, led by public utilities controlled by the municipality governments.7 However,
the hydroelectric sector underwent gradual centralisation, a process that gained momentum after
the Second World War when the state itself assumed a leading role.8 After this, local communities
and local riparian owners became increasingly marginalised. In particular, local communities were
systematically pressured into shutting down their hydroelectric plants, often as a condition for
being granted access to electricity through the national, monopolised, electricity grid.9
Then, in the early 1990s, the electricity sector was liberalised, largely inspired by the market-
orientation and privatisation of the public sector in the UK under Thatcher.10 The production
sector was decoupled from the grid sector, while public utilities were reorganised as commercial
companies.11 At the same time, the regulatory system was decoupled from political decision-making
processes, to become more expert-based.12 Moreover, the sector underwent additional centralisa-
tion, a result of mergers and acquisitions among former public utilities.13
5 See Lars Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (Ad notam Gyldendal 1996) 41-57
(describing the regulatory system set up during this time).
6 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 46 (describing legislation introduced
to promote public utilities, including new expropriation authorities directed at local owners of waterfall).
7 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 44-47.
8 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 59-85. For the history of the state’s in-
volvement with hydropower generally, see Lars Thue, Statens Kraft 1890-1947: Kraftutbygging og Samfunnsutvikling
(Universitetsforlaget 2006); Dag Ove Skjold, Statens Kraft 1947–1965: For Velferd og Industri (Universitetsforlaget
2006); Lars Thue and Yngve Nilsen, Statens Kraft 1965-2006: Miljø og Marked (Universitetsforlaget 2006).
9 See Hans Hindrum, Elektrisitetsforsyning ved hjelp av statsstøtte (NVE 1994) p.111.
10 See generally Atle Midttun and Steve Thomas, ‘Theoretical ambiguity and the weight of historical heritage: a
comparative study of the British and Norwegian electricity liberalisation’ (1998) 26(3) Energy Policy 179.
11 See EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway [2007] EFTA Court Report 164, 86 (describing how
Norwegian electricity companies, most of which are still (partly) publicly owned, now operate as for-profit, limited
liability companies).
12 See Ole Andreas Brekke and Hogne Lerøy Sataøen, ‘Fra Samkjøring til Overkjøring’ (2012) 44(6) Plan 22, 26-27.
13 See Jens Bibow, ‘Energiloven, forvaltningspraksis og EØS-retten: Organisatoriske krav til energiselskaper’ (2003)
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Following the reform, access rights to the national grid are meant to be granted equally to
all potential actors on the energy market, including private companies.14 After the passage of
the Energy Act 1990, the energy companies that operate the national grid (the grid is divided
into regions) are no longer authorised to shut out competitors.15 A side-effect of this is that it has
become possible for local landowners to undertake their own hydropower projects. Local owners can
now access the grid to sell the electricity they produce on Nord Pool, the largest electrical energy
market in Europe.16 This has led to increased tension between local interests and established
hydropower companies. The following fundamental question has arisen: who is entitled to benefit
from rivers and waterfalls, and who is entitled to a say in decision-making processes concerning
their use?
This chapter sets the stage for discussing this question in more depth, by detailing how the
hydropower sector is organised. It looks both to the law and to commercial and administrative
practices. Special attention is directed at those aspects that have changed following liberalisation,
and which have resulted in conflicts involving property. The main goal is to show that the tension
between large-scale development companies and local owners can only be understood on the basis
of a social function perspective on riparian ownership. To set the stage for making this point,
the chapter first provides a brief overview of the legal system, emphasising the role that private
property has played in the development of Norwegian democracy.17
42(10) Lov og Rett 579, 583. I mention that despite significant continuous centralisation from the Second World
War to this day, the Norwegian hydroelectric sector is still relatively decentralised compared to other countries, e.g.,
the UK, see Midttun and Thomas (n 10) 181. Arguably, this is a lasting influence of a tradition based on local,
egalitarian, ownership of water resources.
14 See generally Ulf Hammer, ‘Hovedtrekk ved Organiseringen og Reguleringen av Kraftmarkedet’ [1996] Lov og Rett
390. For an interesting presentation and analysis of grid-based markets in general, see Ingvald Falch, Rett til Nett:
Konkurranse i Nettbundne Sektorer (Universitetsforlaget 2004).
15 See the Energy Act 1990 s 3-4.
16 See generally Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter’
[2006] Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett 175; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Fallerstatning –
Uleberg-dommen’ [2008] Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett 46; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Er
naturhestekraftmetoden rettshistorie?’ [2012] (1) Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett 21.
17 The classic reference on Norwegian constitutional law is Johs Andenæs and Arne Fliflet, Statsforfatningen i Norge
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The Norwegian legal system is often said to be based on a special “Scandinavian” variety of
civil law, which includes strong common law elements: legislation is not as detailed as elsewhere in
continental Europe, some legal areas lack a firm legislative basis, it is generally accepted that courts
develop the law, and the opinions of the Supreme Court are often of crucial importance when the
lower courts interpret and apply legislation.18 In this regard, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court operates a very strict restriction on the leave to appeal.19 It typically only hears cases if a
matter of principle is at stake, or if the law is thought to be in need of clarification.20 Moreover,
legislation remains the primary source used to resolve most legal disputes. When applying it, the
courts tend to place great weight on preparatory documents procured by the executive branch.
These documents are widely regarded as expressions of legislative intent, even though Parliament
is not usually involved in their preparation.
The Constitution of Norway dates back to 1814 and was heavily influenced by then recent
political movements, particularly in the US and France.21 Moreover, it was influenced by a desire
for self-determination, as Norway was at that time a part of Denmark-Norway, largely controlled by
the Danish elite. Following the Napoleonic wars, Norwegian politicians sought to take advantage
of Denmark’s weakened position to gain independence and they drafted the Constitution with
this objective in mind. In the end, Norway was forced to enter into a union with Sweden (who
was backed by the winning side of the Napoleonic wars), but the Constitution remained in place.
(10th edn, Akademika 2006).
18 See, generally, Ulf Bernitz, ‘What is Scandinavian law?’ (2007) 50 Scandinavian Studies in Law 13.
19 See the Civil Dispute Act 2005, s 30-4.
20 See, generally, Jens Edvin A Skoghøy, ‘Anketillatelse til Norges Høyesterett’ in Jan Kleineman, Peter Westberg and
Stephan Carlsson (eds), Festskrift til Lars Heuman (Jure 2008).
21 See generally Ola Mestad, ‘Grunnlovas Historie’ (Store norske leksikon, 4th October 2014) 〈https : / / snl . no /
Grunnlovas historie〉 accessed 14th July 2015.
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Moreover, after the triumph of the parliamentary system in 1884, Norway would also eventually
gain independence, in 1905, following a peaceful and democratic transition process.22
During the 19th century, farmers and smallholders emerged as a powerful group in Norwegian
politics. This was in large part due to the fact that they were also landowners, whose rights and
contributions were not limited to traditional farming.23 This had not always been the case; during
the middle ages, the Norwegian farmer had usually been a tenant.24 However, tenant farmers always
enjoyed a significant degree of control over the management of the land and its natural resources.25
Moreover, between the 17th and the end of the 18th century, almost all Norwegian tenant farmers
bought their land from their landlords.26 As a result, the distribution of land ownership in Norway
had become highly egalitarian at the time of the Constitution.
In the years that followed, the landed nobility in Norway was further marginalised. The Con-
stitution itself prohibited the establishment of new noble titles and estates.27 Then, in 1821, all
hereditary titles were abolished (although existing nobles kept their titles for their lifetimes).28 By
the middle of the 19th century, farmers and smallholders had gained significant political influence.
In fact, they emerged as the leading political class, alongside the city bureaucrats.29 During this
time, Norway also introduced a system of powerful local municipalities. These were organised as
22 See generally Francis Sejersted, ‘Unionsoppløsningen i 1905’ (Store norske leksikon, 24th April 2015) 〈https://snl.
no/Unionsoppl%C3%B8sningen i 1905〉 accessed 14th July 2015.
23 See generally Marthe Hommerstad, Politiske bønder - Bondestrategene og kampen om demokratiet 1814–1837
(Spartacus 2014). The “classic” presentation of the political influence of farmers in Norway is Halvdan Koht, Norsk
Bondereising: Fyrebuing til Bondepolitikken (Aschehough 1926).
24 See generally John Ragnar Mykin, Herre over andre si jord? Norske leiglendingsvilk˚ar i europeisk lys 1500-1800
(Høyskoleforlaget 2005).
25 See Tore Pryser, Norsk Historie 1814-1860: Fr˚a Standssamfunn mot Klassesamfunn (Samlaget 1999) 59-60; Mykin
(n 24) 226-238.
26 See, e.g., Ernst Nordtveit, ‘History of Water Law in Scandinavia’ in Terje Tvedt, Owen McIntyre and Tadessa Kasse
Woldesadik (eds), A History of Water, Series III, Volume 2: Sovereignty and International Water Law (IB Tauris
2015) 108.
27 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814, s 23.
28 See ‘Adel’ (Store norske leksikon, 13th February 2009) 〈https://snl.no/adel〉 accessed 12th September 2015.
29 See generally Hommerstad (n 23).
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representative democracies, becoming miniature versions of the cherished, as of yet unfulfilled, na-
tion state (Norway was still in a union with Sweden at this time). Even today, municipalities retain
a great deal of power in Norway, particular in relation to land use planning.30 They represent a
highly decentralised political structure, with a total of 428 municipalities as of 01 January 2013.31
4.2.1 Property Regimes in Norway
There can be no doubt that the egalitarian distribution of property rights found in Norway was
crucial to the development of a democratic economic and political order, especially in rural parts
of the country.32 Moreover, landownership itself was never understood in purely individualistic
terms, but rather as an important building block of local communities. A reflection of this is the
fact that outfields in Norway tend to be held under a form of common ownership, whereby each
smallholding in the local community owns a share in the surrounding land and its resources.
This type of co-ownership has no exact common law equivalent, but is most similar to the
tenancy in common.33 In the Common Ownership Act 1965, further rules are given to regulate the
relationship between the co-owners and their use of the property they share. The main principle is
that each owner has a right to the “normal” enjoyment of the property, determined by looking at
the natural conditions, the local customs, and the original purpose of the co-ownership arrangement
(if it is known).34 Moreover, an individual owner’s use must not exceed what corresponds to their
30 They are the primary decision-makers for spatial planning, as pursuant to Planning and Building Act 2008.
31 This is down from the all-time high of 747 in 1930. There have long been proposals to reduce the number of
municipalities further, but so far the political resistance against this has prevented major reforms. See ‘Kriterier
for god kommunestruktur’ (1st December 2014) 〈https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/kommuner-og-regioner/
kommunereform/ekspertutvalg/sluttrapport/id751494/〉 accessed 14th July 2015 (report to the Ministry from an
expert committee on municipality reform, 2014).
32 For a comparative discussion, focusing on how egalitarianism influenced the industrialisation process in Norway,
setting it apart from the industrialisation process in the UK, see Ottar Brox, ‘Fattigdom og framgang: Alternative
fortider? – Norsk industrialisering i komparativt lys’ (2013) 24(3/4) Norsk antropologisk tidsskrift 169.
33 However, there is no requirement that the co-ownership takes place behind a trust – all individual shareholders are
formally registered as owners of their share of the land and there is a presumption in favour of continued co-ownership
accompanied by collective productive use of the land, not alienation or individuation.
34 See the Common Ownership Act 1965, s 4.
148
4.2. NORWAY IN A NUTSHELL
share of the property and must not be unduly burdensome to the other owners.35
To some extent, the majority shareholders can enforce a specific use of the property against the
will of a minority.36 This includes new forms of commercial activity, including activities requiring
additional investments in the property. If such activities are organised against the will of a minority,
the minority will still be entitled to take part in the enterprise.37 There are limits to what the
majority can do; they can only order uses for which the property is deemed “suitable”, and they
cannot do anything to dramatically change the character of the property, sell it, or use it as security
for debt.38 Moreover, if the majority does something to interfere with the use rights of a minority
shareholder, compensation must be paid.39 Because of these restrictions, gridlock can often result
if the owners disagree fundamentally about how to manage their land.
For real property, particularly in rural areas, the standard way of resolving conflicts among
co-owners is to bring a case before the Norwegian land consolidation courts. These courts are
empowered to dissolve systems of co-ownership (if certain conditions are met), but they can also be
used to organise joint use of the land, to avoid dissolution. The prevalence of common ownership
over outfields means that land consolidation courts are important in rural Norway, and it also
explains why these courts have been granted such wide powers to help organise the use of privately
owned land. I return to the details of this in chapter 6, as part of a broader discussion on how
the institute of land consolidation can be used as an alternative to eminent domain in economic
development situations.
35 The share in commonly held real property was historically determined based on the amount of rent (“skyld”) that
each farmer paid to the landowner (a figure that was also used to determine the level of taxation). While most
tenant farmers in Norway had bought their land by the end of the 18th century, the notion of “skyld” was kept as a
measure of the share each farm had in the commonly owned larger estates. For further details, see Øyvind Ravna,
‘Skiftegrunnlaget i sameier’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), Perspektiver p˚a jordskifte (Gyldendal Akademisk 2009).
36 See the Common Ownership Act 1965 s 4.
37 See the Common Ownership Act 1965, s 5.
38 See the Common Ownership Act 1965, s 4 paras 1 and 3.
39 See the Common Ownership Act 1965, s 4 para 4.
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In addition to the form of co-ownership regulated in the Common Ownership Act 1965, there
are two other special forms of ownership of land found in Norway that should be briefly mentioned.
Both pertain to land over which a large group of people enjoy extensive rights of use that have
been recognised as so-called “almenningsretter” (common rights) under Norwegian land law. Land
to which common rights attach will also have an in rem owner in the private law sense, but special
rules are in place to protect the group of people who enjoy common rights. These rules presuppose
that the land is owned either by the state or by a majority of the individuals who enjoy use rights.40
If the owner of common land is the state, the primary legislation that protects the rights of the
local people is the Mountain Act 1975. If the land is owned by the rights holders themselves, the
commons is known as a village commons, and the relevant legislation is the Village Commons Act
1992. The details differ, but the main purpose of both Acts is to offer special protection for rights
in common, especially with regard to traditional land uses that local farmers depend on for their
livelihoods.41 There is no extant concept of a commons in Norway that attaches to land owned
by a minority of the rights holders or other groups of private individuals.42 This is a testament
to Norwegian egalitarianism that can partly be explained by the fact that private landlords and
tenant farming is absent from the structure of rural landownership and have been for quite some
time.
40 Historically, the state was not considered the owner of the commons in the private law sense of the word, but rather
as a custodian with special regulatory powers. However, perceptions of this changed over time, with the Supreme
Court eventually concluding that the state was to be considered the owner of the state commons in the full private
law sense of ownership, see Staten v Fron Almenningstyre Rt-1963-1263.
41 For further details on the commons in Norwegian law, see Geir Stenseth, Almenningens janusansikt (Gyldendal
2005).
42 Traditionally, there was also a concept of a “private commons”, but this has all but disappeared from the law since
the land in question has typically been transformed into co-owned private land or a village commons. The courts
might still occasionally derive usage rights over private land from earlier rights in common over that land, but these
use rights would be unlikely to receive legal recognition as specially protected commons rights.
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4.2.2 The Importance of Water Resources
Local control over water resources, ensured through property rights, has always been very important
to farmers and rural communities in Norway. According to Terje Tvedt, 10 000-30 000 mills were
in operation in Norway in the 1830s.43 As Tvedt argues, the fact that these mills were under local
control was particularly important because it helped ensure self-sufficiency. In addition, saw mills
became an important source of extra income for Norwegian farming communities. As mentioned in
chapter 1, the right to harness power from a river is regarded as a separate unit of private property
in Norway, referred to as a waterfall.44 The system is riparian, so by default, a waterfall belongs to
the owner of the land over which the water flows.45 The landowners do not own the water as such
– freely running water is not subject to ownership – and the riparian owners’ right to withhold
or divert water is limited.46 However, the waterfall owners have the exclusive right to harness the
potential energy in the water over the stretch of riverbed belonging to them. This right can be
partitioned off from rights in the surrounding land, and large-scale hydropower schemes typically
involve such a separation of water rights from land rights; the energy company acquires the right
to harness the energy, while the local landowners retain ownership of the surrounding land.
I have already mentioned that undeveloped waterfall rights are usually held in common by
members of the local population. In some cases, this is because a river suitable for hydropower
development runs across many distinct private properties. Hence, the relevant waterfall rights are
held in common in the narrow sense that an assembly of private rights is required in order for
43 See Tvedt (n 3) 121.
44 Historically, the law emphasised ownership of traditional agrarian water resources, such as fishing rights. However,
new sticks were added to the waterfall bundle over the years, including the right to develop hydropower, see Arne
Vislie, Grensene for Grunneierens R˚adighet over Vassdrag (Centraltrykkeriet 1944) 14-32. See also Nordtveit,
‘History of Water Law in Scandinavia’ (n 26) 108. For a detailed presentation of the history of water law in pre-
industrial times, I refer to UA Motzfeld, Den Norske Vasdragsrets Historie indtil Aaret 1800 med Domsamling
(Brøgger 1908).
45 See the Water Resources Act 2000 s 13.
46 See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 8.
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development to take place. However, in most cases, waterfall rights will be owned in common in
a stronger sense since they attach to land that is already in shared ownership, regulated by the
Common Ownership Act 1965.
After the industrial revolution, there was some doubt as to whether rights in common over land
extended to waterfall rights, or whether waterfall rights were held exclusively by the landowners.
This question was particularly important for land owned by the state, since common rights would
be the only potential route for local community members to claim a proprietary stake in local
hydropower resources.47 The question was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Vinstra
in 1963.48 Here the Court held that no rights to waterfalls in state commons could be derived
from communal use rights over that land. It follows that the takings issue does not arise with
respect to hydropower development on commons land, at least not with respect to the waterfall
rights as such. For this reason, the Norwegian framework for regulating common rights will not be
considered further in this thesis.
In chapter 5, I will discuss the Alta case, which involved the special property regime found in
the north of Norway.49 The case arose in the 1970s after the national government had decided to
build a hydropower project in Finnmark, a part of Norway where the state is traditionally regarded
as the owner of the outfields. The state’s ownership of land in this region tends to be at odds with
the interests of the Sami people, an indigenous group from northern Scandinavia. Traditionally,
the state’s ownership was consider to be standard private law ownership, more or less entirely
unencumbered by indigenous interests, except when Sami rights had been explicitly recognised by
the state. In particular, the use rights of the Sami people did not enjoy the protected status given
to rights in common over state land elsewhere in Norway.
47 In village commons, by contrast, the owners themselves are also local community members, although the group of
owners is typically smaller than the group of people who have use rights in common.
48 See Staten v Fron Almenningstyre (n 40).
49 Alta Laksefiskeri Interessentskap v Staten (Norges Vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen) Rt-1982-241.
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Hence, in the Alta case, the dispute revolved around expressly recognised use and property
rights that would be negatively affected by the development. Communal claims based on indigenous
rights were summarily rejected, and the case did not involve takings of waterfalls (since the state
already held these rights). Still, Alta has later been considered an important precedent for disputes
surrounding expropriation of waterfalls, since it dealt with many aspects of administrative law
pertaining to the licensing procedure surrounding hydropower development. As discussed in chapter
5, the case also marked a watershed moment in the legal history of the Sami people, whose rights
over land in Finnmark have since received greater recognition within the Norwegian legal order.
Today, in the special context of Sami land, the law appears to be moving towards a framework
where the Norwegian state is increasingly seen as a custodian of Sami lands, rather than an owner
in the standard private law sense.50
In other parts of Norway, a similar perspective has yet to develop. Natural resources owned
by the state, or taken by it under eminent domain, has the same legal status as private property.
There is no legal basis for regarding the state as a custodian, and there is no legally enforcible
sense in which land owned by the state is held in trust on behalf of the people. However, in a recent
revision of the Constitution, a new section 112 was introduced that compels the government to
preserve the environment and promote sustainability. The exact wording is as follows:
Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a nat-
ural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources
shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will
safeguard this right for future generations as well.
In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, citizens
50 See generally Øyvind Ravna, ‘Retten til jorden i Finnmark, samenes rettigheter og forslaget til Finnmarkslov’
(2005) 31(2) Kritisk juss; Kirsti Strøm Bull, ‘Finnmarksloven: finnmarkseiendommen og kartlegging av rettigheter
Finnmark’ (2007) 46(9) Lov og rett 545; Øyvind Ravna, ‘Samerett og samiske rettigheter i Norge’ in Tore Henriksen
and Øyvind Ravna (eds) (Gyldendal juridisk 2012).
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are entitled to information on the state of the natural environment and on the effects
of any encroachment on nature that is planned or carried out. The authorities of the
state shall take measures for the implementation of these principles.51
This provision replaces a sustainability clause that was first introduced in the Constitution in
1992, following the influential Rio summit at the United Nations. This clause left little or no impact
on Norwegian law, with no consequences discernible at all within the law of property.52 After the
new formulation was introduced in 2014, there have been some indications that the legal status
of the sustainability provision might be about to change. Indeed, the legislator itself expressed
a desire to make the provision more easily justiciable.53 However, there have been no indication
so far that section 112 will become relevant in the law of hydropower. Moreover, it seems highly
unlikely that the section will attain relevance with respect to the issue of expropriation. For this
reason, section 112 will not be examined further in this thesis.54
Although the sustainability clause in the Constitution is of marginal importance in the law
of hydropower, environmental interests are quite well protected during the licensing procedure
in hydropower cases. The rules and practices that apply in this regard are presented in more
depth in section 4.3 below. Before looking at the details, it should be mentioned that Norway has
implemented the Water Framework Directive of the European Union.55 This directive attempts to
51 See the The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814 s 112.
52 See generally Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Forfatning og miljøvern - en analyse av grunnlovens § 110 b’ [2007] (1-2)
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 1.
53 See Dok.nr.16 (2011-2012) (Report from a special committee regarding human rights in the Constitution) 246. As
an example of where this might lead in the future, I mention that a group of Norwegian environmental lawyers
are presently considering the possibility of initiating a class action against the Norwegian state for not doing
enough to fight climate change, using section 112 as a legal basis. See Kjerstin Gjengedal, ‘Venter global bølge av
klimarettssaker’ (Ny Tid, 7th July 2015) 〈https://www.nytid.no/venter-global-bolge-av-klimarettssaker/〉 accessed
4th March 2016.
54 Of course, a normative argument could well be made that the provision should entail greater regard for the interests
and property rights of local people. Such an argument might perhaps also be backed up by considerations based on
international environmental law. Further exploration of economic development takings from this angle will be left
for future work.
55 See Water Framework Directive [2000] OJ L327/1. It has been implemented in Norwegian law as the Directive
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ensure that water resources are managed according to an ecosystem perspective where the regulator
takes an holistic approach to planning in water systems. Such a perspective is at odds with the
sector-based procedures that still dominate in Norwegian water law. Some have argued that the
Norwegian implementation of the directive has not sufficiently recognized the need for structural
reforms.56 However, the holistic perspective on water resources and sustainability now appears to
be gaining ground, especially at the political level. As we will see towards the end of this chapter,
the effect of this on local communities and owners has been mixed. In some cases, an increased
emphasis on conservation and planning has had a negative effect on communities since it further
inflates the power of those that have enough political and financial capital to exert their influence
on the planning process.
To understand how water law works in Norway, it is important to keep in mind that the import-
ance of water does not primarily arise from the fact that water is scarce, but mainly from the fact
that it is so plentiful. Not only is water power the main source of domestic energy, it also occupies
a special place in Norwegian culture. It is important to the identity of many communities, partic-
ularly in the western part of the country, where majestic waterfalls are considered symbols both of
the hardship of the natural conditions and the sturdiness of local people. The implications for the
tourism industry are also significant, as the natural environment attracts visitors and economic
activity to regions of Norway that are otherwise threatened by stagnation and depopulation.
In light of this, it is not surprising that there is a tradition in Norway for local resistance
against development projects that are considered damaging to the environment. In the 1960s and
70s, when the state embarked on their most ambitious projects, local environmental movements
became nationally significant, as symbols of resistance against centralisation, exploitation of weaker
Regarding Frameworks for Water Management, FOR-2006-12-15-1446.
56 See Gro Sandkjær Hanssen, Sissel Hovik and Gunn Cecilie Hundere, ‘Den nye vannforvaltningen - Nettverksstyring
i skyggen av hierarki’ (2014) 3 Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift 155.
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groups, and environmental destruction.57
This illustrates that water resources are embedded in the social fabric in such a way that a purely
entitlements-based approach to property rights in these resources would be largely inappropriate.
Rather, the case of Norwegian water seems to be well-suited for an investigation based on a social
function view on property. As I show in this and the following two chapters, rivers and waterfalls
serve to bring out tensions between rights and obligations in property, while also shedding light on
the question of how to organise decision-making processes regarding economic development.
In the next section, I argue that the present law on hydropower in Norway tends to recognise
only a small part of the relevant picture. On the one hand, it recognises the financial entitlements of
individual owners, which it tries to balance against the regulatory needs of the state. But it largely
fails to take into account that owners have broader interests, even obligations, relating to the
sustainable management of their streams and their waterfalls. Moreover, the law appears largely
unable to prevent commercial companies and special interest groups from exerting a strong pull on
various state bodies, particularly those that are only weakly grounded in processes of democratic
decision-making.
4.3 Hydropower in the Law
The law of hydropower in Norway is marked by a tension where, on the one hand, the right to
harness power from rivers and waterfalls is considered private property, while on the other hand,
it has become common to speak of hydropower as a resource belonging to the public. Since the
Industrial Licensing Act 1917 was amended in 2008, this ambivalence in the discourse surrounding
hydropower has also been part of the statutory provisions regulating hydropower development. I
quote the two relevant sections side by side below:
57 See Yngve Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-˚arene’ (2008) 87(1)
Historisk tidsskrift 61.
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A river system belongs to the
owner of the land it covers,
unless otherwise dictated by
special legal status. [...]
The owners on each side of a
river system have equal rights
in exploiting its hydropower.
(Water Resources Act 2000, s 13)
Norwegian water resources belong to the
general public and are to be managed in
their interest. This is to be ensured by public
ownership.
(Industrial Licensing Act 1917, s 1 (after amendment in 2008))
The intended reading of section 1 of the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, quoted on the right
above, is that it provides a “general starting point”.58 According to the Ministry, it expresses what
has always been the purpose of the legislation used to regulate large-scale hydropower.59
This should not be understood as an explicit attack on the principle of private ownership
expressed in section 13 of the Water Resources Act 2000, quoted on the left above.60 However,
the Ministry’s comment underscores the extent to which the government regards it as natural to
interfere with private rights to waterfalls, to pursue policies that it regards to be in the interest of
the public. Taken in this light, section 1 of the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 reflects the prevailing
opinion that there are few, if any, recognised limits on the state’s power to manage privately owned
water resources.61
This aspect of the Norwegian system has become particularly significant following the liber-
alisation of the electricity sector in the early 1990s.62 Since then, there have been an increasing
number of cases where owners who are interested in undertaking their own development schemes
58 See Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008) (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy regarding changes
to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917) 72.
59 See Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008) (n 58) 72.
60 There are no indications in the preparatory materials that the Ministry sought to confront the principles of ownership
encoded in the Water Resources Act 2000.
61 For a reflection of the same attitude, citing the state’s broad regulatory competence as the main reason not to
nationalise Norwegian water power rights, I refer to the preparatory documents underlying the Water Resources
Act 2000. See NOU 1994:12 (Report to the Ministry of Business and Energy from a special committee appointed
by the Crown Prince Regent in Council 09 November 1990) 152-153.
62 See, e.g., Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, ‘Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter’ (n 16).
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attempt to fend off commercial energy companies wishing to expropriate.63 Importantly, the state
has tended to side with the commercial companies in these cases, granting them the authority to
expropriate for economic development. This has resulted in several Supreme Court decisions on
hydropower and expropriation in the past few years, all of which have been in favour of the energy
companies.64 Before discussing these cases in more detail in the next chapter, I provide an in-depth
analysis of hydropower in the law and in practice, to shed further light on the underlying conflict
that has led to the recent surge in cases on expropriation. First, I briefly present the key legislation
regulating the hydropower sector.
4.3.1 The Water Resources Act
The Water Resources Act 2000 contains the basic rules regarding water management in Norway.
This Act is not only concerned with hydropower, but regulates the use of river systems and ground-
water generally.65 In section 8, the Act sets out the basic license requirement for anyone wishing
to undertake measures in a river system.66 The main rule is that if such measures may be of “ap-
preciable harm or nuisance”, then a license is required.67 The water authorities themselves decide
if this condition is met.68 In relation to hydropower development, it is established practice that
63 See, e.g., Christian Sontum and Einar Sofienlund, ‘Ekspropriasjon av vannkraft – hvorfor den historiske metoden
fra norsk rettspraksis ikke er relevant i dagens marked’ [2007] (4) Sma˚kraftnytt.
64 See Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Møllen Rt-2008-82 (Uleberg); M˚aland v Jørpeland Kraft AS Rt-2011-1393; BKK
Produksjon AS v Austgulen Rt-2011-1683 (Kløvtveit); Bjørnar˚a v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening
Rt-2013-612.
65 See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 1. A river system is defined as “all stagnant or flowing surface water with
a perennial flow, with appurtenant bottom and banks up to the highest ordinary floodwater level”, see the Water
Resources Act 2000, s 2. Artificial watercourses with a perennial flow are also covered (excluding pipelines and
tunnels), along with artificial reservoirs, in so far as they are directly connected to groundwater or a river system,
see the Water Resources Act 2000, ss 2a, 2b.
66 Measures in a river system are defined as interventions that “by their nature are apt to affect the rate of flow, water
level, the bed of a river or direction or speed of the current or the physical or chemical water quality in a manner
other than by pollution”, see the Water Resources Act 2000, s 3a.
67 See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 8. There are two exceptions, concerning measures to restore the course or
depth of a river, and concerning the landowner’s reasonable use of water for his permanent household or domestic
animals, see the Water Resources Act 2000, s 12.
68 See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 18.
158
4.3. HYDROPOWER IN THE LAW
most hydropower projects over 1000 KW will be deemed to require a license.69
The basic assessment criterion is that a license “may be granted only if the benefits of the
measure outweigh the harm and nuisances to public and private interests affected in the river
system or catchment area”.70 Hence, the water authorities are empowered to decide whether a
licence should be granted, if they find that the benefits outweigh the harms. The courts are very
reluctant to censor the discretion of the administrative decision-makers on this point.71
The rules in the Water Resources Act 2000 apply to any measures in river systems, not only
hydropower projects. However, special rules that apply to hydropower cases are described in other
statutes, the most important being the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.
4.3.2 The Watercourse Regulation Act
In order to maximise the output of a hydropower scheme, the flow of water may be regulated
using dams or diversions. Regulation was particularly important in the early days of hydropower,
before the national electricity grid was developed.72 Indeed, in the early days, it was common for
electricity producers to get paid based on the stable effect they were able to deliver, rather than
the total amount of energy they harnessed.73
Today, this has changed, as producers get paid based on the total amount of electricity they
deliver, measured in kilowatt hours (KWh). The price fluctuates over the year, and the supply-side
is still influenced by instability in the waterflow in Norwegian rivers. However, the smoothing effect
69 See, e.g., ‘Konsesjonspliktvurdering vannkraft’ (Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 9th February
2009). Exceptions are possible, for instance projects that upgrade existing plants, or which utilise water flowing
between artificial reservoirs.
70 See the Water Resources Act 2000 s 25.
71 This is an expression of the principle of “freedom of discretion” (det frie forvaltningsskjønn) for the administrative
branch, a fundamental tenet of Norwegian administrative law. See generally Torstein Eckhoff and Eivind Smith,
Forvaltningsrett (10th edn, Universitetsforlaget 2014) 71-74.
72 See Uleberg (n 64) 83.
73 See Sontum and Sofienlund (n 63).
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of the national grid means that run-of-river schemes can be carried out profitably, even if most of
the electricity from the plant is produced during peak periods.
Despite the growing importance of run-of-river schemes, many key rules regarding hydropower
development are still found in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. This Act defines regulations
as “installations or other measures for regulating a watercourse’s rate of flow”. It also explicitly
states that this covers installations that “increase the rate of flow by diverting water”.74 The core
rule of the Act is that watercourse regulations that affect the rate of flow of water above a certain
threshold are subject to a special licensing requirement.75
The threshold is defined in terms of the notion of a “natural horsepower”, such that a license is
required if the regulation yields an increase of at least 400 natural horsepower in the river. Natural
horsepower is a gross estimate of the power that can be harnessed from a river continuously for at
least 350 days a year.76 The definition is a simple mathematical expression, given below:
nat.hp(Q,H) = 13.33×H ×Q
This formula states that the natural horsepower of a regulation project (nat.hp(Q,H)) is a
function of two variables, H and Q. The constant factor 13.33 is the force of gravity of Earth
exerted on a mass of 1 kg (or, approximately, 1 litre of water). The variable H is the difference
in altitude (measured in metre) from the intake dam to the power generator. The variable Q is
the amount of water (measured in litre) continuously available per second of the day, for at least
350 days per year. The result is then a gross estimate (assuming no energy loss) of the stable
horsepower output of a hydroelectric plant that harnesses the power of Q litres of water per second
over a difference in altitude of H metres.
74 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 s 1.
75 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 2.
76 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 2.
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Section 2 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 asks for the increase of this figure after
regulation. To arrive at this number, one first uses the formula with Q taken to be Q1, the stable
water flow prior to regulation, before calculating it with Q taken to be Q2, the stable water flow after
regulation. The difference between the second and the first figure (nat.hp(Q2, H)−nat.hp(Q1, H))
is the increase of natural horsepower resulting from regulation.
Effectively, at a time when electricity had to be produced at a stable effect, from a stable source
of power, this increase in natural horsepower was a gross estimate of the value added to the river by
regulation. In the present context, it suffices to say that if a hydropower project involves regulation
at all (i.e., if it is not a run-of-river scheme), it will indeed yield 400 natural horsepower or more.
Hence, a special license will be required pursuant to section 2 of the Watercourse Regulation Act
1917.
The criteria for granting a regulation license are similar to those for granting a license pursuant
to the Water Resources Act 2000. In particular, section 8 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917
states that a license should ordinarily be issued only if the benefits of the regulation are deemed to
outweigh the harm or inconvenience to public or private interests.77 In addition, it is made clear
that other deleterious or beneficial effects of importance to society should be taken into account.78
Finally, if an application is rejected, the applicant can demand that the decision is submitted for
review by Parliament.79
In general, the issue of who owns and controls the water resources in question receives little
attention in relation to licensing applications, both pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act
1917 and the Water Resources Act 2000. Instead, the focus is on weighing environmental interests
against the interest of increasing the electricity supply and facilitating economic development. The
77 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8.
78 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8.
79 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8.
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issue of resource ownership is more prominent in relation to a third important statute, namely the
Industrial Licensing Act 1917.
4.3.3 The Industrial Licensing Act
In the early 20th century, industrial advances meant that Norwegian waterfalls became increas-
ingly interesting as objects of foreign investment. To maintain national control of water resources,
Parliament passed an Act in 1909 that made it impossible to purchase valuable waterfalls without
a special license.80 The follow-up to this Act is the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, which is still in
force. It applies to potential purchasers and leaseholders of rivers that may be exploited so that
they yield more than 4000 natural horsepower.81
To reach this number requires a substantial regulation, so the Act does not apply to many run-
of-river hydropower schemes, even large-scale projects. Originally, the main rule in the Industrial
Licensing Act 1917 stated that all licenses granted to private parties were time-limited, and that
the waterfalls would become state property without compensation when they expired, after at most
60 years.82 This was known as the rule of reversion in Norwegian law.83
In a famous Supreme Court case from 1918, the rule was upheld after having been challenged
by owners on constitutional grounds.84 This was based on the finding that reversion represented
a form of regulation of property, not expropriation. Hence, it could not be challenged on the basis
of section 105 of the Constitution, even though the owners were not awarded any compensation.
80 See Thor Falkanger, ‘Acquisition of Real Property and State Approval’ (1987) 31 Scandinavian Studies in Law 57,
59.
81 Unlike section 2 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, this asks only for the number of horsepower in the river
(after regulation), not the increase of this number.
82 See the previous Industrial Licensing Act 1917, s 2, in force before the amendment on 26 September 2008.
83 This is a misnomer, however, in light of how most rivers and waterfalls were originally owned by local smallholders,
not the state.
84 See Johansen v Den norske Stat (1 Regjeringens chef, 2 A/S Furuberg ved dets direktions formand) Rt-1918-403
(Konsesjonsdommen).
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While the rule of reversion withstood internal challenges, it was eventually struck down by
the EFTA Court in 2007, as a breach of the EEA agreement.85 This conclusion was based on
the fact that reversion only applied to privately owned companies, which the Court regarded
as an illegitimate form of discrimination. After this ruling, the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 was
amended. Today, only companies where the state controls more than 2/3 of the shares may purchase
waterfalls or rivers to which the Act applies.86
This means that such rivers and waterfalls can only be bought, leased or expropriated by
companies in which the state is a majority shareholder. In practice, however, landowners are
still able to sell the land from which the right to a waterfall originates, even if this also means
transferring the waterfall to a new owner. The rule is typically only enforced when riparian rights
as such are transferred, specifically for the purpose of large-scale hydropower development. In
particular, small-scale development and large run-of-river schemes can still usually be carried out
by local owners. The policy justification for the (amended) Industrial Licensing Act 1917 is based
on the idea that giving preference to state-owned actors will protect the public. However, this
perspective clashes with the fact that the electricity sector itself has been liberalised. The state
may be a majority shareholder in the most powerful companies, but these companies are now run
according to commercial principles, with little or no direct political involvement.87
Hence, as the EFTA court highlights in its judgement on reversion, there appears to be a lack
of convincing policy reasons why state-owned companies should be given preferential treatment.88
85 See EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway (n 11). The EEA (European Economic Area) agree-
ment sets up a framework for the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between Norway, Iceland,
Lichtenstein and the European Union. The EFTA (European Free Trade Association) oversees the implementation of
the EEA for those members of EFTA that are also members of the EEA (all except Switzerland). For further details,
see generally Henrik Bull, ‘The EEA Agreement and Norwegian Law’ [1994] (12) European Business Law Review
291; Mads Magnussen, ‘Traktatbruddssøksma˚l ved EFTA-domstolen’ [2002] Lov og Rett 131; Halvard Haukeland
Fredriksen, ‘Er EFTA-domstolen mer Katolsk enn Paven?’ [2009] Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 507.
86 See the Industrial Licensing Act 1917, s 2.
87 See EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway (n 11) 86.
88 See EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway (n 11) 84-87.
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In light of this, Norway’s response to the Court’s decision is a curious one: instead of creating a
level playing field, the preference given to state-owned commercial companies is made even more
marked, as privately owned companies are now excluded from one segment of the hydropower
market altogether.
4.3.4 The Energy Act
Before 1990, the Norwegian electricity sector was tightly regulated by the government.89 The
responsibility for the national grid was divided between various public utilities that would also
typically engage in electricity production, wielding monopoly power within their districts. The
most powerful utilities were controlled by the state, which also developed large-scale hydropower
to supply the metallurgical industry with cheap electricity.90 However, the county councils and the
municipalities maintained a significant stake in the hydroelectric sector, as they often controlled
the utilities responsible for the electricity supply in their own local area.91 Prior to 1990, there was
no real competition on the electricity market, and the local monopolists could deny other energy
producers access to their segment of the distribution grid.92
This system was abandoned following the passage of the Energy Act 1990.93 This Act set up
a new regulatory framework, where management of the grid was decoupled from the hydropower
production sector.94 In particular, the Act established a system whereby consumers could choose
their electricity supplier freely. At the same time, the Act aimed to ensure that producers were
89 See generally Torstein Bye and Einar Hope, ‘Deregulation of Electricity Markets: The Norwegian Experience’ (2005)
40(50) Economic and Political Weekly 5269; Dag Ove Skjold and Lars Thue, Statens nett: systemutvikling i norsk
elforsyning 1890-2007 (Universitetsforlaget 2007).
90 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 67-71.
91 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 85.
92 See Uleberg (n 64) 83-84.
93 See generally Jens Naas-Bibow and Gunnar Martinsen, Energiloven med kommentarer (2nd edn, Gyldendal 2011).
94 See generally Bye and Hope, ‘Deregulation of Electricity Markets: The Norwegian Experience’ (n 89).
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granted non-discriminatory access to the electricity grid. This laid the groundwork for what has
today become an international market for the sale of electricity, namely the Nord Pool.95
In response to this, monopoly companies were reorganised, becoming commercial companies
that were meant to compete against each other, and against new actors that entered the market.96
In addition to commercialisation, the market-orientation of the sector has also lead to centralisation,
as many of the locally grounded municipality companies have disappeared as a result of mergers
and acquisitions.97 As a result, the local and political grounding of the electricity sector, which
used to be ensured through decentralised municipal ownership, has been significantly weakened.
At the same time, the fact that any developer of hydropower is now entitled to connect to the
national grid gives private actors a possibility of entering the Norwegian electricity market. They
may do so not merely as (minority) shareholders in former utilities, but also as competitors, as long
as they stick to run-of-river or small-scale hydropower.98 In the next section, I give a step-by-step
presentation of the licensing procedure for hydropower, which serves to summarise the legislative
framework and provide information about the institutional framework within which it is called to
function.
4.3.5 The Licensing Procedure
The water authorities in Norway are centrally organised. The most important body is the Nor-
wegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), based in Oslo. In many cases, the NVE
95 See generally Lars Galtung, ‘Nord Pool og Kraftmarkedet’ 39(6) Plan 22.
96 See DH Claes and A Vik, ‘Kraftsektoren: fra samfunnsgode til handelsvare’ in DH Claes and PK Mydske (eds),
Forretning eller fordeling? Reform av offentlige nettverkstjenester (Universitetforlaget 2011).
97 Today, the 15 largest companies, largely controlled by the state and some prosperous city municipalities, own roughly
80% of Norwegian hydropower, measured in terms of annual output. See Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008) (n 58) 28. The
process causing this concentration started long before the market-oriented reform of the sector. In particular, after
the Second World War, there was a significant push by the state towards increased centralisation, see Skjold (n 8);
Thue and Nilsen (n 8).
98 See generally Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, ‘Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter’ (n 16); Larsen, Lund and Sti-
nessen, ‘Fallerstatning – Uleberg-dommen’ (n 16); Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, ‘Er naturhestekraftmetoden rett-
shistorie?’ (n 16).
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have been delegated authority to grant development licenses themselves, but in case of large-scale
development, they only prepare the case, then hand it over to the Ministry of Petroleum and En-
ergy.99 The Ministry, in turn, gives its recommendation to the King in Council, who makes the
final decision.100 Parliament must also be consulted for regulations that will yield more than 20
000 natural horsepower.101
As indicated by the survey of relevant legislation given in previous sections, there are many
categories of hydropower projects. Moreover, different categories call for different licenses. Hence,
the first step in the application process is for the developer to determine exactly what licenses
they require. Generally speaking, the larger the project is, the more licenses it requires. As is
to be expected, the complexity of the licensing procedure tends to increase with the number of
different licenses required. However, the licensing applications tend to be dealt with in parallel,
so that all licenses are granted at the same time, following a unified assessment. In practice,
when the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 applies, it structures the procedure as a whole, also
those aspects that pertain to other licenses.102 In these cases, there is a detailed examination
of environmental effects. The procedure usually includes a designated impact assessment, with a
separate public hearing, that the applicant must complete before the water authorities will consider
their application.103 The time from application to decision can vary widely, depending on the
complexity of the case, the level of controversy it raises, and the priority it receives by the licensing
99 See Delegation of 19 December 2000, from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (FOR-2000-12-19-1705) and
Directive of 15 December 2000, from the King in Council (FOR-2000-12-15-1270), pursuant to the Water Resources
Act 2000 s 64.
100 See Directive of 15 December 2000, from the King in Council (FOR-2000-12-15-1270).
101 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 2.
102 Recall that the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 applies to most projects involving regulation, as well as all projects
that will yield more than 40 GWh/year.
103 See Directive of 19 December 2014 (FOR-2014-12-19-1758), pursuant to the Planning and Building Act 2008, ss 1-
2,14-6.
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authority. Usually, the assessment stage itself will last 1-3 years, sometimes longer.104 While large-
scale schemes involve more complicated procedures, they are also typically given higher priority
than small-scale schemes. In recent years, following the surge of interest in small-scale development,
a processing queue has formed at the NVE.105 This means that small-scale applications typically
have to wait a long time, sometimes several years, before the NVE begins processing them.106
The applicant is expected to submit application notices for publication in local newspapers,
and for larger projects there will typically also be an information meeting arranged in the local
area, where the applicant and the authorities appear side by side, presenting the plans and the
licensing procedure respectively.107 For large-scale projects, it is also common for the applicant to
distribute brochures widely in the local area. These procedural arrangements arguably reflect some
concern for the interests of local populations. However, the procedure is organised in a way that
also creates the impression that the applicant enjoys significant state-backing from the start.
Indeed, applicants not only communicate with locals in place of the authorities, they are also
given responsibility for many material aspects of the assessment process, including the often crucial
assessment of possible alternatives.108 This would seem to raise competency questions, particularly
in cases where the owners present owner-led development as an alternative to expropriation.109
However, even in these cases, the applicant hoping to expropriate will be tasked with evaluating
104 See NOU 2012:9 (Report to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy from a special committee appointed by the King
in Council on 04 March 2011) 84-85.
105 See NOU 2012:9 (n 104) 84.
106 See NOU 2012:9 (n 104) 84.
107 See Ragnhild Stokker (ed), Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, kon-
sekvensutgreiingar og søknader (Rettleier nr 3/2010, NVE 2010) 23.
108 See Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, konsekvensutgreiingar og
søknader (n 107) 24.
109 It also raises questions about the impartiality of the assessment of alternatives motivated by environmental concerns
(especially with respect to the question of what alternatives to evaluate in detail). Quite generally, how the govern-
ment executes its duty to assess alternatives in licensing cases is a thorny issues in Norwegian environmental law, see
generally Inge Lorange Backer and Hans Chr Bugge, ‘Forsømt konsekvensutredning av alternativer – Høyesteretts
dom i Rt-2009-661 om den amerikanske ambassade i Husebyskogen’ [2010] Lov og Rett 115; Nikolai K Winge,
Kampen om arealene: Rettslige styringsmidler for en helhetlig utmarksforvaltning (Universitetsforlaget 2013).
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the owners’ plans on behalf of the government.110
More generally, as discussed in greater depth in chapter 5, the protection offered to waterfall
owners is very limited. For instance, the government does not recognise a duty to notify these
owners individually, to ensure that they are informed of what is at stake for them as owners of
a very valuable resource. Rather, a generic letter is typically sent by the applicant to all affected
private parties. The statement that private property “will be expropriated” unless a settlement is
reached has also been observed.111
After the hearing stage, the NVE will usually compile a final report along with a recommend-
ation and send it to the interested parties for comments.112 It is established practice that local
owners do not count as interested parties in this regard.113 Hence, while the municipalities and
various environmental interest groups are informed of how the case progresses and asked to com-
ment prior to the final decision, the owners must inquire on their own accord if they wish to be
kept up to date on the application process.114
In summary, the procedural framework surrounding licensing of hydropower development leaves
local owners in a precarious position, especially when the applicants wish to expropriate their
waterfalls. At the same time, the liberalisation of the electricity sector means that owners are
in a far better position than before when it comes to developing hydropower themselves. This is
discussed in more depth in the next section.
110 This remarkable form of administrative subcontracting has been given a stamp of approval by the Supreme Court,
see Jørpeland (n 64) 51-55.
111 In the case of Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad LG-2007-176723.
112 See the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 6.
113 See Jørpeland (n 64) 46.
114 In a written statement to the Supreme Court in the case of Jørpeland (n 64), the director of the hydropower division
of the Ministry pointed out that the documents would be made available on the web page of the NVE and that
local owners had to “look after their own interests”.
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4.4 Hydropower in Practice
The history of hydropower in Norway can be roughly divided into four stages. The first stage was
the development that took place prior to 1909. During this time, private actors dominated, with
public ownership playing a minor role.115 Moreover, there were many private interests speculating
in acquiring Norwegian waterfalls, anticipating the value that these would have for industrial
development.116
After 1909, the introduction of licensing obligations and the rule of reversion made it much
harder for private companies to acquire waterfalls that were suitable large-scale industrial develop-
ment. At the same time, local municipalities began to invest in hydropower to provide electricity to
their citizens, a service they were increasingly being obliged to provide.117 This marked the start
of the second stage of hydropower development, which saw the development of a more strictly
regulated sector. However, this sector was also highly decentralised, for a large part dominated by
local actors.
In fact, throughout the first half of the 20th century, most hydroelectric plants were small-scale
plants that supplied local communities with electricity.118 Moreover, as late as in 1943, 89% of
all hydroelectric power stations in Norway were still private, many of which were mini and micro
plants that were owned and operated by the local community.119 However, many bigger plants
were also under private ownership, and 57% of the total hydroelectric power available at this time
was supplied by the private sector.
115 See Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008) (n 58).
116 See NOU 2004:26 (n 4) 30-31.
117 See Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008) (n 58).
118 See Utbygd vannkraft i Norge (Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen 1946) 11. This is a report from the water
directorate published in 1946, showing that as of 31 December 1943, 97.8% of all hydroelectric plants in Norway
were small-scale plants. However, these plants contributed only 28% of the total hydroelectric power installed at
that time.
119 See Utbygd vannkraft i Norge (n 118) 6. See also Hindrum (n 9) 111.
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By the end of 1943, 80% of the Norwegian population had access to electricity at home.120
Hence, the decentralised approach to hydropower development, based on private ownership and
local control, had not been an impediment to the supply of electricity to most of the country’s
population.
However, the regulatory regime was soon to undergo a significant change, designed to facilitate
industrial development and increased state control. This change came quite rapidly after the Second
World War, when the central government began to invest heavily in hydropower, often to ensure
economic development by subsidising the metallurgical industry.121 This period saw increased
marginalisation of small private electricity companies, as well as local owners.122 Indeed, it was
often demanded, as a condition for allowing local communities access to the national electricity
grid, that local hydroelectric plants had to be shut down.123 During this time, the development of
hydropower was seen as an important aspect of rebuilding the nation. However, the goal was not
primarily to supply the public with electricity, but rather to facilitate a specific kind of economic
development that the central government regarded as desirable.124
The state-dominated system set up on this basis remained in place until the 1970s, when increas-
ingly vocal opposition from environmental groups and local populations led to some reforms.125
As the scale of typical development projects had increased significantly compared to earlier times,
new projects would tend to meet with broader and better organised forms of resistance. In many
cases, municipal and regional government institutions would join in opposition against large-scale
120 In rural areas, the corresponding figure was 70%, see Utbygd vannkraft i Norge (n 118) 7.
121 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 59-65.
122 At the same time, powerful (private) metallurgical interests benefited greatly, sometimes also at the expense of the
general supply of electricity. See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 65-71.
123 See Hindrum (n 9) 111.
124 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 59.
125 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 71-75.
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development.126 The typical response from the state was to introduce measures that sought to
pacify the regional and municipal government opposition, which was considered more serious than
opposition from local people and environmental groups. The standard approach was to grant an
increased share of the financial benefit to local and regional institutions of government, to instil
support for state-led development plans.127 The centralisation process in the hydroelectric sector
slowed down somewhat during this time.128 However, despite limiting the discontent among local
power groups, high-profile controversies continued to arise, most notably the Alta case discussed
in the next chapter.
The fourth stage of hydropower development began in 1990 after the passage of the Energy
Act 1990. The liberalisation that followed saw the transformation of the hydropower sector into
a commercial market, based on profit-maximising and competition. As a result, the structure of
decentralised management withered away further, as many municipality companies were either
bought up by more commercially aggressive actors or forced to merge and change their business
practices in order to remain competitive.129 At the same time, a new decentralised force emerged
in the sector, in the form of local owner-led projects.130
The core idea behind the Energy Act 1990 was that the electricity sector should be restructured
in such a way that production and sale of electricity, activities deemed suitable for market regula-
tion, would be kept organisationally separate from electricity distribution over the national grid, a
natural monopoly. Grid companies are now obliged to facilitate access for producers, and after an
amendment in 2009 this applies also when access necessitates new investments.131 However, the
126 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 71-72.
127 See Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-˚arene’ (n 57) 73-76.
128 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 5) 85.
129 See Bibow (n 13) 583 (commenting on the increased concentration of power on the electricity market, following
acquisitions and mergers after 1990).
130 See section 4.4 below.
131 See Act no 105 of 19 June 2009 regarding changes in the Energy Act 1990.
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energy producer seeking access is typically required to reimburse the grid company for the cost of
new investments, as determined in the first instance by the grid company itself (the NVE serves
a supervisory function).132 In addition, grid companies may still deny access in cases when the
needed investments are not “socio-economically rational”.133
Often, the relevant grid company will be a sister company of an energy producer operating in
direct competition with the company seeking access. This can raise questions about the impartiality
of the assessments carried out by the grid company. In expropriation cases, this becomes an issue
particularly in relation to the assessment of the cost of undertaking an alternative development
scheme.134 Riparian owners are rarely pleased when they realise that the expropriating party is part
of the same conglomerate as the grid company that estimates the grid connection costs associated
with owner-led development.135
Meanwhile, the market-orientation of the electricity sector has reduced the level of political
control and accountability. According to Brekke and Sataøen, this serves to set the reform that took
place in Norway apart from similar energy reforms in Sweden and the UK.136 Moreover, Brekke and
Sataøen argue that this has resulted in a lack of legitimacy that has been a significant contributory
cause of recent national-scale controversies, particularly with regards to the development of the
national grid.137
At the same time, the growth of the small-scale hydropower sector gives local communities a
132 See Directive of 7 December 1990 (FOR-1990-12-07-959), s 3-4.
133 See the Energy Act 1990, s 3-4. The authority to decide whether this requirement is fulfilled is vested with the
Ministry.
134 This assessment is often crucial, because it provides information about the value of the development potential that
the owners stand to loose.
135 See, e.g., SKS Produksjon AS v Pedersen LH-2015-92631 (Smibelg).
136 See Brekke and Sataøen (n 12).
137 The most serious case so far is that of Sima - Samnanger, concerning a new distribution line that will cut through
the area known as Hardanger, a scenic part of south-western Norway. The plans met with significant resistance at
both the national and the local level, but the government pushed ahead, leading to confrontations that also involved
some acts of civil disobedience. See Brekke and Sataøen (n 12) 22-23.
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new voice, as market participants, thereby acting as a counterweight to centralisation and expert-
rule. Since the mid- to late 1990s, the small-scale sector has grown significantly. In a recent report,
the potential for profitable small-scale hydropower projects was estimated to be around 20 TWh
per year.138 On this basis, the authors of the report estimate that the total present-day value of
all waterfalls suitable for small-scale hydropower is about 35 billion Norwegian kroner, i.e., about
3.5 billion pounds.139 This calculation is based on a model where the waterfalls are exploited
in cooperation with an external commercial company, inspired by existing agreements between
owners and the limited company Sm˚akraft AS. Hence, the calculation might be an underestimate
of what small-scale hydropower could represent for local communities if they remain in charge of
development themselves.
Small-scale hydropower has become socially and political significant in Norway. In the report
mentioned above, it is estimated that the value of rivers and waterfalls amount to just under
50 % of the total equity in Norwegian agriculture.140 Moreover, hydropower is increasingly seen
as a possibility for declining regions to counter depopulation and poverty. In some communities,
small-scale hydropower is the only growth industry. For these communities, pursuing hydropower
development at the local level also provides a way to regain some autonomy with respect to how
local natural resources should be managed. Hence, small-scale hydropower takes on great political
and social importance, not just for the owners of waterfalls, but for the community as a whole.
For an example of a community where small-scale hydropower has played such a role, I point to
Gloppen, a municipality in the county of Sogn og Fjordane, in the western part of Norway. Here,
138 See Normann Aanesland and Olaf Holm, Verdiskapning av Sma˚kraft (Rapport Nr. 31, Universitetet for miljø- og
biovitenskap 2009). For comparison, suggesting the scale of this potential, I mention that the total consumption of
electricity in Norway in 2013 amounted to about 120 TWh, see (n 1). According to the government, about one third
of the remaining potential for hydropower in Norway, measured in annual energy output, will come from small-scale
projects. See NOU 2012:9 (n 104) 231.
139 See Verdiskapning av Sma˚kraft (n 138) 1.
140 Verdiskapning av Sma˚kraft (n 138) 1.
173
19 hydropower plants have been built in recent years, all except one by local owners themselves,
amounting to a total production of over 250 GWh per year. This prompted the mayor to comment
that “small scale hydro-power is in our blood”.141 When interviewed, he also directed attention
at the fact that hydropower had many positive ripple effects, since it significantly increased local
investment in other industries, particularly agriculture, which had been severely on the decline.
To achieve such effects, it is important to organise development in an appropriate manner.
Moreover, to explain how waterfalls came to be as valuable as they are today, it is crucial to direct
attention to the way in which waterfall owners initially asserted themselves on the market. In the
following, I do this by giving an in-depth presentation of an early model for local involvement
in hydropower development, presented at a seminar in 1996.142 This model contains an early
expression of several ideas that would prove influential to the development of the small-scale
hydropower sector.
4.5 Nordhordlandsmodellen
In five brief points, the Nordhordlandsmodellen sets out a framework for cooperation between water-
fall owners, professional hydroelectricity companies, local communities, and society as a whole.143
The first point makes clear that the aim of cooperation should be to ensure local ownership
and control: external interests should never be allowed to hold more than 50 % of the shares in the
development company. If the company is organised as a limited liability enterprise, then the model
stipulates that local residents – not necessarily owners – are to be given a right of preemption in
the event that shares come up for sale.
141 See Andreas Starheim, ‘Kommunen med Sma˚kraft i Blodet’ [2012] (3) Sma˚kraftnytt.
142 See Otto Dyrkolbotn and Arne Steen, Nordhordlandsmodellen (A manifesto on local hydropower development,
published following a seminar on small-scale hydropower, Dyrkolbotn Leirskole 1996).
143 See Nordhordlandsmodellen (n 142). The model was the result of a collaboration between Otto Dyrkolbotn, a farmer
and a lawyer, and Arne Steen, the director of Nordhordland Kraftlag, a municipality-owned energy company.
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The second point of the model sets out a method for valuing the riparian rights prior to
development. It stipulates that the appraisal should reflect the real value of such rights, normally
estimated on the basis of lease capitalisation. More concretely, the valuation should be based on the
premise that the riparian owners will be entitled to rent based on the level of annual production in
the planned hydropower project. Then, for the purpose of appraisal, the expected rent per annum
is capitalised to find the present value of the riparian rights, relative to the development project
in question.144
After such a value has been calculated, the model stipulates that owners are to be given a choice
of either leasing out their water rights to receive rent, or to use the capitalised value of (part of) this
rent as equity to acquire shares in the development company. The third point in the model then
offers a clarification, by stating that the development company should not in any event acquire
ownership of riparian rights, but only a time-limited right of use. After 25-35 years, this usufruct
should fall away and the waterfall should revert back to the owners of the surrounding land, free of
charge. This is the proposed rule even in cases when the landowners themselves initially control the
majority of the shares in the development company. Hence, the rule places a limit on alienation;
no separation of water rights from land rights is allowed to last for more than 35 years.
The Nordhordland model demonstrated the commercial viability of this organisational model
by pointing to a concrete municipality-owned energy company that had stated its willingness to
cooperate with owners on such terms, to help with financing and share the risk.145
Following up on this organisational blueprint, the fourth and fifth points of the model describe
the intended role of the local development company in society, by stressing the relationship between
hydropower and other interests and potential uses of the affected river. Importantly, the model
144 This approach stands in stark contrast to the earlier valuation method, discussed in chapter 5, section 5.4.1.
145 The company in question is Nordhordland Kraftlag, where one of the authors of Nordhordlandsmodellen, Arne Steen,
was a director.
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stipulates that potential developers should be willing to take on formal obligations towards other
user groups. Moreover, obligations should not only be negatively defined, as duties to minimise
or avoid harms. Positive obligations should also be introduced, such as duties to improve other
qualities of the river system, and to engage in active cooperation with other users.
It is made clear that the overall aim is to ensure sustainable management of the river system
as a whole. Interestingly, the model predicts that active local ownership will achieve more in this
regard than what can be achieved through governmental regulation alone. This claim is illustrated
by a concrete example of a case in which the local owners decided to pursue a scheme that was
less environmentally invasive than the project endorsed by the water authorities.146
The model goes on to emphasise the need for integrated processes of resource planning and
decision-making, to ensure that hydropower development is not approached as an isolated economic
and environmental concern, but looked at in a broader social and political context. To achieve this,
it is argued that local communities need to play an important role in the management of water
resources.
It is important to note that when Nordhordlandsmodellen was formulated, owner-led devel-
opment of hydropower was still a recent phenomenon, driven forward by individual owners and
local groups that saw the potential and had enough know-how to get organised. Later, commercial
companies have emerged that specialises in cooperating with local owners.147 Today, this has made
it relatively easy for owners to initiate small-scale hydropower development. Moreover, owners are
often approached by interested commercial actors who wish to cooperate with them. Most of them
rely on cooperation on terms that reflect the main ideas expressed in the first three points of
Nordhordlandsmodellen.
146 Today, this project has become Svartdalen Kraftverk, finalised in 2006. It produces 30 GWh annually, enough
electricity for about 1500 households.
147 See, e.g., Larsen, Lund and Stinessen, ‘Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter’ (n 16).
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However, several adjustments have become standard, and these systematically benefit the ex-
ternal partner: the requirement that locals should at all times control a majority of the shares is
dropped, the period of usufruct is typically longer than 35 years, the reversion to the landowners
after this time is made conditional on payment for machines and installations, and no preemption
rights are granted to local residents.148 However, the core idea that riparian rights are to be valued
based on a capitalisation of future rent is accepted. This means, in turn, that local owners rarely
need to raise any additional capital to acquire shares in the development company. Moreover, the
rent itself can become a significant source of income.
There are two main approaches to calculating this rent. The first approach, introduced already
in Nordhordlandsmodellen, specifies the rent as a percentage of the gross revenue from sale of
electricity, today often around 10-20 %.149 In this way, passive owners need not take on any risk
related to the performance of the hydropower company. The second approach has been developed
by the company Sm˚akraft AS, which is now the leading market actor specialising in cooperation
with local owners.150 According to their model, riparian owners are paid a share of the annual
surplus from hydropower generation.151
This share is usually higher than the rent payable based on the net revenue; often, the owners are
entitled to 50% of the profit.152 Hence, if the project is a success, the riparian owners might be better
compensated. However, the owners have to accept some risks as though they were shareholders,
and they do so even though they might not have much of a say in how the company is run.153
148 See generally Katrine Broch Hauge, ‘Erstatningsniv˚aet ved tvangsovertaking av fallrettar’ (PhD Thesis, 2015).
149 Source: contracts presented to the court in Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 111) (available from the
author upon request). See also Hauge (n 148) 55-57.
150 It is owned by several large-scale actors on the energy market, see www.smaakraft.no.
151 See Hauge (n 148) 57-60 (also discussing variants of this contractual idea, based on how the surplus is actually
defined in the contract).
152 Source: contracts presented to the court in Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 111) (available from the
author upon request). See also Hauge (n 148) 58.
153 To limit the risk for owners, companies such as Sma˚kraft AS also operates a system of “guaranteed” rent, but this
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To illustrate the financial scale of the rent agreements that have now become standard, let us
consider a typical small-scale hydropower plant that produces 10 GWh annually. With an electricity
price of NOK 0.3 per KWh, this gives the hydropower plant an annual gross income of NOK 3
million. If the rent payable is 20 %, the waterfall owners will receive NOK 600 000 annually,
approximately GBP 60 000. This is many times more than what the owners could hope to receive
according to the traditional method for calculating compensation following expropriation.154
All in all, the financial consequences of the ideas expressed in Norhordlandsmodellen have been
dramatic. However, the latter two points of the model, addressing the importance of holistic and
inclusive management of river systems, have not had the same degree of influence. In the next
section, I address what appears to be a negative consequence of this for the small-scale industry,
threatening to undermine its status as a sustainable alternative to large-scale exploitation.
4.6 The Future of Hydropower
In recent years, there has been a growing tension between the small-scale hydropower sector and
environmental groups. There is talk of a brewing “hydropower battle”, as environmentalists grow
increasingly critical of what they regard as predatory practices.155 Reports on small-scale producers
who are alleged to have violated environmental regulations help fuel the negative impression of the
industry.156
rent is usually quite a lot less than what the owners could expect from an agreement based solely on rent based
on gross income. Source: contracts presented to the court in Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 111)
(available from the author upon request).
154 For an example based on comparing two concrete cases, see chapter 5, section 5.4.1. See also Hauge (n 148) 283-289.
155 See Lars Haltbrekken, ‘Det yppes til ny vassdragsstrid!’ (2012) 44(03-04) Plan 34.
156 In 2010, the NVE conducted randomised inspections and announced that 4 out of 5 mini and micro plants operated
in violation of regulations pertaining to the amount of water they may use at any given time. See ‘Sma˚ kraftverk
driver ulovlig’ (Teknisk Ukeblad, 13th December 2010) 〈http://www.tu.no/kraft/2010/12/13/sma- kraftverk-
driver-ulovlig〉 accessed 15th July 2015. In the largest newspaper in Norway, this was reported under the heading
that four out of five small-scale plants break the law, see ‘Fire av fem sma˚kraftverk driver ulovlig’ (Verdens Gang,
13th December 2010) 〈http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/stroemprisene/fire- av- fem- smaakraftverk- driver-
ulovlig/a/10020264/〉 accessed 15th July 2015. This is misleading, since mini and micro plants are distinct from
small-scale plants proper. Most importantly, the former kinds of plants do not usually require a sector-specific
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On the regulatory side, the water authorities have now adopted much stricter procedures to
assess licenses for small-scale hydropower.157 In addition, different planning routines have been
adopted to ensure that small-scale schemes are no longer considered individually, but in so-called
“packages”, collecting together applications from the same area. As a consequence of these changes,
the number of rejected small-scale applications have increased dramatically in recent years.158
At the same time, powerful market actors who favour a traditional mode of exploitation have
seized the opportunity to lobby more aggressively against small-scale hydropower, in favour of
large-scale projects.159 Such projects, they argue, are preferable also from an environmental point
of view. In recent years, this argument has proven influential in many quarters, particularly among
state agencies, such as the NVE and the Norwegian Environmental Agency.160 It has also been
claimed that this perspective is backed up by research done on environmental effects of small-scale
and large-scale projects.161
The core environmental argument against small-scale solutions has a very simply structure:
small-scale plants indirectly affect a greater total area of land per electricity unit produced, there-
fore they are considered more intrusive than large-scale schemes.162 The stated premise of this
development license. Because of this, it also seems plausible that the reported violations might in large part be
due to a lack of knowledge and professionalism, not predation. I remark that questions later emerged regarding
the accuracy of the report itself. Apparently, one of the plants that was reported to have violated regulations did
not even exist, see Øyvind Lie, ‘NVE inspiserte kraftverk som ikke finnes’ (Teknisk Ukeblad, 20th December 2010)
〈http://www.tu.no/kraft/2010/12/20/nve-inspiserte-kraftverk-som-ikke-finnes〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
157 See Øyvind Lie, ‘NVE varsler flere sma˚kraftavslag’ (Teknisk Ukeblad, 18th January 2012) 〈http://www.tu.no/kraft/
2012/01/18/nve-varsler-flere-smakraft-avslag〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
158 In 2013, the number of rejections tripled compared to previous years, while the number of accepted applications
remained stable. See Linda Sunde, ‘Rekordmange sma˚kraft-avslag’ (Bondebladet, 6th February 2014) 〈http://www.
bondebladet.no/nyhet/rekordmange-smakraft-avslag/〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
159 See, e.g., Rune S Alexandersen, ‘Troms kraft lobber for a˚ stoppe konkurrent - vil bygge kraftverk til 649 mil’ (Nord
24, 16th August 2014) 〈http://www.nord24.no/nyheter/article7531155.ece〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
160 See Jannicke Nilsen, ‘Vil ha større vannkraftverk’ (Teknisk Ukeblad, 14th October 2011) 〈http://www.tu.no/kraft/
2011/10/14/vil-ha-storre-vannkraftverk〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
161 See generally Tor Haakon Bakken and others, ‘Development of Small Versus Large Hydropower in Norway – Com-
parison of Environmental Impacts’ (2012) 20 Energy Procedia 185; Tor Haakon Bakken and others, ‘Demonstrating
a new framework for the comparison of environmental impacts from small- and large-scale hydropower and wind
power projects’ (2014) 140 Journal of Environmental Management 93.
162 Bakken and others, ‘Demonstrating a new framework for the comparison of environmental impacts from small- and
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reasoning is no doubt correct; several small-scale plants, at many different locations, are required
to match the energy produced by a single larger plant, hence a greater land area will be affected.
However, this quantitative observation has no bearing on the issue of how small-scale plants qual-
itatively affect the surrounding environment, compared to large-scale projects. In particular, the
parameters used to compare small-scale and large-scale developments tend to be defined in terms
of generic buffer zones that do not take into account differences in the severity of different kinds of
environmental intrusions. For instance, as long as both installations are observable by passers by,
a small cabin with a turbine inside is considered to have the same “scenic impact” as an imposing
concrete dam that stretches out for 100 meters and significantly distorts the water level in a lake.163
Despite the apparent lack of qualitative arguments, the idea that large-scale development is
better for the environment now appears to be gaining ground in Norway. This represents a complete
reversal compared to the political narrative that has dominated for the last 15-20 years. Indeed,
the merits of small-scale development was strongly emphasised by political leaders around the turn
of the century. In his New Year’s speech 01 January 2001, the Prime Minister went as far as to
declare that the age of large-scale development was over.164 The same phrase was then repeated
in the policy platforms of two successive national governments, in 2005 and 2009 respectively.165
However, as administrative practices and case law on hydropower shows, the end of large-
scale exploitation has proved impossible to implement. Despite being official policy at the highest
level of government for almost 15 years, large-scale development interests continue to dominate
in the hydropower sector.166 Interestingly, the leading national politicians are now changing their
large-scale hydropower and wind power projects’ (n 161) 96-99.
163 See Bakken and others, ‘Demonstrating a new framework for the comparison of environmental impacts from small-
and large-scale hydropower and wind power projects’ (n 161) 95.
164 See, e.g., Haltbrekken (n 155) 34.
165 See the “Soria Moria” declaration from 2005, p 57, and “Soria Moria II”, from 2009, p 52 (available at www.
regjeringen.no).
166 I believe the material presented in this thesis warrants making this claim. Moreover, it is underscored by the two
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position as well.167 Arguably, this demonstrates how the politicians have responded to pressure
from high-ranking bureaucrats and large energy companies.168
The political shift observed at present is likely to result in a further weakening of property
and the rights of local communities. For example, it provides indirect political legitimacy to the
NVE, which pursues an explicit policy of prioritising applications for large-scale projects when
these come into conflict with small-scale schemes in the same rivers.169 Hence, the NVE is likely to
refuse to consider applications from owners as long as there are applications pending that might
result in the expropriation of their property.170
At the same time, the small-scale industry itself has occasionally sought to undermine property
rights, possibly in an effort to mimic the successes of their large-scale competitors. The industry
has argued, in particular, that expropriation should be made more easily available as a tool for
small-scale developers and owners who wish to take property from reluctant neighbours.171 This
argument rests on a peculiar form of anti-discrimination reasoning; as long as large-scale developers
are allowed to take property by force, small-scale developers should be allowed to do the same. In
a world where takings are endemic, this might make some sense. However, it is hardly an attitude
recent Supreme Court decisions in Jørpeland (n 64) and Otra II (n 64).
167 See Øyvind Lie, ‘Energiministeren etterlyser mer regulerbar kraft’ (Teknisk Ukeblad, 28th October 2014) 〈http:
//www.tu.no/kraft/2014/10/28/energiministeren-etterlyser-mer-regulerbar-vannkraft〉 accessed 15th July 2015
(reporting on recent public statements made by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy in support of large-scale
development).
168 In addition to their environmental arguments, these actors also rely on more familiar arguments in favour of large-
scale development, especially the idea that large-scale development is more efficient. See Lie, ‘NVE varsler flere
sma˚kraftavslag’ (n 157). For a contrasting view on efficiency, emphasising the efficiency benefits associated with
small-scale development and a decentralised approach to hydropower, see Innst.O.nr.101 (1999-2000) (Recom-
mendation from parliamentary committee to Parliament regarding the Water Resources Act 2000) 5.
169 See Nye rutiner for behandling av søknader om konsesjon for sma˚kraft (Letter from the NVE regarding new admin-
istrative routines, Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat 2012) 3. See also Lie, ‘NVE varsler flere sma˚kraftavslag’
(n 157).
170 For a concrete example of this, see Smibelg (n 135).
171 See Ola Brekken, ‘Sma˚kraftverk og ekspropriasjon’ [2007] (4) Sm˚akraftnytt; Ola Brekken, ‘Sma˚kraftverk og ekspro-
priasjon – replikk til NVE’ [2008] (1) Sm˚akraftnytt 21. The articles are written by a leading Norwegian energy lawyer,
apparently in his capacity as legal representative of “Sma˚kraftforeningen”, an interest organisation for small-scale
hydropower.
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that helps the small-scale industry preserve its image as the more sustainable hydropower option.
At the same time, the industry is beginning to struggle financially because the price of electricity
has been much lower in recent years than what had previously been forecast.172 Moreover, it has
become clear that some of the investors on the market have engaged in speculative practices, by
aggressively entering into agreements with local owners, without carrying out much hydropower
development.173
These critical remarks should not detract from the fact that the growth in small-scale hy-
dropower has led to dramatically increased benefit sharing with many local owners of rivers and
waterfalls. However, recent events indicate that it is inappropriate to look at this development
in isolation from other concerns. When assessing the future of small-scale hydropower and local
property rights to waterfalls, it seems important to also take into account the broader societal con-
sequences of new commercial practices. If one fails in this regard, the pernicious image of owners
as socially passive “profit-maximisers” gains a firmer hold both on the political and the legal nar-
rative. The negative consequences this can have for property as an institution are already apparent
in Norway, as I will argue in the next chapter.
More generally, recent developments in the hydropower industry illustrate that an entitlements-
based perspective on waterfalls is inappropriate, since local ownership is meant to facilitate sus-
tainable management first, and profit-seeking only second. This insight is also strongly implicit
in Nordhordlandsmodellen. However, as the current debate is evolving, it seems to be at risk of
disappearing from view.
172 See Linda Sunde, ‘Sma˚kraft: Kong Midas i revers’ (Bondebladet, 8th May 2014) 〈http://www.bondebladet.no/
midten/smakraft-kong-midas-i-revers/〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
173 See Rune Endresen, Jostein Løv˚as and Stig Tore Laugen, ‘Solgte før kraftflopp’ (Dagens Næringsliv, 20th March
2014) 〈http://www.dn.no/nyheter/2014/03/20/Energi/solgte-for-kraftflopp〉 accessed 15th July 2015.
182
4.7. CONCLUSION
4.7 Conclusion
Water resources have been, and still are, very important to Norway as a nation. Not only does the
energy of streaming water provide electricity to people and industries, it also provides a source of
profit, prestige and power to those who harness it. Historically, many rural communities in Norway
benefited greatly from this, as it was they who managed local water resources.
Plainly, they did rather well. By the end of 1943, at a time when small-scale plants still out-
numbered large-scale plants 45 to 1, around 80% of the population had access to electricity at
home. The government, especially local governments, also felt responsible for the supply of elec-
tricity to the public, but they generally assumed this responsibility without encroaching on local
populations who wished to manage their own resources.
As discussed in this chapter, the situation changed dramatically after the Second World War,
when the government, especially the central government, assumed more direct control over the na-
tion’s water resources. This led to a situation where local owners became increasingly marginalised.
In recent years, there has been a partial reversal of this trend, as the liberalisation of the electricity
market has enabled local owners and communities to take part in hydropower development once
again.
The result has been a growing tension between large-scale and small-scale development, which
in turn corresponds to a tension between the owners of waterfalls and the energy companies that
wish to expropriate. In the next chapter I will explore this tension in more depth, as I investigate
the rules and practices relating to expropriation for hydropower development.
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5 Taking Waterfalls
5.1 Introduction
The Norwegian water authorities have extensive powers to take waterfalls for hydropower devel-
opment. However, they rarely need to reflect on this power, not even when they use it. The reason
is that expropriation tends to be an automatic consequence of a development license; those who
obtain a license to develop a large-scale hydropower plant almost always obtain also a license to
expropriate the private property rights they require for this purpose.
In some cases, this follows from section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, which gives
license holders a right to expropriate all property rights needed for the development in question.
However, even outside the scope of these provisions, the same approach to expropriation tends
to be adopted. Specifically, the authorities adhere to the presumption that whenever a license to
undertake large-scale development should be granted, then so should a license to expropriate.1
The expropriation presumption has remained in place even though the regulatory and economic
context of riparian expropriation has changed dramatically after the liberalisation of the electricity
sector. This is significant, especially due to how licensing cases are processed. As discussed in
the previous chapter, the administrative licensing assessment tends to focus on the environmental
1 The leader of the hydropower licensing division of the NVE expressed this presumption in Rune Flatby,
‘Sma˚kraftverk og ekspropriasjon – NVEs praksis’ [2008] (1) Sma˚kraftnytt 20 (noting also that the same presump-
tion is not applied for small-scale projects, e.g., when some owners wish to expropriate from neighbours who oppose
development).
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consequences of development, with little attention devoted to how the loss of property rights affects
the owners and their local communities. This is so even though a license to develop is in effect also
a license to expropriate. How did this system come about, and where does it leave local owners
whose waterfalls are targeted by large-scale proposals? This chapter addresses these two questions
in depth.
First, I present the general layout of Norwegian expropriation law, before presenting the history
of expropriation for hydropower purposes. The chapter will demonstrate that the current state of
affairs developed gradually from a pre-industrial starting point where expropriation of waterfalls
was generally not permitted. After the historical assessment, the chapter illustrates how the water
authorities and the courts interpret and apply the rules currently in place. Specifically, I give a
detailed presentation of the recent Supreme Court case of Jørpeland.2 This case demonstrates that
the standing of owners is very weak under administrative law, and it highlights a range of practical
problems that can arise in a system where a right to expropriate is understood as an automatic
consequence of obtaining a development license.
I conclude this chapter with a more overarching assessment based on the theoretical framework
presented in Part I of the thesis, to shed further light on the legitimacy of rules and practices
surrounding takings of waterfalls in Norway. This culminates in an argument suggesting that
the current system systematically produces takings that fail the extended Gray test presented in
chapter 2.
5.2 Norwegian Expropriation Law: A Brief Overview
As mentioned in chapter 2, the right to property is entrenched in section 105 of the Norwegian
Constitution. There it is made clear that when property is taken for public use, full compensation
2 See M˚aland v Jørpeland Kraft AS Rt-2011-1393 (I mention that I acted as legal counsel for the owners in this case).
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is to be paid to the owner. The formulation bears a close resemblance to the formulation of the
US takings clause in the Fifth Amendment.3 However, there is no active public use debate in
Norway and the understanding of “public use” is very broad. It encompasses the natural language
interpretation of both “public interests” and “public purposes”, with no clear distinction being
made between such terms within the law of expropriation in Norway.4 The exact meaning of
public use is hardly ever discussed by the courts, and legal scholars have argued that the public
use formulation should not be interpreted as placing a specific limitation on the state’s authority
to expropriate.5
However, it is a rule of unwritten constitutional law that administrative decisions which affect
the rights of individuals can only be carried out when they are positively authorised by law.6
Moreover, the Constitution is not understood as providing an authority for the state to expropri-
ate. It merely expresses the presupposition that expropriation is possible.7 Hence, when applying
eminent domain, the government needs to justify this on the basis of a more specific authorising
provision.
Historically, there was no general Act relating to expropriation and a range of different Acts
authorised the executive to expropriate for specific public purposes such as roads, public buildings,
3 The Norwegian clause can be translated as follows: “If the needs of the state require that any person shall surrender
their movable or immovable property for public use, they shall receive full compensation from the Treasury.”. I
remark that the translation provided by the parliamentary administration is plainly incorrect. There the “needs of
the state” have been replaced by “the welfare of the state”, which does not reflect the Norwegian text (the Norwegian
expression used is “statens tarv”, literally “the state’s need” or “the state’s interest”). See ‘The Constitution’ (The
Storting’s Administration, 3rd August 2015) 〈https://www.stortinget.no/en/Grunnlovsjubileet/In-English/The-
Constitution---Complete-text/〉 accessed 17th September 2015.
4 Terms like these are not legally defined, but they do feature in legal arguments about expropriation, since it is
usually assumed that expropriation does indeed take place to further some public interest or achieve some public
purpose.
5 See Jørgen Aall, Rettsstat og menneskerettigheter (Fagbokforlaget 2004) 249; Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Halling-
stad LG-2007-176723.
6 See generally Alf Petter Høgberg and Morten Kinander, ‘Det formelle legalitetsprinsippet og rettskildelæren’ [2011]
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 15.
7 See, e.g., Carl August Fleischer, ‘Grunnlovens § 105’ [1986] Jussens Venner 1, 6.
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and schools.8 Today, many of these authorities have been broadened and included in the Expropri-
ation Act 1959. After an amendment in 2001, this Act includes an authority for the government to
authorise expropriation of property and use rights in order to facilitate hydropower production.9
This is understood to include the authority to expropriate waterfalls.10
According to the Expropriation Act 1959, expropriation can only be authorised if the benefits
undoubtedly outweigh the harms, as determined following a discretionary assessment.11 Formally,
the authorising authority lies with the King in Council. However, this authority can be delegated to
ministries or other state bodies that the King in Council can instruct.12 The compensation to the
owner is determined following a judicial procedure administered by the so-called appraisal courts.13
This is the name given to the regular civil courts when they hear appraisal cases, observing the
special procedure set out in the Appraisal Act 1917.
The appraisal procedure emphasises the importance of factual assessment and lay discretion
(the appraisal court typically sits with four lay judges).14 In addition, there are special rules
regarding costs, indicating that the expropriating party is usually required to pay for the procedure,
including the owners’ legal expenses.15 In other regards, the appraisal procedure resembles a typical
adversarial process before a civil court.16
The Expropriation Act 1959 states that unless the King in Council decides otherwise, expropri-
8 See NUT 1954:1 (Report to the Ministry of Justice from a special committee appointed by the King in Council on
22 June 1951) 11-12.
9 See the Expropriation Act 1959, s 2 no 51.
10 See, e.g., Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad TSTAV-2004-84901.
11 See the Expropriation Act 1959, s 2.
12 See the Expropriation Act 1959, s 5.
13 See the Expropriation Act 1959, s 2.
14 See the Appraisal Act 1917, s 11-12.
15 See the Appraisal Act 1917, s 54.
16 For a more in-depth discussion, see Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ in JAMA Sluysmans, S
Verbist and E Waring (eds), Expropriation Law in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 382-384.
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ation orders may only be granted to state or municipality bodies. This is formulated as a limiting
principle, but in effect it serves as a general authorisation for the executive to decide, without par-
liamentary involvement, that a larger class of legal persons may be granted expropriation licenses.
For many purposes, directives have been issued that extend the class of possible beneficiaries to
any legal person, including companies operating for profit. In 2001, such a directive was issued for
the authority to expropriate in favour of hydropower production.17
In addition to providing a general authority for expropriation, the Expropriation Act 1959 also
contains procedural rules. Most notably, the Act stipulates that owners should be notified and that
the facts of the case should be clarified to the “greatest extent possible” before an expropriation
order is issued.18 This formulation seems very strict, but is highly non-specific. In practice, the
level of scrutiny given to the expropriation question under Norwegian law varies greatly depending
on sector-specific administrative practices.19 Moreover, established practice from several fields,
including the hydropower sector, suggests that when expropriation takes place to implement a
public plan or a licensed development, little attention is devoted to expropriation as a special
issue.20 For hydropower, this tendency is particularly strong, since expropriation is typically an
automatic consequence of a development license. The statutory background to this automatic
expropriation effect is explained in the next section.
17 See Directive no 391 of 06 April 2001.
18 The Norwegian expression is “best r˚ad er”, which literally means “best possible way”, see the Expropriation Act
1959, s 12, para 2. The individual notification requirement is relaxed (to a publication requirement) when it is
“unreasonably difficult” to fulfil, see the Expropriation Act 1959, s 12.
19 See Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ (n 16) 380-381.
20 For zoning plans, see Namsos Kommune v Braaholmen sameie Rt-1998-416; Harald Bø v Radøy kommune Rt-1999-
513. For hydropower, see Jørpeland (n 2).
189
5.3 Taking Waterfalls by Obtaining a Development License
As mentioned in the introduction, section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 establishes
an automatic right to expropriate rights needed to implement a licensed watercourse regulation.
This does not include a right to expropriate waterfalls as such. However, it includes a right to
transfer water away from a river for development somewhere else. This has the de facto effect of a
waterfall expropriation, since the water is transferred away from the source river.
This kind of expropriation has always been treated as waterfall expropriation in relation to the
compensation issue.21 Formally, however, the interference is not considered an expropriation of real
property, but rather an expropriation of a right to remove the water, a sort of easement whereby
the developer acquires the right to interfere with the rights of riparian owners in source rivers.
In theory, the rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967
apply when the right to expropriate follows automatically from a development license. Indeed,
the rules in the Public Administration Act 1967 express general principles of administrative law,
pertaining to all kinds of individual decisions, including both expropriation and licensing decisions.
The Expropriation Act 1959, for its part, explicitly states that it applies to property interferences
authorised under the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.22 However, it is also stated that the rules
in the Expropriation Act 1959 only apply in so far as they are “suitable” and do not “contradict”
sector-specific rules.23 This points to the potential caveat that while a range of procedural rules
apply in theory, there is a risk that they will be ignored in practice, if they are deemed unsuitable
by the licensing authorities.
This is practically significant in hydropower cases. Specifically, the water authorities regard
21 See Jørpeland (n 2).
22 See the Expropriation Act 1959 s 30.
23 Expropriation Act 1959, s 30.
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the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 as providing an exhaustive legislative basis for the licensing
procedure.24 This also means that the material assessment requirement in the Expropriation Act
1959 is not considered to have any independent significance alongside the assessment criterion in
the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.25
This is so even though case law on the former assessment criterion emphasises the interests
of affected property owners in a way that case law and administrative practice on the licensing
issue does not.26 As a consequence of how the law is understood on this point, it is very hard
for owners to challenge a decision to allow expropriation of their riparian rights, especially when
expropriation takes place pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.27 Moreover, even if
section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 does not apply, the water authorities rely on the
presumption that an expropriation license should be granted whenever a large-scale development
license is granted.28
Hence, in order to defend themselves, owners must proceed in a roundabout manner by ad-
dressing the licensing question, for instance by arguing that large-scale development will be en-
vironmentally unsound or by presenting a detailed development plan of their own in the hope of
convincing the water authorities of its merits. This is a daunting task, particularly in light of the
continued influence of administrative practices developed during the period of monopoly regulation,
24 This was made clear through the case of Jørpeland (n 2), where this practice also got a stamp of approval from the
Supreme Court.
25 See Jørpeland (n 2) 30.
26 In addition, as mentioned above, the formulation in the Expropriation Act 1959, s 2 contains the additional qual-
ification that the benefit of interference must “undoubtedly” outweigh the harm. This is interpreted to mean that
the benefit must clearly outweigh the harm (pertaining to the evidence, not the weight of the benefit compared
to the harm), see Løvenskiold-Vækerø v Staten (Landbruks- og matdepartementet) Rt-2009-1142. No correspond-
ing requirement is included in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 8. Instead, the formulation there is that a
license should “normally” not be given unless the benefits outweigh the harms. See also Odd Stiansen and Kjell
Haagensen, ‘Vannkraftutbygging’ in Thor Falkanger and Kjell Haagensen (eds), Vassdrags- og energirett (2nd edn,
Universitetsforlaget 2002) 325-236 (arguing that the “normally” qualification is without practical significance).
27 It follows from the discussion in chapter 4 that large-scale development projects almost always involve a license
pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 (or such that many of the rules from this Act, including section
16 on expropriation, apply pursuant to the Water Resources Act 2000).
28 See Flatby (n 1).
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which systematically favour the large energy companies.29
To shed further light on how the current situation came about, I will now present the history
of the law in this area. As will become clear, the current state of affairs was not inevitable, but
rather the result of a series of reforms that gradually undermined property as an anchor for active
community participation in hydropower development.
5.4 Taking Waterfalls for Progress
In the now repealed Water Systems Act 1887, several provisions authorised appropriation of water-
rights and land for various water-related purposes, but the criteria were very narrow.30 Waterfall
rights as such could never be expropriated, and expropriation of other rights pertaining to the use
of water could only be permitted in so far as the affected owners were not thereby deprived of any
water-power that they could reasonably make use of themselves.31
Specifically, expropriation for hydropower development was only permitted when it benefited
waterfall owners who needed to acquire surrounding land in order to make better use of their
own property rights.32 Moreover, riparian owners could apply for licenses to engage in various
industrial exploits, in some cases also when this would prove damaging to other landowners, for
instance through deprivation of water or flooding.33 These rules were similar to many of the rules
found in contemporaneous mill Acts from the US, discussed in section 3.3 of chapter 3. As in
the US, these rules could be classified as giving rise to economic development takings. However,
29 See sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 below.
30 See WS Dahl, Den Norske Vasdragsret (Den Norske Forlagsforening 1888) 69-85. In addition, the purpose of expro-
priation was largely understood to be binding also on future use, so that the taker would not gain unrestricted control
over the rights they acquired. Rather, they were obliged to use these rights to pursue the specific purpose for which
expropriation was authorised. See, e.g., Per Rygh, ‘Ekspropriantens raadighet over ekspropriert ting’ Rt-1912-113,
133-140.
31 See Dahl (n 30) 58.
32 See the Water Systems Act 1887, ss 15, 16. See also the commentary in Dahl (n 30) 60-65.
33 See the Water Systems Act 1887, s 14. See also the commentary in Dahl (n 30) 54-60.
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they did not permit the source of the economic development potential as such to be taken from
the owners.34 Rather, takings were only warranted with respect to additional rights that existing
owners needed to realise the full potential of their own resources.
In fact, an important principle of Norwegian expropriation law at this time was that no property
could be taken if the taker’s interest in that property was part of the current owner’s bundle of
interests associated with the property.35 This applied regardless of whether or not the owners,
subjectively speaking, were likely to pursue the interest in question in an optimal way. On the basis
of this principle, expropriation of waterfalls for hydropower development was not permissible. The
reason was simple: the right to develop hydropower was considered part of the owners’ bundle of
interests. Hence, it could not be taken from them, as a matter of principle.
By contrast, if ancillary land was needed by someone wishing to make optimal use of their
waterfall rights, expropriation was possible. In these cases, the takers did not seek to take the
owners’ rights as much as to negate them, in order to fully enjoy their own. More generally,
expropriation at this time was considered a way to resolve conflicts between rights, not a way to
redistribute them.36
Following industrial advances, the interest in hydropower exploded in the late 19th century.37
As a result, the state increasingly came to see it as a political priority to regulate the hydropower
sector, especially to prevent foreign speculators and industrialists from acquiring ownership of
Norwegian resources.38 As discussed in chapter 3, the most important expressions of this came in
the form of two new licensing Acts, namely the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 (section 4.3.2)
34 See Dahl (n 30) 168-170.
35 See Dahl (n 30) 168-170.
36 See Dahl (n 30) 168-170.
37 See Thor Falkanger, ‘Acquisition of Real Property and State Approval’ (1987) 31 Scandinavian Studies in Law 57,
58-59.
38 See Falkanger (n 37) 58-59.
193
and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917 (section 4.3.3).
Following up on this, Parliament soon passed legislation that authorised expropriation of ri-
parian rights – including waterfalls – for the benefit of public bodies, also when the purpose was
hydropower development.39 In 1940, these authorities were consolidated and integrated in the gen-
eral water resource legislation, through the Water Systems Act 1940.40 According to this Act,
the authority to expropriate waterfalls could be granted only to the state and the municipalities.
Moreover, the municipalities could only expropriate waterfalls when the purpose was to provide
electricity to the local district.41 Private parties could not expropriate except in exceptional circum-
stances, when they already owned more than 50 % of the riparian rights they sought to exploit.42
In all cases of waterfall expropriation, it was felt that benefit sharing with local owners was
required. Hence, special rules were introduced to ensure that takers would have to pay more than
full compensation (typically a 25 % premium, but in some cases the owner was also given a right
to opt for compensation in the form of a proportion of the electricity output of the plant).43
As I showed in chapter 4, the electricity supply in Norway just after the passage of the Water
Systems Act 1940 was already well developed, with 80 % of the population having access to
electricity. Moreover, in the rural areas the supply often came from one among a vast number of
small power plants. In light of the progress already made and the highly decentralised structure of
the hydroelectric sector at this time, one might have expected expropriation to remain a relatively
39 Legislation that made it possible to expropriate waterfalls to the benefit of the municipalities was introduced in 1911,
and a similar authority that authorised expropriation in favour of the state appeared in 1917, see Olaf Amundsen,
Lov om vasdragsreguleringer av 14 december 1917 (nr. 17) med senere tillæg og forandringer: med kommentar
(Aschehough 1928) 29.
40 This Act has since largely been replaced by the Water Resources Act 2000.
41 See the Water Systems Act 1940, s 148. See also the commentary in A Hugo-Sørensen and Birger Olafsen, Lov om
vassdragene av 15. mars 1940: med kommentarer (Tanum 1941) 201-210.
42 See the Water Systems Act 1940, s 55. See also the commentary in Hugo-Sørensen and Olafsen (n 41) 70-74. I
remark that this was a novel rule in the 1940 Act, which contradicted earlier theories about the legitimacy of
allowing expropriation for private benefit.
43 See Hugo-Sørensen and Olafsen (n 41) 70-91,184,210. For more on compensation, see below in section 5.4.1.
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rare occurrence.
However, the prevalence of expropriation to facilitate hydropower development increased greatly
after the war, as the state itself became engaged much more actively with hydropower development,
also for commercially oriented industrial purposes.44 Hence, despite the spirit and wording of the
Water Systems Act 1940, this was the time when expropriation of rivers and waterfalls became a
measure to facilitate large-scale transfers of resources.
This development had little do with supplying electricity to the people. Rather, it arose from
increased political demand for hydropower to support the metallurgical and electrochemical in-
dustries, combined with the fact that the hydropower sector was reorganised and brought under
increasingly centralised political control.45 Following this, a growing share of the financial benefits
from development would accrue to urban areas, as local development companies were replaced
by state companies and companies dominated by prosperous city municipalities.46 In addition,
a highly idiosyncratic compensation method was adopted in expropriation cases, resulting in a
situation where waterfalls could be acquired very cheaply from local owners.
5.4.1 The Natural Horsepower Method
In section 4.3.2 of the previous chapter, I presented the notion of a natural horsepower, used to
determine when a development project requires development licenses pursuant to the Watercourse
Regulation Act 1917 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917. As mentioned, the natural horsepower
of a development scheme is a gross measure of the stable electric effect harnessed following the
44 See Lars Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (Ad notam Gyldendal 1996) 59-71.
See also Dag Ove Skjold, Statens Kraft 1947–1965: For Velferd og Industri (Universitetsforlaget 2006).
45 See Thue, Strøm og styring: norsk kraftliberalisme i historisk perspektiv (n 44) 69-71.
46 In 2007, as the result of a gradual centralisation process, the 15 largest hydropower companies in Norway, which are
largely controlled by the state and some city municipalities, owned roughly 80% of Norwegian hydropower, measured
in terms of annual output. In 2006, the public owners of hydropower in Norway benefited from receiving more than
NOK 9 billion in dividends. See Ot.prp.nr.61 (2007-2008) (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Petroleum
and Energy regarding changes to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 and the Industrial Licensing Act 1917) 28.
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development. Specifically, it measures the electric output that can be maintained for at least 350
days each year, a figure that is sensitive to fluctuating river flows. Before the development of a
national grid, the need to supply electricity at a stable output meant that the notion of natural
horsepower could be used to provide a sensible measure of how much a developer would be willing
to pay for access to riparian rights.47 Indeed, the notion was used in this way on the market for
waterfalls that existed prior to state regulation. The price of a waterfall was typically calculated
on the basis of the price that the developer was willing to pay per natural horsepower that the
planned development would yield.48 The total payment offered to the owners, consequently, would
be found by multiplying the natural horsepower of the development with the price offered per
natural horsepower.
This method was also adopted by appraisal courts to fix the level of compensation following
expropriation.49 Moreover, when the notion of natural horsepower fell into disuse among energy
producers, because it no longer reflected the actual value of development projects, the courts did
not modify their compensation practices. They stuck with the natural horsepower method, which
was now applied on a customary basis, not as a way of calculating realistic economic values.50
Over time, the price level became more and more unrealistic as a measure of the value of
waterfalls as a natural resource. By the time of liberalisation in the early 1990s, the discrepancy
had become extreme. To give an example: in 1999, the appraisal court of appeal awarded a one
time payment of NOK 722 068 in compensation for a waterfall that yields 152 GWh per annum.51
By comparison, in the case of Sauda from 2009, where a market-based valuation method was used,
47 See Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Møllen Rt-2008-82 (Uleberg) 83.
48 See Uleberg (n 47) 83.
49 Ingolf Vislie, ‘Ekspropriasjon og Skjønn i Vassdrag’ in Thor Falkanger og Kjell Haagensen (ed), Vassdrags- og
energirett (2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget 2002) 521.
50 See, e.g., Bergenshalvøens Kommunale Kraftselskap v Neset RG-2000-459, 1599 (the Supreme Court comments that
the method is used customarily because the market provides “little guidance”).
51 See Bergenshalvøens Kommunale Kraftselskap v Neset (n 50).
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the owners of the Maldal river were awarded NOK 1 149 044 in compensation as a yearly payment
for a waterfall that would yield 36.5 GWh per annum.52 If we assume an interest rate of 4 %, this
corresponds to a one time payment of NOK 28 726 100. This, in turn, corresponds to NOK 787
017 per 1 GWh produced annually. That is, the owners of Maldal were paid in the excess of 150
times more for their waterfall than the owners of Hellandsfoss.
This data is from the time after liberalisation, when commercial exploitation became possible
and a more realistic method of valuation came to be used by some appraisal courts, based on the
leasehold model discussed in section 3.5 of the previous chapter. However, the mismatch between
economic values and compensation payments had in fact been noted much earlier, on the basis
of socio-economic calculations. A major discrepancy had been identified as early as in the 1950s,
by the head of the water directorate himself. In an article published in an internal newsletter in
1956, the director commented that the natural horsepower method did not result in compensation
payments that reflected the economic value of waterfalls as natural resources.53 Moreover, he
speculated that the method could be sustained only by exploiting the lack of knowledge about
hydropower development among rural populations.54
One might think that the continued use of the natural horsepower method, in a situation
when the water authorities themselves were aware of its shortcomings, would result in controversy.
However, at this time, the local owners of waterfalls did not attack the method in court. Active
resistance on this point would not be seen until much later, after the liberalisation of the electricity
sector, as discussed in sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 below. However, conflicts arose with respect to other
aspects of the regulatory framework regarding hydropower, as discussed in the following section.
52 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 5).
53 See Olaf Rogstad, ‘Verdien av R˚a Vannkraft’ [1956] (4) Fossekallen.
54 See Rogstad (n 53).
197
5.4.2 Increased Scale of Development and Increased Tension
As discussed in the previous chapter, the state pursued increasingly complex hydropower projects
after the Second World War. At this time, technological and economic advances also made it
more feasible to divert water over great distances, to collect several different rivers in a common
reservoir for joint exploitation. Such projects became known as “gutter” projects, and they grew
greatly in scope during the post-War years. Since the relevant licensing procedure was covered by
the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, the practical importance of the expropriation authority in
section 16 of this Act also increased dramatically.
Initially, the law stood in the way of this development, since section 16 itself stated that a
license to divert water should “normally” not be given unless the owners in the source rivers
agreed to it.55 However, this rule was removed after an amendment in 1959. The department argued
that the rule had an unfortunate effect on the administrative procedure in large-scale diversion
cases, noting also the vastly increasing complexity and scale of typical diversion regulations.56 The
minority in the parliamentary committee recommended against the amendment, noting that it
would “greatly increase” the authority to expropriate waterfalls, conflicting with the principles of
the Water Systems Act 1940.57 However, the majority rejected this argument by maintaining that
the state would prevent any abuse of power, and that the practical significance of the amendment
would be limited to ensuring a “more rational” approach to large-scale applications.58
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the opposition to hydropower grew proportionally to
the scale and complexity of typical development projects.59 The critical focus was often on envir-
55 See generally Innst.O.I (1959) (Recommendation to Parliament from parliamentary committee regarding changes
to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917).
56 Innst.O.I (1959) (n 55) 11.
57 See Innst.O.I (1959) (n 55) 14.
58 See Innst.O.I (1959) (n 55) 14.
59 See generally Yngve Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-˚arene’
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onmental effects, but the interests of local people also featured in these debates. Moreover, local
interest were often aligned with the environmental interests.60
Some controversies led to legal conflicts that came before the Supreme Court. Here the claims
of owners and local communities were consistently rejected. First, the Court held that owners of
ancillary rights (e.g., land needed for dams or buildings) were not entitled to compensation based on
the value of their rights as an asset for hydropower development.61 Instead, they would only receive
damages based on the value of their current use of the property. Second, it was held that when
compensation was awarded to waterfall owners according to the natural horsepower method, then
this would preclude additional compensation for harms and nuisances associated with large-scale
watercourse regulation.62
In the case of Aura, the owners argued that they had originally agreed to sell their water rights
to a private developer, on the understanding that a specific development project would take place,
not involving diversion of water.63 Hence, the owners thought that the purchaser of their water
rights had not acquired a right to divert the water away from the river. Still, when the government
later acquired the water rights in question, they decided to embark on a more intrusive project
that would involve water diversion. For this reason, the owners argued that they were entitled to
additional compensation.
The claim was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that insufficient evidence had been
provided to establish that the sale of the water rights was made conditional on a specific type of
(2008) 87(1) Historisk tidsskrift 61, 64-65.
60 See Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-˚arene’ (n 59) 72-73.
61 See Torgeir Tjønn v Hovedstyret for Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen Rt-1963-316 (Tokke-Vinje) 332-333.
62 See Endre Vange v Fellesskapet Vikfalli Rt-1971-1217; Sør-Trøndelag Kraftselskap v Grunneierne og rettighetshav-
erne i Driva-skjønnet Rt-1982-1518 (Driva).
63 See Staten (Hovedstyret for Norges vassdrag- og elektrisitetsvesen) v Peder Utigard Rt-1961-1282 (Aura) 1284 (the
original transaction took place in the period 1906-1910, when there was still a market for sale of waterfalls to private
speculators and developers).
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development.64 Moreover, it was held – on the basis of the facts – that the sale of the water rights
had not been restricted to only cover the waterfall (i.e., the right to harness hydropower from the
river in question). According to the Supreme Court, the fact that the rights in question had been
referred to as “water rights” meant that the right to divert away the water was also included.65
In the later case of Mardøla, the situation was similar, with the crucial difference being that
these local owners had not sold “water rights”; their contract explicitly stated that what had been
sold was the waterfalls.66 However, the government interpreted this to mean that they had a right to
divert water away from the river, without paying any additional compensation.67 This contradicted
the premise of Aura, where the decision to allow a diversion was premised on the fact that not
only the waterfalls had been acquired by the developer. Still, in Mardøla, the Supreme Court cites
Aura as the primary authority in favour of a general rule by which the sale of a “waterfall” also
includes the right to divert water away from the river.68 No explanation is provided by the Court
to reconcile this with what was actually said in Aura.69
The case of Mardøla illustrates the increasing tension that arose regarding hydropower in the
1970s. Indeed, the case stirred up a high level of controversy that also resulted in civil disobedience
and criminal prosecutions.70 The culmination of the increasing tension surrounding hydropower at
64 See Aura (n 63) 1285-1286.
65 See Aura (n 63) 1284-1285.
66 See Nesset kommune v Staten (Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen) Rt-1973-107 (Mardøla) 112 (the voluntary
sale dated back to the early 20th century, when the market for waterfall was still unregulated).
67 See Mardøla (n 66) 112.
68 See Mardøla (n 66) 112.
69 Arguably, the Court’s finding on this point has since been overruled by Jørpeland (n 2). Here a waterfall right was
defined explicitly as a right to exploit the hydropower in a river along its present trajectory. This definition was
provided in order to avoid the conclusion that a diversion of water by someone other than the waterfall owner (in the
source river) amounts to a waterfall expropriation. If the Court had instead concluded in keeping with the precedent
set by Mardøla, by holding that the diversion right is part of the waterfall bundle, it would have shed serious doubt
on the legitimacy of the established practice of allowing diversions under section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation
Act 1917, with no prior acquisition of the waterfall rights in source rivers.
70 See Statsadvokat Knut Hval, aktor v A Rt-1971-1120.
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this time came with the case of Alta, where the question of procedural legitimacy was raised in full
breadth. To this day, the Alta case remains the most important Supreme Court precedent in the
area of hydropower law.
5.4.3 The Alta Controversy
The Alta case went before the Supreme Court in 1982 after a long period of high-intensity conflict
going back to the mid-seventies.71 In Alta, the affected local population largely lacked formal title
to the property they sought to defend. This was because the development in question would take
place in the northernmost part of Norway, in the native land of the Sami people.72
Norway has a history of discrimination against the Sami, and as their culture is largely nomadic,
their land rights were never formalised in private law.73 As a result, land and natural resources in
the county of Finnmark are largely owned by the state, at least in the sense of the state appearing
as the nominal in rem owner.74
Due to the sensitive context of interference, the Alta plans met with particularly strong criticism
from local people, as well as environmental groups and groups fighting for indigenous rights. A
broad political movement was mobilised in opposition to the plans, eventually resulting in several
serious cases of civil disobedience.75 The plans for development had initially involved a dam that
71 See Alta Laksefiskeri Interessentskap v Staten (Norges Vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen) Rt-1982-241. For comment-
aries, see Torstein Eckhoff, ‘Alta-dommen’ [1982] Lov og Rett 399; Erik Boe, ‘Altadommen – en rettslig løsning
p˚a konflikten mellom energiforsyning, naturvern og minoritetsbeskyttelse’ (1983) 6(3) Retfærd 76; Geir H˚agvar,
‘Alta-dommen og Høyesteretts oppgave. En studie i forholdet mellom jus og økologi’ [1988] (4) Kart og Plan 401.
72 For Sami law generally, see Susann Funderud Skoglund, Samerett: om samenes rett til en fortid, n˚atid og fremtid
(Universitetsforlaget 2002).
73 See Øyvind Ravna, ‘Samerett og samiske rettigheter i Norge’ in Tore Henriksen and Øyvind Ravna (eds) (Gyldendal
juridisk 2012) 149-156
74 In the past 30 years, partly as a response to the controversy of the Alta case, there has been a gradual change in
attitude, whereby the rights of the Sami people receives greater legal recognition. In 2007, formal title to most of
the land in the county of Finnark was transferred to a special state agency which is regulated by a special statute
that obliges it to manage the land with due regard to customary and prescriptive rights of indigenous groups and
local people. See generally Kirsti Strøm Bull, ‘Finnmarksloven: finnmarkseiendommen og kartlegging av rettigheter
Finnmark’ (2007) 46(9) Lov og rett 545.
75 This included hunger strikes and attempts at sabotage, see Nilsen, ‘Ideologi eller kompleksitet? Motstand mot
vannkraftutbygging i Norge i 1970-˚arene’ (n 59) 80-83. For the Alta controversy generally, see Lars Martin Hjorthol,
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would flood a village and displace its inhabitants, but this aspect of the project was abandoned.
However, the conflict continued, with the local population arguing that the proposed hydropower
plans would threaten their livelihoods. The case eventually came before the courts, when the locals
joined forces with environmental groups to request judicial review of the development licenses that
had been granted.76
The Alta case did not involve expropriation of waterfalls. However, because of the priority
given to the licensing procedure over specific expropriation procedures, the principles expressed
in Alta also largely determine the legal position of waterfall owners whose rights to hydropower
are expropriated.77 Moreover, the case involved expropriation of other property rights as well as
special usufructuary rights held by the Sami people.
Alta was admitted to the Supreme Court in plenum, directly on appeal from the district court.78
The presiding judge commented that as far as he knew, it was the longest and most extensive civil
case that the Court had ever heard.79 In an opinion totalling 138 pages, the Court considers a
long range of objections against the development licenses, all of which are either rejected or held
to provide insufficient reasons to declare the licenses invalid.
First, the Court summarily rejects arguments based on indigenous and human rights law on the
basis that the impact of the planned development would not be sufficiently severe to raise any issues
in this regard.80 After concluding in this way, the Supreme Court goes on to approach the case
Alta. Kraftkampen som utfordret statens makt (Gyldendal akademisk 2006); ‘Alta Controversy’ (Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia, 23rd January 2015) 〈https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alta controversy〉 accessed 16th July 2015.
76 See Eckhoff (n 71).
77 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 5); Jørpeland (n 2).
78 This is a special arrangement available in cases that raise important questions of principle, see the Civil Dispute
Act 2005 s 30-2 and the Courts of Justice Act 1915, s 5.
79 Alta (n 71) 254.
80 See Eckhoff (n 71) 351-352. I note that the most important international instrument protecting indigenous rights,
ILO Convention No 107, was not ratified by Norway at the time of Alta (Norway later ratified its replacement,
ILO Convention No 169). Still, it was argued that it had the status of customary international law, an argument
not considered in any depth by the Supreme Court. See generally Asbjørn Eide, ‘Menneskerettigheter og samenes
rettigheter’ [1980] Lov og Rett 139.
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on the basis of administrative law. The focus is solely on the procedural rules of the Watercourse
Regulation Act 1917. In this regard, the opponents of the Alta development had pointed to a large
number of purported shortcomings of the decision-making process.
First, it had been argued that the original licensing application did not meet the requirements
stipulated in section 5 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. Essentially, the original application
contained little more than technical details about the planned development, with hardly any iden-
tification or assessment of deleterious effects.81 This shortcoming had been openly acknowledged
by the water authorities themselves, but a public hearing had nevertheless been initiated.82
The Supreme Court concluded that this was “clearly unfortunate”.83 However, several reports
and assessments had subsequently been provided, to fill the gaps left open by the initial application.
For this reason, the Supreme Court held that the initial mistakes were irrelevant, since it was the
licensing process as a whole that should be assessed.84 Shortcomings at specific stages in the
assessment would not be given weight unless they could be seen to imbue the process with a
dubious character overall.85
The Court then moved on to assess whether the process as a whole fulfilled the procedural
requirements of sections 5 and 6 in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. In addition, the Court
considered whether the assessment of the licensing criteria in section 8 of the Watercourse Regula-
tion Act 1917 had been sufficiently detailed. In addition to assessing a large amount of information
regarding the negative effects of development and how these had been assessed by the water au-
thorities, the Alta Court also made some important statements of principle. In particular, the
Court held that since a licensing decision itself is discretionary, it is appropriate to grant the ex-
81 See Alta (n 71) 264-265.
82 See Alta (n 71) 265.
83 Alta (n 71) 265.
84 See Alta (n 71) 265-266.
85 Alta (n 71) 265.
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ecutive some margin of appreciation also with regard to the question of how to interpret vague
requirements of administrative law.86
The Court made a second decision of principle when it supported the state’s contention that the
administrative licensing assessment did not have to be as thorough as that required in a subsequent
appraisal dispute.87 This observation was used to downplay the risk of factual error; if mistakes are
made with regard to the owners’ losses at the assessment stage, these mistakes can be corrected
later by a correct compensation award.
In fact, the Alta Court agreed that the license had been based on erroneous information about
some issues, particularly regarding alternative ways to meet the need for electricity in Finnmark.88
However, the Supreme Court did not regard the factual errors in this regard as relevant to the
licensing decision.89
Here a third clarification of principle took place. The Court held, in particular, that the duty
to consider alternatives – different ways in which the purpose of development could be satisfied
– is very limited in hydropower cases.90 This was how the Court dealt with factual errors and
inadequate information concerning alternatives; since the information in question was not required
in the first place, the mistakes had no bearing on the validity of the decision.91
The Court’s perspective on alternatives appears to have been at odds with how Parliament had
approached the licensing question, on three separate occasions.92 Indeed, there was little doubt that
the favourable political assessment of the Alta development depended strongly on the perceived
86 See Alta (n 71) 262-264.
87 See Alta (n 71) 279.
88 See Alta (n 71) 346-357.
89 See Alta (n 71) 346.
90 See Alta (n 71) 346.
91 Alta (n 71) 346.
92 See Alta (n 71) 342.
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electricity crisis in Finnmark and the supply situation in Norway generally, as well as the perceived
inadequacies of alternative solutions.93
Hence, it is quite remarkable how little attention the Court directs towards the factual errors
and the inadequate information that had been provided in this regard.94 By contrast, the Court
goes into painstaking detail regarding issues that seem to have been far less important to the
political decision-makers.
The dismissive attitude towards the duty to correctly assess alternatives is a controversial aspect
of the Alta-decision. On this point, the decision met with particularly clear criticism from legal
scholars.95 It has been argued that the way the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of alternatives
in Alta can serve as an example of a more general tendency for the Norwegian judiciary to identify
itself with other organs of state.96 Some also argued that it was unlikely that Alta would become
a leading precedent in this regard.97 However, this has been proven wrong. Indeed, Alta continues
to receive favourable citations by the Supreme Court, both in relation to hydropower and with
respect to administrative law generally.98
It should be mentioned, however, that after the Alta decision, the legal position of the Sami
people has improved quite significantly.99 Moreover, the controversy surrounding Alta has been
93 See Alta (n 71) 338-347.
94 See also the surprise expressed in Eckhoff (n 71) 349-351.
95 See Stiansen and Haagensen (n 26) 311. For an example of a particularly critical assessment, see Inge Lorange
Backer, Naturvern og Naturinngrep (Universitetsforlaget 1986) 580-584.
96 See, e.g., Hans Petter Graver, ‘Norms and Decisions’ (1988) 32 Scandinavian Studies in Law 49, 64 (commenting
also that “government prestige” was at stake).
97 See Backer, Naturvern og Naturinngrep (n 95) 580-584.
98 See Naturvernforbundet i Oslo og Akershus v Staten (Miljøverndepartementet) Rt-2009-661; Jørpeland (n 2).
99 See generally Jon Gauslaa, ‘Utviklingen av sameretten de siste 25 a˚rene og betydningen for arealforvaltning og
rettspleie’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), Areal og Eiendomsrett (Universitetsforlaget 2007). Gauslaa presents the emergence
of Sami law, a collection of rules and principles serving to protect established land use patterns and the Sami way
of life while also giving the Sami people a better opportunity to partake in decision-making processes that affect
them as group.
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regarded as a catalyst for change in this regard.100 Hence, it is unlikely that the courts today
would be as quick as the Alta court to dismiss arguments based on indigenous rights.101
However, with regard to local owners more generally, the Alta decision is considered to express
key principles that still apply.102 At the same time, the context surrounding takings for hydropower
development have changed significantly. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, takings of
waterfalls now occur in a very different economic context. Moreover, as discussed in the next
section, the legal context has also changed, giving rise to a situation where expropriations of
waterfalls now take place to the benefit of companies operating for profit, not public utilities.
5.5 Taking Waterfalls for Profit
Following the introduction of the Water Resources Act 2000, the legislative authority to expropriate
waterfalls was expanded and incorporated in the Expropriation Act 1959. This change in the law
was not singled out for political consideration. In fact, the increased scope of expropriation was
not mentioned at all when the Ministry presented their proposals to Parliament. Rather, the new
expropriation authority was described merely as a “simplification” of existing law.103
The proposal stemmed from the report handed to the Ministry by a committee appointed to
prepare a new Act relating to water resources. The report totals almost 500 pages, but devotes only
three of those pages to discussing the new expropriation authority.104 Here it is noted that a range
of different authorities for expropriation has long co-existed in the law, with many of them positing
strict and specific purpose requirements as a precondition for granting a license. This, it is argued,
100 See Ravna, ‘Samerett og samiske rettigheter i Norge’ (n 73) 156.
101 See Gauslaa (n 99) 180.
102 See Jørpeland (n 2). See also Stiansen and Haagensen (n 26) 312.
103 Ot.prp.nr.39 (1998-1999) (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy regarding the Water
Resources Act 2000) 223-225.
104 See NOU 1994:12 (Report to the Ministry of Business and Energy from a special committee appointed by the
Crown Prince Regent in Council 09 November 1990) 235-237.
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is not a very “pedagogical” way of providing expropriation authorities.105 Moreover, it is suggested
that such a system runs the risk of omitting important purposes for which expropriation should be
possible. Hence, the committee proposes to replace all older authorities by a sweeping authority
that will make expropriation possible for the purpose of facilitating “measures in watercourses”.106
The committee notes that such a formulation might seem wide, but remarks that this is not
a problem since the executive can simply refuse to issue an expropriation order when they regard
expropriation as undesirable.107 There is no discussion of the consequences of such a perspective,
neither in relation to property rights nor in relation to the balance of power between the legislature,
the executive and the courts.
However, the later case of Sauda shed light on this question, as it emerged that the new authority
would, for the first time in Norwegian history, make it possible for private commercial interests to
directly expropriate waterfalls.108
5.5.1 Sauda
In Sauda, a case before the court of appeal, the riparian owners formally protested a license that
granted a private company the right to expropriate their rivers and waterfalls.109 In the district
court, the owners’ principal argument was that the executive could not grant such a right to a
private party, since the legislation authorising private expropriation of waterfalls had not been
properly authorised by Parliament.110
105 NOU 1994:12 (n 104) 235.
106 NOU 1994:12 (n 104) 235-236.
107 NOU 1994:12 (n 104) 235.
108 In cases involving diversion of water, a de facto right to expropriate could be granted to private actors indirectly
under section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917. See the discussion in section 5.4.2 above.
109 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 10) (the decision from the district appraisal court) and Aktiesel-
skabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 5) (the decision from the appraisal court of appeal).
110 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 10).
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This argument appeared weak, since the Expropriation Act 1959 contains a provision which
implies that the executive is authorised to decide what legal persons can benefit from expropriation
licenses under that Act.111 However, the owners argued that the executive had not appropriately
informed Parliament that private takings of waterfalls would result from including the waterfall
expropriation authority in the Expropriation Act 1959. It was pointed out, in particular, that the
crucial amendment to the Expropriation Act 1959 had been passed as a mere formality following
the adoption of the Water Resources Act 2000, on the basis of the Ministry’s description of the
new expropriation authority as a “simplification” of existing law.
To back up their constitutional argument, the owners presented the written testimony of two
members of the parliamentary committee that had prepared and voted for the Water Resources
Act 2000 and the associated amendments of the Expropriation Act 1959.112 Neither of them could
recollect that they had been aware that their actions would make private expropriation possible.
Plainly, they had not been told, and had not realised on their own, that this would be the result.
Their ignorance was not in fact very surprising, since the crucial change in the law was only apparent
as an implicit consequence of the combined effect of three different sections in two separate Acts.113
In the entire collection of preparatory documents, the change was discussed only once, and then
only very briefly, in the report from the committee to the Ministry.
On this basis, the owners argued that the purported expropriation authority was not consti-
tutionally valid, since Parliament had not intended it. Unsurprisingly, this argument was rejected
by the district court.114 It had to be assumed that members of Parliament understood the con-
sequences of their own legislative actions.
111 See section 3 of the Expropriation Act 1959. As mentioned in section 5.2 above, the provision gets to the point in
a rather roundabout way, by stating that no one except state bodies may be granted a permission to expropriate,
unless the King in Council has decided otherwise.
112 Presented to the Court in Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 10) (available from the author on request).
113 See the Water Resources Act 2000 s 51 and the Expropriation Act 1959, ss 2, 3.
114 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 10).
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Interestingly, however, when the case went before the court of appeal, the issue was not discussed
at all, since the court decided to rely on a different authority as the legislative basis for allowing the
expropriation to go ahead. Specifically, since the expropriation in question involved a diversion of
water, the court of appeal held that the taker did not in fact require the expropriation license it had
been granted pursuant to the Expropriation Act 1959. Section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation
Act 1917 would suffice.115 Hence, the constitutional question could be laid to rest.
In addition to the constitutional complaint, the owners in Sauda also raised procedural objec-
tions. They argued, in particular, that the expropriation question had been insufficiently assessed
by the water authorities.116 The court did not agree, and the procedural arguments at stake here
foreshadow the later Supreme Court case of Jørpeland, discussed in more depth in section 5.6.
While the owners in Sauda lost the validity dispute, the level of compensation they received
was dramatically increased compared to earlier practice. Because of this, the development company
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, with the owners lodging a counter-appeal regarding
the question of legitimacy. The Supreme Court decided not to hear the case, possibly because it had
recently considered the compensation issue in the case of Uleberg, discussed in the next section.117
5.5.2 Uleberg
Just before the Sauda case was decided by the court of appeal, the Supreme Court had addressed
the compensation question in the case of Uleberg.118 Here the Supreme Court agreed in principle
that the natural horsepower method was not binding on the appraisal courts. Specifically, the
Court held that market value compensation could be awarded just in case small-scale development
115 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 5). See also the discussion in section 5.2 above.
116 See Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v Hallingstad (n 5).
117 As is the norm in Norway, the Supreme Court did not give any reason for its refusal to hear Sauda.
118 See Uleberg (n 47).
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by owners would have been “foreseeable” in the absence of expropriation.119 In Uleberg, this was
not the case. Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the relevant date of valuation was in
1968, when the waterfall rights in question had been transferred to the developer by a voluntary
agreement.120
This agreement stated that the final payment to the owners should be fixed by the appraisal
courts at the time when the development took place. Both the appraisal court and the appraisal
court of appeal took this to mean that the valuation should be based on the value of the waterfall
at the time when the compensation was awarded. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding
instead that the intended reading was that the valuation should be based on the value of the
waterfall at the date when the voluntary agreement was made (with interest paid for the delay).121
Furthermore, the Supreme Court then stated, without any substantive argument, that the
natural horsepower method should then be used.122 Presumably, this was based on the opinion
that it was obvious that owner-led development would have been ‘unforeseeable’ at the relevant
time of valuation. The exact meaning of the foreseeability requirement has since become a much
contested issue, resulting in several Supreme Court cases pertaining specifically to the compensation
question.
5.5.3 Recent Developments on Compensation
Since Uleberg, there have been many controversial cases involving expropriation of waterfalls.123
In most of these, the issue of compensation has occupied center stage. With respect to this issue,
119 See Uleberg (n 47) 81.
120 See Uleberg (n 47) 70.
121 See Uleberg (n 47) 71.
122 See Uleberg (n 47) 62.
123 See generally Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Erstatning for erverv av fallrettigheter’
[2006] Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett 175; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Fallerstatning –
Uleberg-dommen’ [2008] Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett 46; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund and Stein Erik Stinessen, ‘Er
naturhestekraftmetoden rettshistorie?’ [2012] (1) Tidsskrift for eiendomsrett 21.
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owners initially appeared to be gaining significant ground, as the appraisal courts started to apply
a market-based method quite systematically, resulting in dramatically increased compensation
payments.124
The large energy companies consistently resisted this development, typically by arguing that
small-scale hydropower was unforeseeable and therefore not compensable according to the prin-
ciple expressed in Uleberg.125 Moreover, the takers would tend to argue that a license to undertake
large-scale development was by itself conclusive evidence that small-scale development was unfore-
seeable.126 The large-scale development license showed, according to the takers, that a license to
undertake small-scale development would not have been granted.
This line of argument conflicts with the so-called no-scheme principle, whereby compensation
for expropriated property is to be based on the situation such as it would have been in the absence
of the expropriation scheme.127 This principle is often contentious, and notoriously hard to apply
in practice.128 However, in hydropower cases, its meaning is typically clear enough: compensation
should be based on the situation as it would have been in the absence of plans for large-scale
124 See the discussion on the natural horsepower method above, in section 5.4.1. See also Katrine Broch Hauge, ‘Er-
statningsniv˚aet ved tvangsovertaking av fallrettar’ (PhD Thesis, 2015) 278-290.
125 See, e.g., BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen Rt-2011-1683 (Kløvtveit); Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaen Brugseierforening
v Bjørnar˚a Rt-2010-1056; Bjørnar˚a v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening Rt-2013-612.
126 See, e.g., Otra I (n 125) 17.
127 This principle is found in many jurisdictions. See JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), Expropriation
Law in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 20-21; Amnon Lehavi and Amir N Licht, ‘Eminent Domain, Inc.’ (2007) 107(7)
Columbia Law Review 1704, 1722. The common law formulation is also often referred to as the Pointe Gourde rule,
named after Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad
and Tobago) [1947] UKPC 71.
128 For a recent clarification of (some aspects of) the principle as applied in England and Wales, see Waters and other
v Welsh National Assembly [2004] UKHL 19; Transport for London v Spirerose Limited [2009] UKHL 44, (2009)
1 WLR 1797. There have been many calls for legislative reform as well, which have so far not been taken up by
the government, see Emma Waring, ‘Expropriation Law in England’ in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring
(eds), Expropriation Law in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 152. In Norway, the principle has proven itself equally
problematic (if not more so), see for instance NOU 2003:29 (Report to the Ministry of Justice and Police from a
special committee appointed by the King in Council 16 March 2001) (including an aggressive dissent from a professor
of law opposing a widening of the no-scheme principle, especially in cases when the ‘scheme’ involves protecting
the environment). I also mention that in economic development situations, a wide application of the no-scheme
principle can have the effect of precluding benefit sharing between takers and owners, giving rise to a legitimacy
issue that is discussed in depth in Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘On the compensatory approach to economic development
takings’ in Bjo¨rn Hoops and others (eds), The Context, Criteria, and Consequences of Expropriation (forthcoming,
Ius Commune 2016).
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development. Hence, the energy companies contradict the no-scheme principle when they argue
that small-scale hydropower should be considered unforeseeable because the licensing authorities
prefer large-scale development.
In most early cases before the lower courts, this type of argument failed precisely because the
no-scheme principle was applied. Moreover, in the case of Otra I, the Supreme Court appeared to
express its support for this line of precedent.129 However, the Court did not focus specifically on
the no-scheme principle and how it should be applied in hydropower cases. Moreover, the taker
in that case succeeded in having the appraisal court of appeal’s decision overturned on the basis
that inadequate reasons had been provided to justify the amount of compensation awarded to
owners.130 The court of appeal therefore had to hear the case again. This time, the taker was able
to successfully argue that small-scale hydropower was unforeseeable. Hence, the court of appeal
used the natural horsepower method to calculate compensation.131
The owners duly appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the
case for a second time.132 But this time, the Supreme Court endorsed the understanding of the
no-scheme principle argued for by the energy company. Specifically, the Court refused to censor
the appraisal court of appeal’s assessment of foreseeability, even though it was based explicitly on
the premise that the expropriation project was preferable from the point of view of the licensing
authorities.133
If the precedent set by Otra II stands, compensation for the loss of alternative development
opportunities will generally not be awarded in future cases where waterfalls are expropriated in
129 See Otra I (n 125) 31-48.
130 See Otra I (n 125) 52.
131 In fact, the court used a slightly modified version of the method, first developed in Aktieselskabet Saudefaldene v
Hallingstad (n 5), serving to make the discrepancy between market value and compensation slightly less pronounced.
See Bjørnar˚a v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening LA-2010-181441.
132 See Otra II (n 125).
133 See Otra II (n 125) 53-54.
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favour of large-scale schemes.134 However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has been very
vague on how exactly it understands the no-scheme principle in these cases. Instead of tackling this
issue directly, the Court has chosen to rely largely on deference to the foreseeability determinations
carried out by the appraisal courts.
This is clearly illustrated by the earlier case of Kløvtveit.135 Here the Supreme Court agreed with
the appraisal court of appeal that it might in principle be foreseeable that the owners, in the absence
of expropriation, could have cooperated with the taker to implement the expropriation project.
This too contradicts the no-scheme principle, but unlike the reasoning of Otra II, it also provides
an alternative route to substantial compensation, on the basis of a valuation of the expropriation
project itself. In effect, it points to an approach that promises to deliver a form of benefit sharing
between owners and takers.
For this reason, Kløvtveit is an interesting decision. However, it seems quite unlikely that it will
become an important precedent for the future. Its importance was undermined already by Otra II,
when the presiding judge explicitly denied that cooperation between the taker and the owners was a
realistic scenario in that case.136 Moreover, Kløvtveit itself was eventually sent back to the appraisal
court of appeal, because the Supreme Court held that the date of valuation had been incorrectly
determined.137 On the second hearing in the appraisal court of appeal, cooperation between owners
and taker was regarded as unforeseeable, so market value compensation was denied.138
In fact, no case heard by the Supreme Court so far has concluded with compensation based
on commercial values. In the end, the natural horsepower method has always been used. This, no
134 The precedent has already been used to deny such compensation in the case of SKS Produksjon AS v Pedersen
LH-2015-92631 (Smibelg) (appeal to the Supreme Court denied).
135 See Kløvtveit (n 125).
136 See Otra II (n 125) 69-71.
137 See Kløvtveit (n 125) 35-39.
138 See BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen LG-2011-205374.
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doubt, sends a clear signal to the appraisal courts. In the future, it seems likely that we will see a
resurgence of the natural horsepower method and a return to compensation awards amounting to
tiny fractions of the values that are taken from local owners.
In light of this development, the broader issue of legitimacy becomes increasingly important.
The financial entitlements of owners and communities, which seemed to be better protected after
Uleberg, are again at risk of being undermined. Moreover, as the social function theory of property
indicates, the issue of legitimacy goes well beyond the individual financial entitlements of owners. It
also pertains to the future of the local communities, the duties of owners in this regard, sustainable
management, and the democratic legitimacy of decision-making regarding natural resources. These
aspects have not received any attention from Norwegian courts so far. However, as I have already
mentioned, the case of Jørpeland saw the procedural legitimacy of hydropower takings come to
the forefront, for the first time since the case of Alta. In addition to clarifying legal points in this
regard, the case also sheds light on the practices adopted by the water authorities in expropriation
cases. Hence, it provides an excellent opportunity for a closer inquiry into the legitimacy question.
5.6 A detailed case study: Ola M˚aland v Jørpeland Kraft AS
The expropriating party was a public-private commercial partnership, Jørpeland Kraft AS. Ori-
ginally, this limited liability company was jointly owned by Scana Steel Stavanger AS, with 1/3 of
the shares, and Lyse Kraft AS, with the remainder.139 Lyse Kraft AS is a publicly owned energy
company with the city municipality of Stavanger being the dominating shareholder. Scana Steel
Stavanger AS, on the other hand, was a subsidiary of the publicly traded Scana Steel Industrier
ASA. The largest shareholder of the parent company is a private individual, a leading business
139 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland TSTAV-2007-185495, 2.
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person and one of the richest people in the city of Stavanger.140
Scana Steel had long operated a steel mill in the small town of Jørpeland, belonging to the mu-
nicipality of Stranda, Rogaland county, in south-west Norway. The source of energy was a relatively
small hydropower plant harnessing energy from the river that reaches the sea near Jørpeland.141
At the height of activity, the mill had about 1200 employees and was an important local institu-
tion.142 However, after going bankrupt and being reorganised in 1977, the importance of the steel
mill declined significantly.143 After a second bankruptcy in 2015, Scana Steel Stavanger AS was
wound up. The mill has since been reorganised yet again, with the number of employees reduced
from around 100 to around 30.144
In parallel with the decline of the steel mill, the hydropower plant in Jørpeland was rebuilt and
expanded, not to supply energy for local industry, but to sell electricity on the national grid.145
Jørpeland Kraft AS was put in charge of this development, which was thereby decoupled from the
steel mill operations. In 2011, the same year when M˚aland came before the Supreme Court, Scana
Steel Stavanger AS sold their shares in Jørpeland Kraft AS to the German investment company
Aquilla Capital.146 In light of this, the story of Jørpeland nicely illustrates broader trends in the
history of hydropower, reflecting the centralisation and commercialisation pressures discussed in
chapter 4.
140 See Harald Birkevold, ‘Milliardærer mot strømmen’ (Aftenbladet, 21st October 2009) 〈http://www.aftenbladet.no/
nyheter/okonomi/skatt/Milliardarer-mot-strommen-2078850.html〉 accessed 3rd September 2015 (the business man
in question is John Arild Ertvaag).
141 See Camilla Aadland, ‘Scana Industrier vil eie kraften selv’ (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2nd November 2009) 〈http://www.
tu.no/kraft/2009/11/02/scana-industrier-vil-eie-kraften-selv〉 accessed 3rd September 2015.
142 See Eilef A Meland and Geir Nybø, Konkursen ved Stavanger Staal A/S: reorganisering, ansettelsestrygghet og
arbeidsmarkedspolitikk (Rogalandsforskning 1982) 11.
143 See Meland and Nybø (n 142) 8-15.
144 See Tor Inge Jøssang, ‘Smelter igjen p˚a st˚alverket’ (Aftenbladet, 21st April 2015) 〈http://www.aftenbladet.no/
nyheter/lokalt/ryfylke/Smelter-igjen-pa-stalverket-3679339.html〉 accessed 3rd September 2015.
145 See Aadland (n 141).
146 See John Sandvik, ‘Vannet blir delvis tysk’ (Strandbuen, 6th July 2011) 〈http://strandbuen.no/index.php?page=
vis nyhet&NyhetID=7652〉 accessed 3rd September 2015.
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The river that gave rise to controversy in M˚aland was not located in the same municipality as
Jørpeland, but in a different valley across a mountain range, in the rural municipality of Hjelmeland.
The contested license in M˚aland gave Jørpeland Kraft AS the right to divert the water from this
river for electricity production at Jørpeland. In the following, I present the facts of the case in
more detail, before considering the legal questions that were addressed by the courts.
5.6.1 The Facts of the Case
The plans to divert water from Hjelmeland would deprive riparian owners of potential hydropower
along some 15 kilometres of riverbed, all the way from the mountains on the border between
Hjelmeland and Jørpeland, to the sea at Tau. Not all the water would be removed, but the flow
of water would be greatly reduced in the upper part of the river known as Sag˚ana, the rights to
which is held jointly by Ola Ma˚land and five other local farmers from Hjelmeland.
The water in question comes from a lake called Brokavatn, located 646 meters above sea level,
where altitude soon drops rapidly, making the river suitable for hydropower development. Plans
were already in place for such a project, which would use the water from just below the altitude
of Brokavatn, to the valley in which the original owners’ farms are located, about 80 meters above
sea level.
A rough estimate of the potential of this project was made by the NVE itself, stating that the
energy yield would be 7.49 GWh per annum.147 This is about five times more energy than the
water from Brokavatn would contribute to the project proposed by Jørpeland Kraft AS.148
This estimate was not made in relation to the expropriation case, but as part of a national
project to survey the remaining energy potential in Norwegian rivers.149 The owners were not
147 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 16.
148 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
149 The survey was carried out in 2004 and its results are summarised in Torodd Jensen (ed), Beregning av Potensial
for Sma˚ Kraftverk i Norge (Rapport nr. 19-2004, NVE 2004).
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informed of these assessments carried out regarding their resources. Moreover, even after Jørpeland
Kraft AS had submitted a formal application for permission to divert the water, the owners were
not notified that this would deprive them of a valuable natural resource.150
Moreover, the procedural approach to the case was the traditional one, with an assessment dir-
ected at evaluating the environmental impact. Many interest groups were called on to comment on
environmental consequences, and public debate arose with respect to the balancing of commercial
interests and the desire to preserve wildlife and nature.151
One of the local owners, Arne Ritland, also commented on the proposed project. He did this in
an informal letter sent directly to Scana Steel Stavanger AS.152 In this letter, he inquired for further
information and protested the proposed diversion of water from Brokavatn. He also mentioned the
possibility that an alternative hydropower project could be undertaken by original owners, but he
did not go into any details, stating only that a locally owned hydropower plant had previously
been in operation in the area.153
Arne Ritland received a reply from Scana Steel Stavanger AS, which stated that more informa-
tion on the project and its consequences would soon be provided. Ritland did not pursue the matter
further at this time. Meanwhile, Scana Steel Stavanger AS submitted his letter to the NVE, who
in turn presented it as a comment directed at the application.154
This prompted the majority owner of Jørpeland Kraft AS, Lyse Kraft AS, to undertake their
150 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 16. The owners claimed not to have been notified of the diversion plans
at all, but Jørpeland Kraft AS was able to convince the court of appeal that they had sent a generic orientation
letter to substantially affected private individuals, including the owners of Sag˚ana. See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland
LG-2009-138108, 5.
151 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
152 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 17.
153 The plant he was referring to dates back to the time before there was a national grid. It ensured a local supply of
electricity, but has since been shut down, in keeping with the general trend mentioned in chapter 4, section 4.4.
154 Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 18.
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own survey of alternative hydropower in Sag˚ana.155 The conclusions were sent to the water au-
thorities, but the owners were not informed that such an investigation was being conducted.156
Moreover, the water authorities did not take steps to investigate the commercial potential of local
hydropower on their own accord. Instead, they referred to the conclusion presented by Jørpeland
Kraft AS, stating that if the local owners decided to build two hydropower plants in Sag˚ana, then
one of them, in the upper part of the river, would not be profitable, not even with the contested
water. The other project, in the lower part, could apparently still be carried out, even after the
diversion.157
No mention was made of what the original owners stood to loose, nor was there any argument
given as to why it made sense to build two separate small-scale power plants in Sag˚ana. Neverthe-
less, the NVE handed the expropriating party’s findings over to the Ministry, without conducting
their own assessment and without informing the original owners.158
In addition to the report made by Jørpeland Kraft AS, the municipality government of Hjel-
meland also commented on the possibility of local hydropower. In its statement to the NVE, the
municipality directed attention to the data in the NVE’s own national survey, which suggested
that a single hydropower plant in Sag˚ana would be a highly beneficial undertaking.159 On this
basis, the municipality protested the diversion, arguing that original owners should be given the
possibility of undertaking such a project. This statement was not communicated to the original
owners, and in its final report, the NVE stated that the most efficient use of the water would be
to transfer it and harness it at Jørpeland.160
155 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
156 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 23.
157 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 23.
158 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 22-23.
159 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
160 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
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In addition to the statement made by Ritland, one other property owner, Ola Ma˚land, com-
mented on the plans.161 He did so without having any knowledge of the commercial potential of
the waterfall and without having been informed of the statement made by the municipality of
Hjelmeland. On this basis, Ma˚land expressed his support for Jørpeland Kraft’s plans, citing that
the risk of flooding in Sag˚ana would be reduced. He also phrased his letter in such a way that it
could be interpreted as a statement on behalf of the owners as a group.162 However, Ma˚land was
the only person who signed.
In the final report to the Ministry, the NVE refers to Ma˚land’s letter and state that the
owners are in favour of the plans.163 For this reason, the NVE concludes that the opinion of the
municipality of Hjelmeland should not be given any weight.164 The NVE neglects to mention that
Arne Ritland’s statement strongly opposed the development.
The report made by the NVE was not communicated to the affected local owners at all, so the
owners had no chance of correcting the mistakes that had been made. However, the report was sent
to many other stakeholders, including the municipality of Hjelmeland.165 In light of the report, the
municipality changed their original position and informed the Ministry that they would not press
for local hydropower, since this was not what the affected owners (i.e., Ola Ma˚land) wanted.166
Again, this happened without the owners’ knowledge. However, while the case was being pre-
pared by the water authorities, the original owners had begun to seriously consider the potential for
hydropower on their own accord. In late 2006, Jørpeland Kraft’s application reached the Ministry
and a decision was imminent. At the same time, the owners were under the impression that they
161 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 17.
162 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 17.
163 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
164 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 19.
165 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 24.
166 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 24.
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would receive further information before the case progressed to the assessment stage.
All the owners, including Ola Ma˚land, had now come to realise the value of the water from
Brokavatn. Hence, they approached the NVE, inquiring about the status of the plans proposed by
Jørpeland Kraft AS. They were subsequently informed that an opinion in support of the transfer
had already been delivered to the Ministry. This communication took place in late November 2006,
summarised in minutes from meetings between local owners, dated 21 and 29 November. On 15
December 2006, the King in Council granted a concession for Jørpeland Kraft AS to transfer the
water from Brokavatn to Jørpeland.167
At this point, it had become clear to the original owners that the water from Brokavatn would
be crucial to the commercial potential of their own project. They also retrieved expert opinions
that further substantiated that the NVE was wrong to conclude that diversion to Jørpeland would
be the most efficient use of the water.168 In light of this, the owners decided to question the legality
of the licence (with the corresponding permission to expropriate).
5.6.2 The Lower Courts
The matter went before the district court in the city of Stavanger, which decided in favour of the
owners on 20 May 2009.169 The district court agreed with the local owners that the decision to
grant the license was based on an erroneous account of the relevant facts.170 Moreover, the court
concluded that it was evident that allowing the applicants to use the water from Brokavatn in their
own hydroelectric scheme would be the most efficient way of harnessing the hydropower poten-
167 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 3.
168 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 23.
169 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139).
170 See Jørpeland (n 2) 25.
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tial.171 This, the court noted, directly contradicted what the NVE had stated in their report.172
The court backed up its conclusion by giving several direct quotes from the report made by
the NVE. On the legal side, the court relied on a well-established principle of administrative law:
while the exercise of discretionary powers is usually not subject to review by court, a decision
based on factual mistakes is invalid if it can be shown that the mistakes in question were such that
they could have affected the outcome.173 Since the small-scale alternative would in fact represent
a more effective use of the water in question, the court was not in doubt that this principle applied
here.174
Importantly, the district court also commented that the traditional procedure used to deal
with diversion cases was inadequate and had to be supplemented by looking to the procedural
rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967.175 Moreover, the
court made a crucial statement about expropriation of riparian rights in general, regarding the
duty of the water authorities to properly assess whether or not an expropriation license should
be granted.176 This duty, the court held, included a duty to properly consider negative effects on
small-scale development potentials.177 According to the court, this was the natural consequence of
the increasing interest in small-scale development.
If the principle expressed by the district court on this point had been allowed to stand, it would
have had significant implications for the water authorities. Specifically, it would directly confront
their traditional lack of interest in the expropriation question. However, it was not to be, as the
171 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 22-23.
172 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 23.
173 See the Public Administration Act 1967, s 41; Torstein Eckhoff and Eivind Smith, Forvaltningsrett (10th edn,
Universitetsforlaget 2014) 407-410.
174 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 25.
175 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 21.
176 Compare the Expropriation Act 1959, s 12 and the Public Administration Act 1967, s 16.
177 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 22.
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district court’s decision was overturned on appeal.
The court of appeal approached the case very different than the district court. Specifically, its
decision did not rely on any close assessment of the facts against the report made by the NVE.
Instead, the court of appeal largely based its decision on the opinion that the rules in the Wa-
tercourse Regulation Act 1917 exhaustively regulate the administrative procedure in watercourse
regulation cases.178 According to the court of appeal, the procedural rules in the Expropriation Act
1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967 do not apply at all to diversions of water authorised
under section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.179 With regard to the Watercourse
Regulation Act 1917, the court of appeal concludes that the NVE’s assessment met all general
requirements and was clearly adequate. Regarding the factual basis for the license, the court did
not comment on most of the evidence presented to it. Moreover, the Court did not address those
quoted segments of the report from the NVE that had formed the basis for the district court’s
decision. Specifically, the court of appeal never mentions the objection to the transfer made by
the municipality of Hjelmeland, nor does it mention the fact the small-scale alternative proposed
by the municipality would use the contested water more effectively. Instead, the court of appeal
points out that the NVE was well aware of the possibility of developing small-scale hydropower,
was well-informed about such development, and had considered it during their assessment.180 The
court notes that the NVE’s written assessment on this point was brief, but argues that this must
be understood as a natural response to what the court of appeal describes as a lack of input from
local owners.181
The owners appealed the court of appeal’s decision to the Supreme Court, which decided to
178 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 150) 7.
179 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 150) 7.
180 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 150) 9.
181 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 150) 9.
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hear the juridical aspects of the case.182
5.6.3 The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court approached the case in much the same way as the court of appeal. Regarding
the facts, the Court emphasised that the majority owner of Jørpeland Kraft AS had considered
the possibility that a hydroelectric scheme could be undertaken by local property owners.183 As
mentioned, Lyse Kraft AS had indeed made a report on this, concluding that one small-scale plant
would be unprofitable regardless of the diversion, while another one, further down in the river,
could still be carried out.184 The report did not explain why anyone would want to build two
consecutive small-scale plants so close to each other in the same river.185
In any case, the follow-up question was what the owners stood to loose when the water from
Brokavatn was diverted away from Sag˚ana. Both the report and the Supreme Court remained
silent on this point. Moreover, the Court does not mention that the report was never handed over
to the applicants, nor that the details of the calculations were never independently considered by
the NVE. Just like the court of appeal, the Supreme Court also neglects to mention that small-
scale development would be a more efficient use of the water, according to the national survey of
small-scale potentials carried out by the NVE itself.186 Furthermore, no mention is made of the
fact that the NVE claims that the opposite is true in the report to the Ministry, contradicting also
the statement made by the municipality of Hjelmeland.
Regarding the legal questions raised by the case, the Supreme Court agreed with the owners
that the procedural rules in the Expropriation Act 1959 and the Public Administration Act 1967
182 See Jørpeland (n 2) 8. Specifically, the Supreme Court would not engage in any independent fact-finding, but only
consider legal questions, including how the law should be applied to the facts.
183 See Jørpeland (n 2) 53.
184 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 23.
185 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 16.
186 See Jørpeland Kraft AS v M˚aland (n 139) 16.
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did apply to the case.187 However, the Court held that these procedural rules do not imply a
more extensive duty to assess the expropriation question, compared to established practices in
hydropower cases.188 There is no rule in the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917 which states that
the authorities are required to consider specifically the question of how the regulation affects the
interests of property owners. This is also rarely done in practice.189 However, a rule explicitly
demanding this is found in section 2 of the Expropriation Act 1959. This is not regarded as a
procedural rule, as it pertains to the content of substantive considerations. Hence, according to
the Supreme Court, the rule does not apply at all when expropriation takes place on the basis of
section 16 of the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917.190 This was the conclusion despite the fact that
section 30 of the Expropriation Act 1959 explicitly states that the provisions of that Act apply to
expropriations pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, in so far as they are compatible
with the rules therein. It would appear to follow, by implication, that the Supreme Court does
not think that directing more attention at owners’ interests is compatible with the Watercourse
Regulation Act 1917.
This is a clear rejection of the principled position taken by the district court, whereby the
water authorities should generally be obliged to consider small-scale alternatives before allowing
expropriation. According to the Supreme Court, no special procedural obligations arise on account
of the owners’ interests in small-scale development. Essentially, cases that involve expropriation can
be processed as though the waterfalls already belonged to the applicant; expropriation is permitted
to remain a non-issue during the licensing process pursuant to the Watercourse Regulation Act
187 See Jørpeland (n 2) 32-34.
188 See Jørpeland (n 2) 51-52 (citing also the Alta case, Alta (n 71)).
189 See Ragnhild Stokker (ed), Konsesjonshandsaming av vasskraftsaker – Rettleiar for utarbeiding av meldingar, kon-
sekvensutgreiingar og søknader (Rettleier nr 3/2010, NVE 2010). This is the water authorities’ own guideline for
the assessment of large-scale applications. The previous version of this guideline (which also fails to mention the
interests of owners) was presented to the Supreme Court. The Court also refers to it explicitly when it comments
that existing practices are beyond reproach. See Jørpeland (n 2) 51.
190 See Jørpeland (n 2) 30.
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1917.191
Formally, this implication of Jørpeland only applies to expropriations carried out on the basis
of section 16 of that act. However, in practice, there is reason to believe that the impact will be
the same for all cases involving large-scale hydropower development. Indeed, the water authorities
themselves do not appear to make any significant distinction between cases where expropriation is
automatic and cases where a separate license is formally required.192
5.7 Predation?
How should takings of waterfalls be assessed according to the normative theory developed in the
first part of this thesis? In chapter 3, I presented the extended Gray test, a set of key assessment
points for determining whether a taking violates important property norms.193 In the following, I
briefly assess takings of waterfalls against this test, to shed further light on the normative status
of current practices observed in Norway.
5.7.0.1 The Balance of Power
In light of the presentation so far, it is safe to conclude that typical large-scale waterfall expropri-
ations in Norway are marked by a severe imbalance of power between the taker and the owners.
The economic and political power of local communities is clearly very limited compared to that of
the large energy companies. The imbalance is accentuated by procedural arrangements and prac-
tices presided over by the water authorities. As demonstrated by the case of Jørpeland, the formal
position of owners and local communities under administrative law is very weak in hydropower
191 Moreover, the procedural standards that the water authorities were held to in Jørpeland appear to be essentially the
same as those formulated by the Court in Alta (n 71). In particular, the Jørpeland Court maintained a controversial
position on the duty to assess alternatives, see Nikolai K Winge, Kampen om arealene: Rettslige styringsmidler for
en helhetlig utmarksforvaltning (Universitetsforlaget 2013) 157.
192 See Flatby (n 1).
193 See chapter 3, section 3.5.
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cases. Hence, in addition to shedding doubt on the legitimacy of current practices in Norway, as-
sessing waterfall takings against the balance of power criterion also underscores that this criterion
is related to administrative law.
Ideally, procedural rules should function so as to maintain an appropriate balance of power
between the different actors involved in an administrative dispute. At least, the rich and powerful
should not be allowed to dominate decision-making processes within the polity, at the expense
of those most intimately affected by the decisions reached. If the administrative branch fails in
this regard, or acts in such a way that existing imbalances are worsened, this is surely a cause for
additional criticism with respect to the balance of power criterion. I believe the case study so far
shows that the framework for management of Norwegian hydropower is deserving of such criticism.
5.7.0.2 The Net Effect on the Parties
The immediate financial effect that a taking for hydropower has on the owners depends on how
the compensation is calculated. As discussed in section 5.4.3, the law on this point has been in
turmoil in recent years. In the late 2000s, there were signs that a commercially realistic valuation
method might become dominant, leading in turn to a dramatic increase in compensation compared
to earlier practice based on the natural horsepower method. But this trend now appears to have
been reversed, as the energy companies have successfully argued that a license for large-scale
development counts as proof that owner-led projects would not in any case have been ‘foreseeable’
(because the necessary licenses would not have been granted). For this reason, the argument goes,
owners suffer no actual loss when their resources are taken from them.194
The local owners are in an even weaker position when it comes to indirect financial effects,
as well as social and political effects, such as harms done to the cohesion and prosperity of the
local community. In this regard, losses are not only under-compensated, they are typically not
194 See Otra II (n 125).
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acknowledged at all, neither by the executive nor by the courts. The effects that go unnoticed
range from the concrete, such as losses incurred because the expropriation proceedings drag out
in time, to the abstract, such as the damage that is done to democracy when owners and local
municipality governments are replaced by energy companies as the primary resource managers in
the local district.195
5.7.0.3 Initiative
It follows from the regulatory framework that almost all cases involving expropriation for hydro-
power development originate from applications submitted by commercial companies.196 The energy
company draws up the plans and initiates the expropriation proceedings, by submitting a request
for a development license to the water authorities. The main purpose, which is usually acknow-
ledged by both the applicant and the water authorities, is to make money. Hence, it is usually
hard or impossible to argue that takings of waterfalls for hydropower development in Norway are
motivated by the needs of the public.
Exceptions to this are possible, in so far as the energy companies themselves embody public
service functions. In some cases one might argue that they do, but such arguments are becoming
increasingly unconvincing due to the fact that most energy companies have been reorganised as for-
profit enterprises whose activities are largely unconstrained by institutions of local government.197
195 In Smibelg (n 134), the owners submitted applications for small-scale hydropower in several affected rivers in
2005, but the water authorities refused to process these on account of the pending large-scale application. In 2015,
compensation was awarded based on the natural horsepower method, with no compensation for, or discussion of,
the owner’s loss in the 10 year period where the water authorities refused to process the owners’ applications.
196 See especially chapter 4, section 4.4 and chapter 5, section 5.3.
197 See, e.g., the EFTA Court’s description of the industry, EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway
[2007] EFTA Court Report 164.
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5.7.0.4 Location
As mentioned in chapter 4, riparian rights are often of great importance to Norwegian farming
communities and the subsistence of its members.198 Indeed, the taking of riparian rights from a
local community might well contribute significantly to depopulation, although indirectly rather
than by physical displacement.199 Moreover, in many rural communities, small-scale hydropower
appears to be the only growth industry, as farming is becoming increasingly unprofitable and
communities are threatened by stagnation and decline.200
Hence, the location criterion suggests that takings of waterfalls merit heightened critical scru-
tiny, especially due to the importance of the property that is taken to the subsistence of the local
communities forced to give it up.
5.7.0.5 Social Merit
There is no shortage of electric energy in Norway, and electricity prices are very low compared
to the rest of Europe.201 Indeed, development projects such as Jørpeland are not motivated by
any particular need to supply more energy to the Norwegian people or local industry, but openly
pursued as commercial endeavours.202 Hence, they do not appear to have any particular social
merit.
On the contrary, waterfall takings can contribute to creating social ills, by exacerbating rural
decline and depopulation. In south-western Norway, for instance, the average income for a sheep
198 See especially chapter 4, sections 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5.
199 Today, it is very unlikely that the Norwegian government would sanction physical displacement of people from their
homes in order to facilitate hydropower development. However, this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted;
the current political attitude on this point appears to have arisen in large part due to extensive and forceful anti-
development activism during the 1970s, especially in relation to the Alta case (which initially involved plans to
physically displace a local Sami community). See (n 75).
200 For an example, I refer again to the case of the Gloppen municipality, discussed in chapter 4, section 4.4.
201 See chapter 4, section 4.1.
202 See chapter 5, section 5.6.
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farmer corresponds to about half of the minimum wage that farmers are required to pay to full-
time farm workers.203 During harvesting season, sheep farmers wishing to hire 16 year old vacation
workers are required to pay the kids about 30 % more per hour than they themselves can expect to
earn from running their own farms. In short, sheep farming communities in western Norway, such
as that affected by the taking in Jørpeland, are struggling. To deprive them of valuable waterfalls,
therefore, is an indication of abuse of eminent domain.
5.7.0.6 Environmental Impact
It is clear that hydropower development can have negative environmental impacts. Hence, it is
important that the value of development is appropriately balanced against environmental interests.
To ensure this is a core aspect of the regulatory system. As discussed in chapter 4, local initiatives
for small-scale hydropower are now typically scrutinized quite intensely in this regard, particularly
after reforms in recent years. By contrast, large-scale projects appear increasingly likely to receive
preferential treatment.
Moreover, the large companies are clearly in a better position to exert pressure on the regulator
in order to overcome regulatory hurdles. The fact that large-scale solutions continued to receive
priority, despite it being official government policy for a decade that no more large-scale plants
should be built, is an indication of the severity of this effect. Hence, while the debate continues
regarding the comparative environmental merits of different kinds of hydropower, it appears safe
to conclude that the dynamics of power on display in relation to environmental issues raise further
doubts about the legitimacy of waterfall takings.
203 According to the Norwegian Bioresearch Institute, the average sheep farmer in the western part of Norway could
expect to earn NOK 65 per hour from working at their farm in 2012. See Anna Smedsdal and Heidi Knudsen,
Økonomien i jordbruket p˚a Vestlandet: Trendar og økonomisk utvikling (Norsk institutt for landbruksøkonomisk
forsking 2014) 50. The minimum wage for unskilled farm workers during the same time was NOK 123.15 per hour.
The minimum wage for 16-17 year old vacation workers was NOK 83.75 per hour. See ‘Tariffnemndas vedtak 27.
november 2012 om videreføring av forskrift om allmenngjøring av tariffavtale i jordbruks- og gartnerinæringene’
(Arbeids- og Sosialdepartementet, 7th December 2012) 〈https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/asd/org/nemnder-
styrer-rad-og-utvalg/permanente-nemnder-rad-og-utvalg/tariffnemnda/vedtak/2012/protokoll-fra-tariffnemndas-
mote-27-nove/id709433/〉 accessed 6th September 2015.
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5.7.0.7 Regulatory Impact
When waterfall rights are expropriated, they also become a separate commodity, divorced from the
surrounding land rights. They are also typically removed from the sphere of municipal control on
land use, falling instead under the regulatory jurisdiction of the centralised water authorities.204
Hence, the regulatory context shifts from one emphasising holistic resource management and local
community needs to one which focuses mainly on facilitating hydropower development.
Moreover, the fact that the takers of waterfalls are powerful actors might make it harder for
regulators to do their job. After expropriation, the parties who stand to loose from increased
regulation are the state-supported energy companies. They are therefore likely to oppose stricter
standards, and to do so in a manner that is much more forceful than any lobbying one might
expect from local community owners of waterfalls. Hence, takings in this sector appear likely
to cause systemic imbalances and a push for less intrusive government control, or government
regulation on terms dictated by the major market players. A sign of this effect can be found
in recent controversial decisions made with regard to the national grid, where the interests of
the electricity industry appears to have completely overshadowed broad public opposition against
further environmental intrusions in valuable nature areas in the west of Norway.205
5.7.0.8 Impact on Non-Owners
Non-owners can exercise some influence during the licensing procedure. However, this typically
requires them to be organised or aligned with special interest groups, to effectively stand up to the
authority of the prospective takers, who take the lead already during the administrative process.206
If there are objections, organisations rather than individuals are prioritised under the Watercourse
204 Specially, the water resource legislation will take priority over the otherwise rather municipality-empowering Plan-
ning and Building Act 2008.
205 See Ole Andreas Brekke and Hogne Lerøy Sataøen, ‘Fra Samkjøring til Overkjøring’ (2012) 44(6) Plan 22.
206 See the discussion in chapter 4, section 4.3.5.
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Regulation Act 1917. The non-owners most directly affected by hydropower development are usu-
ally local residents, from the same community as the waterfall owners. They have little chance of
being heard in the process, except if they find that their interests are aligned with those of more
powerful stakeholders, such as national or regional environmental groups. In general, the means
available for local non-owners to influence the decision-making do not appear commensurate with
the local stakes in hydropower cases.
The transfer of property to a large-scale owner, moreover, changes the dynamics of interaction
between owners and non-owners; corporations that take waterfalls appear highly unlikely to interact
with local non-owners on equal terms. Moreover, the transfer of riparian rights away from the
jurisdiction of municipal governments is significant, since it significantly reduces the level of (local)
democratic control over the use of the water resource.
5.7.0.9 Democratic Merit
Following Jørpeland, it seems that owners’ right to participate in decision-making processes re-
garding the use of their rivers and waterfalls is extremely limited under Norwegian law. The reg-
ulatory system effectively negates private property rights by making expropriation an automatic
consequence of any large-scale development license granted to any non-owner. The original justific-
ation was that the needs of the public should take precedence over private proprietary entitlements.
However, after the liberalisation of the energy sector, this idea has transformed into a practice of
systematic prioritisation of powerful commercial interests at the expense of local communities. This
has happened despite the political commitment to end large-scale development, which remained
official government policy for over a decade.
In light of this, it is difficult to see any democratic merit in the practice of taking waterfalls for
profit, to the benefit of large-scale development companies. Overall, it seems clear that according
to the extended Gray test, current rules and practices regarding takings for hydropower render
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such takings highly suspect with regard to the question of legitimacy.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has explored expropriation of waterfalls, focusing on the legitimacy issue. The present-
ation has demonstrated that waterfall rights have effectively been rendered subservient to the
management framework set up by the sector-oriented water resource legislation. Specifically, the
chapter tracked a transformation of the regulatory framework whereby the water authorities can
now exercise de facto proprietary control over water resources through licensing arrangements,
largely unconstrained by the fact that these resources nominally remain in private ownership.
As such, this chapter has shed further light on the tension identified at the beginning of the
previous chapter, between hydropower as private property and hydropower as a ‘national asset’.
Importantly, the flavour of this national asset is strongly influenced by the liberalisation of the
electricity sector. In particular, this chapter has made the case that takings of waterfalls today are
pure takings for profit. In most cases, the government itself does not even feel the need to argue
otherwise, since expropriation simply follows automatically from large-scale development licenses
granted to commercial energy companies.
The chapter used the case of Jørpeland to shed light on the effect that this can have in practice,
showing how owners desiring to carry out alternative projects can be marginalised in the decision-
making process, regardless of the merits of their proposals. In light of this, I concluded that the
Norwegian system fails to deliver on legitimacy in the sense of the word explored in Part I of this
thesis.
From this arises the question of how to restore legitimacy in a way that does not hamper the
democratic process by placing too much emphasis on exclusion rights and individual entitlements
attached to property. This is addressed in the next chapter, where I consider the institution of land
consolidation and how it is used as an alternative to expropriation in Norway.
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6 Enabling Participation to
Replace Eminent Domain
6.1 Introduction
In recent years, land consolidation has been used to facilitate hydropower projects in Norway, some-
times also by imposing development against the will of private owners. So far land consolidation
has been used almost exclusively for small-scale projects organised by local owners themselves. In
these situations, expropriation orders are rarely sought and rarely authorised, even if some owners
object to the development plans.1 Instead, various consolidation measures are used, including the
practically important “use directives”, serving to set up organisational frameworks for compulsory
implementation of a development plan, possibly against some of the owners’ wishes.
Essentially, a use directive can be used to take some of the holdout power away from the
owners, without depriving them of their property. Instead, owners are encouraged to cooperate
and participate in a decision-making process that has economic development as an overarching
aim. Some argue that because of the compulsion involved, land consolidation can leave owners in
a precarious position by weakening their property rights.2 By contrast, this chapter sets out to
1 See Ola Brekken, ‘Sma˚kraftverk og ekspropriasjon – replikk til NVE’ [2008] (1) Sma˚kraftnytt 21.
2 See Geir Stenseth, ‘De nye reglene om “urbant jordskifte”. En presentasjon og vurdering’ [2007] Tidsskrift for
Eiendomsrett 293.
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make the opposite case, namely that the use of consolidation for economic development can be
used to strengthen property as an institution, particularly when use directives replace traditional
expropriation proceedings. The chapter starts by introducing this idea in some more depth, before
clarifying the consolidation alternative and its building blocks. It then goes on to demonstrate
how it works in the context of hydropower development. It concludes with a discussion of possible
objections to the legitimacy of consolidation and a brief assessment of the possibility of exporting
the Norwegian consolidation model to other jurisdictions.
6.2 Land Consolidation as an Alternative to Expropriation
The notion of land consolidation is widely used on the international stage, but it is somewhat am-
biguous. Often, it refers to mechanisms whereby boundaries in real property are redrawn to reduce
fragmentation, without affecting the relative value of the different owners’ holdings.3 However, it
is also common to use consolidation to refer to mechanisms for pooling together small parcels of
land to create larger units.4 There is a tension between these two notions of consolidation, with
some claiming that consolidation in the latter sense is sometimes used to surreptitiously bestow
benefits on powerful property owners, at the expense of weaker groups.5
In light of this, I should stress that I will use the term land consolidation in a very broad sense
in this chapter, much wider than both of the interpretations mentioned above. Land consolidation,
as I use the term, refers to any mechanism by which the state intervenes, at the request of some
interested party, to (re)organise property rights and land uses in a local area. Hence, a consolidation
measure might as well involve increased fragmentation of property, if this is deemed a rational form
3 See, e.g., the entry on land consolidation in Susan Mayhew, A Dictionary of Geography (Oxford University Press
2009).
4 See, e.g., Zvi Lerman and Dragos¸ Cimpoies¸, ‘Land Consolidation as a Factor for Rural Development in Moldova’
(2006) 58(3) Europe-Asia Studies 439.
5 Michael Lipton, Land Reform in Developing Countries: property rights and property wrongs (Routledge 2009)
237-239.
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of consolidation of the property values involved. Importantly, I also use land consolidation to refer
to efforts directed at managing property, not just redrawing boundaries.
Some might argue that this terminology is strained, but I adopt it for a reason. It is motivated
by the fact that in Norway, the institution known as “jordskifte”, which is officially translated as
land consolidation, has exactly such a broad scope.6 Since land consolidation measures in Norway
can be used to interfere with property rights quite extensively, one may ask about the legitimacy
of consolidation, held against rules that protect private property owners.7
There is a shortage of case law on this regarding the Norwegian system, but legitimacy issues
have been raised before the ECtHR regarding the Austrian system of land consolidation, which is
also equipped with broad powers to interfere with private rights. Specifically, the Austrian system
has been found to offend against the property norm in P1(1) of the ECHR in cases when the
consolidation procedure has dragged out in time, while severely restricting the owners’ use of their
property.8
In some situations, it may be argued that a land consolidation measure is a form of expropri-
ation, even if it is not recognised as such by the legislature or the executive. In the US, for instance,
a land consolidation provision ordering escheat (to Native American tribes) of fractional property
interests in Native American reservations was struck down as an uncompensated taking by the
Supreme Court.9
6 See, e.g., Magne Reiten, ‘Avgjerd om fremme av jordskiftesak’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), Perspektiver p˚a jordskifte
(Gyldendal Akademisk 2009); Jørn Rognes and Per K˚are Sky, ‘Intervention methods in land disputes’ (2003) 11(8)
European Planning Studies 965. The notion of consolidation at work in Norway appears to be quite unique, but I
note that land consolidation also has a relatively broad scope in many other jurisdictions of continental Europe, as
well as in Japan and in parts of the developing world. See generally Per K˚are Sky, ‘Internasjonalt perspektiv p˚a
jordskifte’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), Areal og eiendomsrett (Universitetsforlaget 2007); Arvo Vitikainen, ‘An overview
of land consolidation in Europe’ (2004) 1(1) Nordic journal of surveying and real estate research 25.
7 For an analysis of the Norwegian land consolidation process held against the provisions of the ECHR, I refer to
Karl Arne Utg˚ard, ‘Jordskiftedomstolane og den europeiske menneskerettskonvensjonen’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed),
Perspektiver p˚a jordskifte (2009).
8 See Erkner and Hofauer v Austria (1987) Series A no 61; Poiss v Austria (1987) Series A no 103.
9 See Hodel v Irving 481 US 704 (1987).
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In relation to the legitimacy issue, the Norwegian system stands out in two important respects.
First, the consolidation procedure is managed by judicial bodies, namely the land consolidation
courts.10 Second, land consolidation is largely seen as a service to owners, not a tool for increased
state control and top-down management.11 In particular, a case before the land consolidation courts
is almost always initiated by (some of) the affected owners themselves and the court often acts
as a “problem-solver”, aiming to facilitate dialogue and cooperation among owners.12 Finally, the
so-called no-loss requirement is a core principle of consolidation law, stating that no consolidation
measure can take place unless the benefits make up for the harms, for all the properties involved.13
Indeed, this remains one of the key principles of land consolidation in Norway.14
The combination of a judicial procedure that emphasises owner-participation and a no-loss cri-
terion that ensures local benefits means that, arguably, land consolidation in Norway strengthens
property as an institution. Moreover, land consolidation courts can serve as an effective counter-
10 See generally Tor Langbach, ‘Jordskiftedomstolene og de alminnelige domstoler – likheter og ulikheter’ in Øyvind
Ravna (ed), Perspektiver p˚a jordskifte (Gyldendal Akademisk 2009). The fact that the land consolidation process
is administered by a judicial body appears to be unique to Norway, see Per K˚are Sky, ‘Jordskifte i andre land –
organisering og prosess’ [2001] Kart og Plan 43, 45.
11 See generally Per K˚are Sky, ‘Jordskiftets ulike effekter’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), Perspektiver p˚a jordskifte (Gyldendal
Akademisk 2009).
12 See generally Jørn Rognes and Per K˚are Sky, Mediation in the Norwegian Land Consolidation Courts (Working
Papers, 12808, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Land Tenure Center 1998) 〈http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:
ags:uwltwp:12808〉; Rognes and Sky, ‘Intervention methods in land disputes’ (n 6); Kjell Jørn Rognes and Per K˚are
Sky, ‘Konfliktløsning og fast eiendom – ekisterende og nye arenaer’ in Øyvind Ravna (ed), Areal og eiendomsrett
(Universitetsforlaget 2007).
13 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979 s 3 a) and the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 3-18. In terms of economic
theory, this amounts to requiring that all measures should lead to Pareto improvements, see Thomas J Miceli,
The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain: Private Property, Public Use (Cambridge University Press 2011) 59-
61. Moreover, what is required is actual improvement, not merely potential improvement (known as Kaldor-Hicks
improvement, see Miceli (n 13) 61-63). Importantly, the no-loss guarantee requires Pareto improvements in or in
relation to the affected properties; no mention is made of their respective individual owners. As a result, the no-
loss criterion is averse to the monetization of benefits and harms – it is normally not possible to fulfil the no-loss
requirement by paying compensation to the owners of adversely affected properties, see Sky, ‘Jordskiftets ulike
effekter’ (n 11) 394. Improvements must typically be rendered in kind, in a manner that offsets potential losses
to the property as such, independently of the owner’s own (hidden or revealed) valuations, see Sky, ‘Jordskiftets
ulike effekter’ (n 11) 371-372. Hence, the starting point here is completely different from that normally assumed
in economic analyses of takings law, where complete monetization and individuation is standard (usually starting
from the notion of the owners’ reservation price – the price at which they would be willing to sell if they behaved
non-strategically).
14 See generally Ola Rygg, ‘Jordskiftelova § 3 a)’ [1998] Kart og Plan 179.
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measure against two of the most widely discussed challenges to any property regime.
First, consolidation can serve to protect an egalitarian distribution of property against the
threat of inefficiency and underdevelopment that is otherwise associated with fragmentation.15
Importantly, it can do so without disturbing the underlying property structure and without be-
stowing disproportionate benefits or harms on certain owners or other select groups. In particular,
land consolidation can ensure commercial development without pooling together property rights
and without handing property over to powerful market actors.
Second, land consolidation can be used to manage privately owned common pool resources to
tackle problems of over-exploitation and under-investment that can arise when harms and benefits
are inefficiently distributed across a potentially large group of resource users.16 In particular,
land consolidation can ensure sustainable management of collectively owned resources without
necessarily forcing an enclosure process (enclosure can be the result of land consolidation, but it
is only one of many measures in the consolidation toolbox).
In short, land consolidation can be used to address both anti-commons and commons problems,
in a way that protects, and possibly enhances, desirable social functions of property, through a
judicial system that combines participatory and adversarial decision-making. Furthermore, land
consolidation is based on a conceptual premise that – potentially – offers increased protection to
owners and their properties, by recognising them as members of a community that are mutually
dependent on each other. In this way, the form of property protection offered in the context of
land consolidation is distinct from the protection offered in the context of expropriation. But it is
not necessarily weaker.
In the context of economic development, the no-loss criterion will generally be possible to fulfil
15 See generally Michael A Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’
(1998) 111(3) Harvard Law Review 621.
16 See generally Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243; Harold Demsetz,
‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57(2) The American Economic Review 347.
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through benefit sharing. Indeed, it becomes the responsibility of the land consolidation court to
ensure that a sufficient degree of benefit sharing results, so that consolidation measures may be
applied in accordance with the law.17 Moreover, ensuring a fair distribution of benefits is usually
regarded as one of the key goals of consolidation, independently of the no-loss criterion. Often,
this is taken to mean that the benefits should be distributed among the affected properties in
accordance with their relative value prior to the consolidation measure.18
This way of thinking can clearly be applied to address the compensation issue that arises
following an economic development taking.19 However, the principle of benefit sharing at work in
consolidation is usually not compensatory, but rather one that sees the owners as active participants
in the development project, also when it takes place against their will. This is a highly interesting
shift of attention, particularly from the point of view of human flourishing conceptions of property.
On such accounts, it can make good sense to impose obligations on owners to participate in the
fulfilment of public priorities, particularly when they and their properties also stand to benefit
from doing so.20
The fact that consolidation implies benefit sharing and owner participation means that com-
mercially motivated developers may have an incentive to favour eminent domain over consolidation.
Hence, the question becomes whether or not owners should be able to use land consolidation as a
17 For a detailed discussion of the extent of the court’s duties in this regard, also discussing recent changes in the
law that might indicate a weakening of the no-loss guarantee, see Katrine Broch Hauge, ‘Erstatningsniv˚aet ved
tvangsovertaking av fallrettar’ (PhD Thesis, 2015).
18 This principle is not as strictly encoded as the no-loss criterion, but is formulated as an “ought”-rule. See the Land
Consolidation Act 1979 s 31. In my opinion, this is a weakness of the current framework. I mention that for the
special case of consolidation to implement a zoning plan, the rule is absolute, see the Land Consolidation Act 1979,
s 3 b).
19 For the compensation issue generally, see Lee Anne Fennell, ‘Taking Eminent Domain Apart’ (2004) 2004 Michigan
State Law Review 957; Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘Taking Compensation Private’ (2007) 59(4)
Stanford Law Review 871. The land consolidation approach to benefit sharing also parallels key insights contained
in the proposal for compensation reform made in Amnon Lehavi and Amir N Licht, ‘Eminent Domain, Inc.’ (2007)
107(7) Columbia Law Review 1704 (proposing that a special institution should be set up to allow owners to bargain
for higher compensation in for-profit situations).
20 See the discussion on the social function theory and human flourishing in chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.5.
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defence against expropriation. If owners are granted such a right, it would become a very powerful
version of what is known in some jurisdictions as the “self-realisation” mechanism, a rule whereby
owners can sometimes preclude a proposed taking by proposing to implement the required devel-
opment themselves.21 Even in the absence of any legislation explicitly granting owners the right
to rely on consolidation as a self-realisation argument, one might ask whether owners can already
achieve the desired effect in practice. Can owners preclude expropriation by asking the court to
organise the desired development as a consolidation measure?
As long as the expropriation application is still pending a final decision, the owners could
theoretically hope to achieve this. Moreover, consolidation measures to implement economic devel-
opment would generally fulfil the no-loss criterion. Hence, the land consolidation courts should in
fact be obliged to take on such a case, even if there were also plans for expropriation. However, I
am not aware of any case where the consolidation courts have actually intervened in this way. They
might hesitate to get involved, particularly if the proposed development is large-scale. Moreover,
even if they did decide to get involved, it is not clear how the expropriation authorities would
react. In principle, an ongoing consolidation case, or even a formally valid use directive, would not
in itself prevent expropriation from taking place. However, it might then become harder to justify
that an economic development taking would be an appropriate measure.
After an expropriation order has been granted, things are very different. The law as it stands
leaves no room for a consolidation defence in these cases. Quite the contrary, the land consolidation
courts would have to respect a valid expropriation order and might even be called on to implement
it, by awarding replacement land or financial damages to affected owners.22
In the future, if the consolidation alternative to expropriation is to develop successfully, it seems
21 Rules to this effect are found in several jurisdictions in continental Europe (including a very limited rule to this effect
in Norway, pertaining to housing projects), see JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), Expropriation Law
in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 13-14.
22 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 6.
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that the owners’ right to request consolidation in place of expropriation must be strengthened. So
far, there are no signs of this happening in Norway. However, the use of consolidation as an
alternative to expropriation has received attention from a different angle, as a potentially valuable
service to developers who seek a more efficient way of acquiring property.23
Following a change in the law that took effect in 2016, private developers without existing prop-
erty interests in the target area will be granted the right to bring a case before the land consolidation
courts, to seek help in implementing projects that would otherwise necessitate expropriation.24 De-
velopers might well be motivated to do so, since this could result in reduced administrative costs
and (cheaper) compensation arrangements, e.g., compensation in kind through land readjustment.
In light of this, one must ask the following: will land consolidation remain a service to owners,
or will it become a service to developers who seek cheap access to property owned by others? This
question is about to become pressing in Norway, as the scope of land consolidation continually
broadens, making it interact with expropriation law to a greater extent than before.25
The idea that consolidation can serve as an alternative to expropriation also raises practical
questions. Specifically, it seems pertinent to ask how well such arrangements could be expected to
work in practice. Here there is already some interesting empirical data available, arising mainly
from situations when some owners wish to undertake economic development projects on collectively
owned land against the will of other owners, possibly also in cooperation with external developers.
In the context of hydropower development, such uses of land consolidation have become very im-
portant in recent years. In 2009, the Court Administration reported that land consolidation had
23 See Prop. 101 L (2012-2013) (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the Land Consol-
idation Act 2013) 84.
24 See the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 1-5(3).
25 In addition to the new rules granting developers a formal standing in certain consolidation disputes, this develop-
ment is also strongly felt in the move to apply land consolidation in the context of urban development, outside
the traditional scope of agricultural pursuits. See generally Stenseth, ‘De nye reglene om “urbant jordskifte”. En
presentasjon og vurdering’ (n 2).
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helped realise 164 small-scale hydropower projects with a total annual energy output of about 2
TWh per year.26 Moreover, in the Supreme Court case of Kløvtveit, discussed briefly in the previous
chapter, the importance of land consolidation was recognised also in the context of expropriation.27
Specifically, the presiding judge pointed to the prevalence of consolidation in the context of hy-
dropower as a justification for requiring a commercial taker to pay additional compensation to the
owners. According to the Court, it would have been possible for the taker to cooperate with the
owners rather than expropriate from them. Increased compensation was then required because the
taker should not be allowed to benefit financially from choosing not to cooperate.28
To set the stage for a more in-depth presentation of consolidation for hydropower development,
I will now give some further details about the Norwegian system, focusing on use directives.
6.3 Land Consolidation in Norway
Rules regarding land consolidation have a long history in Norwegian law. The first known consolid-
ation rules were included already in King Magnus Lagabøte’s landslov (law of the land) from 1274,
the first piece of written legislation known to have been introduced at the national level in Nor-
way.29 The earliest rules targeted common rights in farming land, giving owners and rights holders
on that land an opportunity to demand apportionment that would give them exclusive rights on a
single parcel.30 The land consolidation courts still provide this function, but additional rules were
introduced during the 19th century. At this time, the main use of land consolidation was to pool
26 See Gevinstbetraktninger ved jordskifte (Domstoladministrajonen 2009). For the scale, I mention that 2 TWh per
year is roughly what it takes to supply Bergen with electricity, the second largest city in Norway with around 250
000 inhabitants.
27 See chapter 5, section 5.5.3.
28 See BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen Rt-2011-1683 (Kløvtveit).
29 See chapter 4, section 2 of NOU 2002:9 (Report to the Ministry of Agriculture from a special committee appointed
by the King in Council 10 October 2000).
30 See also the discussion of property regimes in Norway in chapter 4.
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together fragments and divide up commonly owned land, to create larger single-owned parcels that
could facilitate higher-intensity farming.31 However, it was noted that complete individuation of
property rights was not necessarily required or desirable. As an alternative, collective-action mech-
anisms were introduced, to facilitate economic development without disturbing the established
governance structures associated with agrarian property rights.32
Consolidation measures can be roughly grouped into the following three categories:33
• Land readjustment : Rules that empower the court to either set up systems of shared ownership
or else dissolve such systems by apportioning to each estate a parcel corresponding to its
share, or by reallocating property through exchange of land.34
• Delimitation of boundaries: Rules that empower the court to determine, mark and describe
boundaries between properties and the content and extent of different rights of use attached
to the land.35
• Directives for use: Rules that empower the court to prescribe rules for the use of land that
can benefit from joint management, including setting up organisational units for carrying out
specific development projects.36
31 The fragmented system of land ownership that was consolidated at this time served an interesting function in the
earlier agrarian economy, to promote governance through a combination of scattered individual rights and property
held in common. See generally Henry E Smith, ‘Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields’
(2000) 29(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 131; Henry E Smith, ‘Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights’ (2002) 31(S2) The Journal of Legal Studies S453.
32 This idea was behind a range of provisions introduced during the 19th century, not all pertaining to land con-
solidation. For instance, a special management structure was set up to govern forestry on common land, to avoid
overexploitation and ensure rational management without necessitating enclosure. See generally Geir Stenseth, ‘By-
gdeallmenningenes rettshistorie og dens møte med fremtidens landbruk’ in Kirsti Strøm Bull (ed), Natur, Rett,
Historie (Oslo Studies in Legal History 5, Akademisk Publisering 2010).
33 I consciously omit the compensatory function that a consolidation court can serve by acting as an appraisal court,
e.g., in expropriation cases, see the Land Consolidation Act 2013 s 1-4(d). This is arguably not a consolidation
power at all, but rather an additional function that distracts from the uniqueness of consolidation.
34 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 2 and the Land Consolidation Act 2013, ss 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-11, 3-12.
35 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 88 and the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 3-13.
36 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, ss 2 c), 34, 35 and the Land Consolidation Act 2013, ss 3-8, 3-9, 3-10.
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In all cases, the consolidation courts can only employ these tools when they are called on to
do so by someone with legal standing.37 This was traditionally limited to the owners and those
holding perpetual rights of use.38 Today, the government also has legal standing in many kinds of
consolidation cases, but most cases (about 90 %) are still initiated by owners.39 From 2016, legal
standing can be granted to a larger class of actors, including development companies that could
otherwise obtain an expropriation licence.40 Moreover, legal standing can be granted to all rights-
and ground leaseholders.41
After a case has been brought before the court, the consolidation court can implement con-
solidation measures in so far as they are needed to alleviate problems and difficulties preventing
rational use of the affected land.42 To determine whether or not this requirement has been met,
the court will look to the prevailing economic and social situation, as well as predictions for the
future.43
The procedural rules of consolidation closely mimics those that pertain to regular civil courts.
This ensures that consolidation measures are only applied by the court following a public hearing
where all involved parties are given an opportunity to present their case, give supporting evid-
ence, and contradict each others’ testimony. The consolidation process has both administrative,
adversarial and participatory characteristics. While the content and scope of the court’s decision
will often have an administrative flavour and is not primarily directed at settling any specific dis-
pute, the process is judicial. Hence everyone is entitled, and to some extent even obliged, to have
37 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 5 and the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 3-16.
38 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 5.
39 See, e.g., Øystein Jakob Bjerva, ‘Jordskiftedomstolene og forvaltningsmyndighetene – to kokker og ingen oppskrift?’
(2012) 72 Kart og Plan 130, 135.
40 See the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 1-5(3).
41 See the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 1-5(1).
42 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 1 and the Land Consolidation Act 2013, s 3-16.
43 See generally Reiten, ‘Avgjerd om fremme av jordskiftesak’ (n 6).
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their voice heard and to partake in the process. Moreover, while the process is guided and overseen
by the court, the decisions made will be based on considerations arising from the interests of the
properties involved, usually as expressed by the parties in their own words.44 The decisions made
by the consolidation courts can be appealed to the regular courts of appeal (and then the Supreme
Court), but such cases are only dealt with by regular judges if they address legal questions; the
factual and discretionary aspects of consolidation decisions are decided by a panel of consolidation
judges in the last instance.45
More generally, the court is tasked with determining what is best for the land as a productive
unit in the local community, in light of all relevant economic, social and political facts, including
the fact that the current owners will remain in charge after the consolidation procedure ends.46
To flag the dual nature of the consolidation process, it is tempting to designate it as a process of
judicially structured deliberation. The final decision-making authority rests with the court, but the
court is required to act on behalf of the rights holders, on the basis of their wishes, but always also
in the best interest of their properties and their community.
For this reason, land consolidation is perfectly situated for providing an additional institutional
layer in situations when the public wishes to facilitate or even compel economic development
involving privately owned property. In the next section, I present the rules pertaining to use
directives in more detail, to elaborate on how consolidation can be used to replace expropriation.
6.3.1 Organising the Use of Property
Traditionally, use directives targeted property rights that were owned jointly or for which some
form of shared use had already been established.47 However, in the 1979 Act, the power of the
44 See generally Rognes and Sky, ‘Konfliktløsning og fast eiendom – ekisterende og nye arenaer’ (n 12).
45 See Land Consolidation Act 2013 s 8-7.
46 See generally Reiten, ‘Avgjerd om fremme av jordskiftesak’ (n 6); Sky, ‘Jordskiftets ulike effekter’ (n 11).
47 In accordance with s 2 c) of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.
244
6.3. LAND CONSOLIDATION IN NORWAY
courts to issue use directives was extended, so that directives could also be issued when there
was no prior connection between the rights and properties in question. The requirement was that
special reasons made this desirable.48 Traditional examples include directives for the shared use of
a private road which crosses several different properties, or regulation of hunting that takes place
across property boundaries.
The rules pertaining to use directives emerged as an alternative to apportionment of jointly
owned property, a more subtle and less invasive measure that could often give rise to the same pos-
itive effect as a full division of ownership, without leading to unwanted fragmentation or excessive
pooling of resources. Hence, in the now repealed Land Consolidation Act 1950 it was stated that
use directives should be the primary mechanism of consolidation, such that apportionment could
only take place if such directives were deemed insufficient to reach the goal of creating more favour-
able conditions for the use of the land.49 In the Land Consolidation Act 1979, the two mechanisms
were formally put side by side, but the intention behind this was to ensure greater flexibility of
the system, not to reduce the scope of use directives. Quite the contrary, the 1979 Act explicitly
intended to promote the increased use of such directives, also in conjunction with other measures.50
Since the Act was introduced, there has been a gradual increase in the willingness of the courts
to rely on use directives to facilitate new development on the land, not just as a means to regulate
an existing activity.51 The Land Consolidation Act 1979 lists a range of different circumstances
in which such directives can be applied.52 But the list is not understood to be exhaustive. Hence,
48 See s 2 c), para 2 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.
49 See section 3 no 3 and 4 of the Land Consolidation Act 1950 and the discussion in NOU 1976:50 (Report to the
Ministry of Agriculture from a special committee appointed by the King in Council 12 May 1972) 30-37.
50 See the discussion in NOU 1976:50 (n 49) 35-37 and Ot.prp.nr.56 (1978-1979) (Proposal to Parliament from the
Ministry of Agriculture regarding the Land Consolidation Act 1979) 47-48.
51 Ot.prp.nr.57 (1997-1998) (Proposal to Parliament from the Ministry of Agriculture regarding changes to the Land
Consolidation Act 1979) 103.
52 See section 35 of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.
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as the notion of agriculture has broadened to include activities such as small-scale hydropower
development, the scope of use directives has followed suit.
In the Land Consolidation Act 2013, the list has been replaced altogether by a general rule
which makes it clear that the consolidation courts have the authority to give directives whenever
they regard this to be favourable to the properties involved.53 The new Act maintains the principle
that directives regarding joint use of properties with no prior connection can only be given if there
are special reasons for it. However, this requirement is not intended to be very strict and the
Ministry of Agriculture was initially inclined to remove it.54 However, it was eventually decided
that it should be kept, in order to flag that two distinct questions arise in such cases. First, the
court must consider whether or not joint use is in fact desirable, before moving on to the question
of how it should be organised.
In addition to giving directives prescribing how joint use is to be organised, the consolidation
court can give rules compelling owners to take joint action to realise potentials inherent in their
land. Rules to this effect were novel to the Land Consolidation Act 1979. According to this Act,
joint action can only be prescribed in circumstances covered by one of the points in a concrete list
of conditions.55 Moreover, joint action directives can only be directed at in rem property owners,
not other parties.56 Following the new Land Consolidation Act 2013, however, the consolidation
courts will be authorised to prescribe joint action also to groups of use right holders. In addition,
the existing list of circumstances that warrant joint action will be replaced by a general joint action
rule, potentially increasing the scope of such directives.57
When commenting on this change in the law, the Ministry noted that the joint action rules
53 See section 3-8 of the Land Consolidation Act 2013.
54 For a discussion on this see Prop. 101 L (2012-2013) (n 23) 140-141.
55 The rules are given in the Land Consolidation Act 1979 ss 2 e), 42-44.
56 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 34 a).
57 See section 3-9 of the Land Consolidation Act 2013.
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currently in place have been widely used. Indeed, applying them is now one of the core responsib-
ilities of the consolidation courts.58 Joint action directives can even include prescriptions for joint
investments.59 On the one hand, this means that such directives can be used to facilitate capital-
intensive new development, making consolidation a more effective tool to implement economic
development. On the other hand, questions arise regarding the extent to which it is legitimate to
rely on compulsion in this regard, when the owners are required to contribute financially or put
themselves at financial risk.
The magnitude of investments required to undertake complex projects can soon become quite
burdensome for individual owners. The Land Consolidation Act 1979 attempts to resolve this by
a rule stating that if a development project will involve “great risk”, the court must set up two
distinct organisational units to undertake it.60 First, the rights needed to undertake the scheme
will be pooled together and managed by an owners’ association. Then, to undertake the scheme
itself, a separate development company will be set up on behalf of the owners.
In this way, the risk is diverted away from the individual owners onto a company controlled by
them. This company will be entitled to the profit from the scheme, but it will also be required to
pay rent to the owners’ association on terms agreed on by the parties with the help of the court.61
The owners are entitled to shares in the development company proportional to their share of the
relevant rights in the land, as determined by the consolidation court. However, they are not obliged
to acquire any such shares if they do not wish to do so. If they do not, they will still benefit from
membership in the owners’ association.
This two-tier system provides a mechanism that can also empower owners to undertake large-
58 See Prop. 101 L (2012-2013) (n 23) 146.
59 See section 3-9 of the Land Consolidation Act 2013.
60 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 34 b).
61 See s 34 b) of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.
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scale projects, possibly by setting up partnerships with external commercial actors. Moreover, the
owners’ association is not always obliged to lease out the development rights to a specific owner-
controlled development company. The exact rules depend on the statutes of the association, as
determined by the consolidation court, but typically it will be possible for a majority of owners
to lease out the development rights to an external developer, should they choose to do so. In this
regard, conflicts may arise, if some of the owners wish to undertake development themselves, while
others wish to strike a deal with an external company. The challenge for the consolidation court,
illustrated concretely in the next section, is to organise the owners’ association in such a way that
the chance of later conflicts is minimised.
Since the new consolidation Act took effect in 2016, both planning authorities and commercial
developers can be granted legal standing in the consolidation process. This might prove particularly
useful in connection with large-scale industrial development, as it might otherwise be hard to
implement such projects successfully. In these cases, the consolidation courts can now function
as an arena for interaction and deliberation between the three main groups of stakeholders: the
public, the local owners, and the commercially motivated developers.
To sum up, use directives are highly versatile tools that may be used to organise extensive
projects of land development on behalf of local owners. This form of development organisation
makes it possible for original owners to maintain their interest in the land, obviating the need for
expropriation, while giving the public a greater opportunity to influence and control how their
planning decisions are implemented in practice.
In the next section, I consider in depth the particular case of hydropower, where the consolid-
ation courts have recently started to make use of a wide arsenal of its tools to facilitate owner-led
development.
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6.4 Enabling Participation in Hydropower Development
In this section, I look at four recent cases in detail, all of which involved directives of use for
hydropower development by local owners. The waterfalls and rivers dealt with in these cases are
all located in the county of Hordaland, in south-western Norway. Three of the cases revolved around
proposals where the owners would develop hydropower themselves, while the fourth also involved
an alternative where the owners would cooperate with an external energy company. The cases
are particularly useful because we have access to data on how the process of consolidation was
perceived by the owners themselves.62
In the following, I present each case separately, focusing on the organisational issues, the solu-
tions prescribed by the court, and the reception among the parties.
6.4.1 Vika
The case was brought before the consolidation court in 2005, by riparian owners who had all agreed
to pursue hydropower development.63 The owners disagreed on how to organise the owners’ associ-
ation and on how the shares in this association should be divided among the properties involved, 15
in total.64 However, a consensus had formed regarding the main organisational principle, namely
that the owners would rent out their waterfall to a separate development company which every
owner would have a right (but not a duty) to take part in.
The parties in Vika were closely involved in the consolidation process and the statutes for the
owners’ association were based on suggestions made by the owners themselves. The main point
of disagreement concerned how the shares in this association should be allotted, a question that
62 This material is due to Sæmund Stokstad, who conducted interviews for his master thesis on land consolidation,
devoted to the study of how consolidation measures can be used to facilitate hydropower development. See Sæmund
Stokstad, ‘Bruksordning ved Jordskifte i Samband med Utbygging av Sma˚skalakraftverk’ (Master Thesis, 2011).
63 Vika 1210-2005-0014, [2005] Haugalandet og Sunnhordland jordskifterett.
64 See Stokstad (n 62) 25-28.
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was made more difficult by the fact that some owners benefited from old water-mill rights in the
river.65
There was also some disagreement about whether the voting rights in the owners’ association
should be tied to the number of shares belonging to each owner, or if the owners should simply be
allotted one vote each, irrespectively of their share of the relevant riparian rights. The consolidation
court went for the first option.66 However, the way shares where allotted deserves special men-
tion. In particular, the court decided to take into account that some additional water entered the
main river from smaller rivers where only a sub-group of the owners held riparian rights.67 These
owners’ share in the association was increased accordingly. This is surprising in light of Norwegian
water law, as ownership of riparian rights usually arises from ownership of land along the relevant
riverbed, regardless of where the water itself comes from.68 Hence, this is an illustration of how the
land consolidation court can opt for organisational solutions that seem rational given the concrete
circumstances, even if they do not follow from any generally recognised principles of law.
The statutes of the owners’ association in Vika also contains a second interesting provision,
based on a suggestion made by the owners.69 This provision states that all rights in the association
are to be tied to the underlying agricultural properties so that they can not be sold separately. In
Norway, a division of agricultural property requires permission from the local municipality.70 In
recent years, however, this protection of farming communities has grown weaker in practice. It is
interesting, therefore, that the owners in Vika decided that a dissociation of water rights from the
65 See Stokstad (n 62) 26. In the end, the consolidation court held that these rights were tied to the form of use
relevant at the time they were established. Hence, the rights were not regarded as having any financial value and
could therefore be extinguished without compensation, as provided for in the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 2.
66 See Stokstad (n 62) 26.
67 See Stokstad (n 62) 26.
68 See the Water Resources Act 2000, s 13.
69 See Stokstad (n 62) 26.
70 See section 12 of the Land Act 1995.
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underlying agricultural properties should be expressly forbidden.
According to Stokstad, a general consensus had developed among the parties whereby the land
consolidation procedure was seen as a great success.71 It allowed for an orderly and fair decision-
making process regarding the conflicts that had arisen. The resolution of the case followed from
continuous interaction between the owners and the court, where everyone felt they had been given
an opportunity to have their voices heard.
Initially, the situation had been tense, but the consolidation process had resolved all conflicts.
Some owners also pointed to the fact that the main hearing had been physically conducted in the
local community, in a meeting hall that was neutral yet familiar to the owners. This also gave them
a feeling that they were meant to actively partake in the decision-making process.
When the interviews were conducted, 5 years after the case was concluded, the owners also
appeared to agree that the association was working as intended and that the climate of cooper-
ation among the owners was good. The hydropower scheme itself had been completed in 2008,
yielding an annual production of around 15 GWh per year, providing enough energy for around
700 households.72
6.4.2 Oma
The case of Oma was brought before the courts in 2006.73 The case involved four properties. The
owners of three of them, A,B and C, wanted to develop hydropower, while the fourth owner, D,
was opposed to the plans.74 Rather than attempting to expropriate the necessary rights from owner
D, owners A,B and C took the case to the consolidation court. They argued that development
would benefit all the properties involved. Moreover, they pointed out that an alternative project
71 See Stokstad (n 62) 39-41.
72 See Stokstad (n 62) 41.
73 Oma 1200-2006-0015, [2006] Nord- og Midthordaland jordskifterett.
74 See Stokstad (n 62) 36-39.
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which would not make use of owner D’s rights would be less profitable. Hence, in their view, the
consolidation court should compel D to cooperate in a joint scheme. Owner D protested, arguing
that the project would not economically benefit him, and that it would also be to the detriment
of his plans to build holiday cottages in the same area.
The case of Oma differs from that of Vika since the question of whether it was appropriate to use
compulsion was more prominent. In the end, the court agreed with the majority that an owners’
association with compulsory membership should be set up.75 To justify the use of compulsion
against D, the court commented specifically on owner D’s plans for building holiday homes, noting
first that he was unlikely to be given planning permission, and secondly that a hydropower plant
would not adversely affect such plans in any significant way.76 Moreover, the court noted that while
owner D’s rights were relatively minor, they were quite crucial for the profitability of the project,
particularly because owner D controlled the best location for the construction of a dam to collect
the water used in the scheme. Overall, the court’s conclusion was that a joint hydropower scheme
would be a better option for everyone than a project that did not include owner D’s property.
The question then arose as to how the shares in the owners’ association should be divided.
With regard to this question, the court departed significantly from one of the basic principles of
Norwegian hydropower law. This is the principle stating that no right to hydropower can be derived
from being in possession of land suitable for the construction of dams or other facilities necessary
to exploit riparian rights.77 The land consolidation court broke with this principle in the case of
Oma, deciding instead to set the value of the land designated for construction of a dam and a
power station at 6% of the total value of the rights that went into the owners’ association.78
75 In doing so, the court relied on s 2 c) of the Land Consolidation Act 1979.
76 See Stokstad (n 62) 36-37.
77 The principle is well-established in expropriation law, going back to the Supreme Court decision in Hosanger, Haus
og Hamre kommunale kraftverk v Askild Fusesen Vare Rt-1922-489. The principle was challenged unsuccessfully
following the increased scale of development after the Second World War, as discussed in chapter 5, section 5.4.2.
78 See Stokstad (n 62) 36.
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The proportion of financial benefit and decision-making power awarded to the unwilling owner
D thus increased accordingly, since these rights were all held by him. In fact, his share went from
1.75% to 7.75%, so the consolidation process itself led to a situation where he would have a far
greater incentive for supporting the development. Hence, the decision in Oma was more to the
benefit of owner D than any other among the involved parties. If the rights in question had been
expropriated, D would have been given next to nothing in compensation and would have lost his
rights forever. Instead, the solution prescribed by the consolidation court gave him a lasting and
substantial interest in local hydropower.
According to Stokstad, interviews conducted with the parties show how the process and outcome
of consolidation served to create a much better climate for further cooperation.79 Indeed, when the
interviews where conducted, 4 years after the court’s decision, owner D had changed his mind and
was now in favour of the development. Moreover, he had also decided that he wanted to take part
in the development company. He was not obliged to do so, but his right to take part was ensured
by the agreement made with the development company, as required by the statutes of the owners’
association.80
The owners all reported that the consolidation process had been very successful and that the
court had listened to them, allowing everyone to have their voices heard. Moreover, some owners
reported that the court had cleverly maintained a bird’s eye view on the best way to develop the
land in question, ensuring both long term benefits to all involved properties as well as creating
an improved climate for cooperation and mutual understanding. The consensus was that making
concessions to owner D was appropriate and had been in the interest of everyone involved. In 2011,
the hydropower project was completed and today its output is roughly 5 GWh per year.81
79 See Stokstad (n 62) 44-45.
80 The owners’ right to take part in the development company is obligatory in some situations, pursuant to the Land
Consolidation Act 1979, s 34 b) no 3.
81 See Stokstad (n 62) 45.
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Oma serves as a good illustration of how consolidation can be an effective instrument for
facilitating locally controlled development, also in cases when this requires the use of compulsion
against some owners. Interestingly, the successful outcome appears to be partly due to the fact that
the consolidation court actively used its discretionary powers when deciding how to organise joint
use. This power allowed them to deviate from established rights-based legal doctrine and adopt a
more context-dependent approach, pursuing solutions that better suited the situation. Interesting
legal questions arise in this regard, particularly regarding the extent to which the consolidation
court can deviate from sector-based doctrines when organising development.
For instance, one may ask what would have happened if the majority owners in Oma had
appealed the decision to the regular courts on the basis that D was awarded too many shares in
the owners’ association. Would this be regarded as a question of the court’s interpretation of the
law regarding the owners’ rights, or would it be regarded as a discretionary decision regarding
the best way to organise development? If a rights-based perspective was adopted, the decision
would almost certainly be overturned. If not, it would seem beyond reproach, as an exercise of the
consolidation courts’ discretionary power.
A second interesting question that arises is whether or not consolidation can work as well as it
did in Oma in cases where conflicts run deeper, or where the parties favouring development are a
minority among the owners. The next two cases I consider shed some light on this issue.
6.4.3 Djønno
This case was brought before the courts in 2006, by a local owner A who wanted to develop
hydropower in a small river crossing his land, the so called Kvernhusbekken.82 A wanted the court
to help him implement a hydropower project, by compelling the other owners, B,C and D, to
82 Djønno Indre Kaland 1230-2006-0010, [2006] Indre Hordaland jordskifterett.
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rent out their share of the waterfall on terms dictated by the court.83 The starting point for the
other owners was that they did not want hydropower development. Hence, they were not willing
to rent out their rights to owner A or any other developer. There was also a dispute regarding the
ownership of the waterfall rights, with A believing initially that he controlled a large majority. It
soon became clear that this was not the case. As it turned out, owner A’s share of the riparian
rights was only 5%, so his financial interest in hydropower was in fact very limited compared to
the owners who did not want any development.
On the other hand, the land rights needed for the necessary physical constructions were pre-
dominantly held by owner A alone. For this reason, A maintained that the court should compel
the other owners to allow him to go ahead with his development plans. The court agreed that hy-
dropower would be a rational use of the waterfall, and initially assessed the case against the rules
relating to compulsory joint action.84 This could have resulted in concrete directives regarding how
the hydropower development should be carried out, including at the level of specific investments
and building steps.
However, the court eventually held that this approach would place too much of a burden on
the owners opposing hydropower. Hence, it chose to resolve the case using directives for joint use.
By doing so, the court also restricted the scope of their decision to the establishment of an owners’
association that would be responsible for renting out the rights.
The model used for the owners’ association was similar to the one the court adopted in Oma.
This included allocating shares in the owners’ association in a way that took into account the special
importance of land needed for physical constructions. In total, this land was held to correspond
to 6% of the shares in the association. Since these rights were held by owner A alone, his share in
the association doubled. In addition to this, owner A purchased the shares from owner B, so that
83 See Stokstad (n 62) 28-31.
84 See the Land Consolidation Act 1979, s 2 e).
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his total share ended up amounting to 22%. Still, for the majority, membership in the association
was imposed on them against their will.
The wording of the statutes for the association took into account that it would be run by a
majority of unwilling shareholders. In particular, it was stated clearly that the association was
going to rent out the rights in the waterfall such that hydropower could be developed. In Oma and
Vika, by contrast, the statutes only stated that this was the purpose of the association, leaving the
shareholders with the freedom to determine whether or not to go through with development.
In interviews, those who were compelled to take part in the association against their will
expressed dissatisfaction and surprise at the result. Moreover, while the association had apparently
tried to be loyal to the wording of the statutes, by looking for interested developers, there had
been no willingness among the majority to engage actively with this work. No deals had been
made, no separate development company had been set up, and the conflict among the owners was
ongoing. Hence, while the case of Djønno is an example that consolidation can be used even when
it involves compulsion against the majority of owners, it also serves to illustrate that the chance
of a successful outcome may be more limited.
The question arises as to how such cases should be dealt with by courts in the future. According
to owner A, the problem was that the directives of use were not specific enough. In his opinion,
the directives should not have been restricted to merely setting up an owners’ association for
renting out the rights. In addition, the court should have actively addressed the question of how
the development company should be organised. Among the majority owners, on the other hand,
the prevailing feeling was that the development in question was more or less doomed to fail from
the start, since it was unwanted.
Hence, the case of Djønno illustrates that when the courts are not prepared to actively organise
the development company, compulsory participation might fail in practice unless a majority agrees
that development should take place.
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6.4.4 Tokheim
This case was brought before the consolidation court in 2008, by the owners of Tokheimselva.85
The five owners all agreed that development should take place, but they disagreed about how it
should be done and about the proportion of each owners’ share of the riparian rights.86 Some
owners argued that development should be organised by the owner community, while other owners
thought it would be best to rent out the rights to an external developer. The case was further
complicated by the fact that the proposed development was so substantial that it could require a
waterfall transferral license pursuant to the Industrial Licensing Act 1917. As discussed in chapter
4, such a license can only be given to a company in which the state controls at least 23 of the
shares.87
The consolidation court eventually decided to set up an owners association. However, there
was no adjustment made for land that would be needed for physical constructions. Instead, the
statutes state that owners will be entitled to a lump sum estimated on the basis of the damages
and disadvantages that a concrete hydropower project will bring. This marks a different kind of
departure from established practice in expropriation law; specifically, it rejects the established
principle that owners can be compensated on the basis of either the value of their waterfalls or
the damages and disadvantages caused by the project, not both.88
In other respects, the statutes for the owners’ association are similar to those adopted in the
previously considered cases. Specifically, the statutes do not resolve the controversial question of
how to carry out development. Moreover, nothing is said about the extent to which interested
owners should be given a right of first refusal with respect to the development rights held by the
85 Tokheim 1230-2008-0020, [2008] Indre Hordaland jordskifterett.
86 See Stokstad (n 62) 34-36.
87 See the discussion in chapter 4, section 4.3.
88 See for instance the case of Endre Vange v Fellesskapet Vikfalli Rt-1971-1217. See also the discussion in chapter 5,
section 5.4.2.
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owners’ association. This was an important issue raised by the case, but the consolidation court
explicitly decided not to address it.
In interviews, the owners expressed that they were happy with how the case was dealt with by
the court.89 Everyone was heard and the owners’ association was set up in consultation with the
parties. However, the main issue, concerning who should develop the waterfall, was still unresolved
after the case concluded. Some of the owners expressed criticism against the court on this basis.
The case of Tokheim serves to illustrate that established practices of consolidation, while being
well received and understood by local owners, face some new challenges in relation to hydropower,
challenges that consolidation courts might be reluctant to take on. It seems that the court in
Tokheim felt that it was not in a position to assess the question of what kind of development
would be best. The court was particularly cautious about expressing an opinion about the legal
status of the project with respect to the relevant licensing legislation.
It remains to be seen whether such an agnostic attitude can be maintained by the consolid-
ation courts, as local owners increasingly turn to them for help in resolving disputes regarding
hydropower. Moreover, it will be interesting to see how the new Land Consolidation Act 2013 will
influence case law in this area. It seems that a case like Tokheim could benefit from the court taking
a broader view, possible even by including government bodies as parties in the case, to clarify the
licensing status of the proposed development.
6.5 Assessment and Future Challenges
The cases discussed in the previous section show that the system of land consolidation can work
as a practical alternative to expropriation in the context of hydropower development. At the same
time, the cases suggest that the land consolidation courts may find it hard to deliver effective
89 See Stokstad (n 62) 43-44.
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directives if owners disagree fundamentally about how their water resources should be managed.
In addition, land consolidation courts are clearly less effective in situations when they are forced to
consider rules and regulations from other areas of the law, outside their traditional area of expertise.
Specifically, the land consolidation courts might be overly cautious about implementing solutions
that they fear will contradict sector-specific provisions. Furthermore, the land consolidation courts
might be unwilling to intervene in a potential conflict between owners and powerful commercial
interests, especially if the sector-specific rules seem to speak in favour of expropriation.
Paradoxically, the potential weaknesses of the land consolidation courts in this regard may be
exacerbated by the fact that these courts are not authorised to make use of sufficiently strong
forms of compulsion against owners. This worry, specifically, can give rise to the argument that the
public interest in development is unlikely to be realised through the use of consolidation measures
alone. Hence, one may fall back on expropriation, to the detriment of all owners, including those
that also oppose development by consolidation.
The consolidation alternative seems to be quite vulnerable to this mechanism. This is illustrated
by the Supreme Court case of Holen v Holen, concerning a conflict between a small quarry and
a neighbouring farmer.90 In order to continue extracting his minerals, the owner of the quarry
would have to interfere with the property of a neighbouring owner who was using his land for
more traditional forms of agriculture. The farmer was unwilling to reach an agreement with the
quarry owner, so the latter brought a case before the land consolidation court. The court noted
that it would be possible to reach an accommodation that would benefit both parties and issued
use directives that would allow the quarry to continue its operations.
The directives gave the quarry owner access to the farmer’s land, who was in turn granted
replacement property from the quarry owner. The consolidation court also noted that the quarry
would, in the future, be likely to extract minerals that belonged to the farmer. Hence, a directive
90 Holen v Holen Rt-1995-1474.
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was issued that gave the quarry owner a right to extract these minerals, provided he paid market
value for them.
Hence, not only was the farmer awarded replacement property for agricultural purposes, he
was also granted a share of the benefits that would result from the continued operation of his
neighbour’s quarry. This was clearly beneficial to his property, economically speaking. The owner
himself, however, objected to the arrangement. The Supreme Court found in his favour. This was
not because they sanctioned his right to block the continued operations of the quarry, or because
they thought the replacement property or the payment model was inappropriate. Instead, the
Court held that the farmer’s right to extract minerals could not be transferred to the quarry by a
consolidation measure, even if the farmer was ensured payment for his share of the total mineral
rights.91 Specifically, such a transfer was not held to fall within the meaning of organising joint
use of their properties.
This decision seems to suggest a reluctance to permit land consolidation being used in a way
that tracks eminent domain too closely. However, Holen v Holen was decided in 1995, and as I
have already mentioned, the law has developed in recent years in the direction of increased use of
land consolidation as an alternative to expropriation. Moreover, it might have been possible for the
land consolidation court to avoid the outcome in Holen by providing a more subtle use directive.
Specifically, the court could set up an organisational arrangement that would have allowed the
unwilling owner to take active part in the development company later on, if he were to his mind.
If so, the arrangement as a whole would likely have fallen back inside the meaning of joint use.
At least, it would then have been in keeping with current practices observed in the context of
hydropower development, e.g., as seen in the Oma case discussed above. Still, Holen v Holen
reminds us that critics might be able to raise convincing formal objections against compulsion in
land consolidation, on the basis of earlier case law.
91 See Holen (n 90) 1481.
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some scholars argue that land consolidation sometimes
offers less protection to owners than administrative expropriation.92 In expropriation cases, it is
true that a range of procedural rules tend to apply, pertaining to notification to the owners, impact
assessments, a duty to provide guidance and reasons for the decision, and a possibility (sometimes
several) for administrative appeal.93 Moreover, after an expropriation order has been granted, the
owner can still challenge it before the appraisal courts, in principle at the expropriating party’s
expense.94
In practice, however, the administrative expropriation procedure often leaves the owners com-
pletely marginalised, as they are overshadowed by other stakeholders. This is particularly clear in
situations when expropriation arises as a result of more comprehensive planning or licensing pro-
cedures, such as in the context of hydropower development.95 In addition to this, the possibility
of raising validity objections before the courts in expropriation cases is mostly a theoretical one in
Norway.96 The courts almost always defer to the discretion of the administrative decision-maker
in such cases.
More generally, the narrative of expropriation is one where the owners have to endure a loss in
the public interest, for which they must be compensated as individuals. By contrast, the narrative
of consolidation is one where the owners themselves are tasked with making a contribution to the
development project, in the best interests of both the local community and greater society. In
particular, the owner’s role is no longer that of a passive obstacle to development. Rather, the
owner is placed in the position of active participant, one who might yet have to be nudged to fulfil
92 See Stenseth, ‘De nye reglene om “urbant jordskifte”. En presentasjon og vurdering’ (n 2) 318-319.
93 See Sjur K Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ in JAMA Sluysmans, S Verbist and E Waring (eds), Expro-
priation Law in Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2015) 377-382.
94 See Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ (n 93) 382-384.
95 See the discussion in chapter 5. For the same point with respect to planning more generally, see Dyrkolbotn,
‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ (n 93) 376.
96 For a discussion on this with further references, see Dyrkolbotn, ‘Expropriation Law in Norway’ (n 93) 384-386.
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their potential. In addition, the properties as such receive recognition as important resource units,
independently of the interests of their current owners. Moreover, the owners as a group come into
focus, as the process is meant to facilitate rational collective action.
This is achieved by placing owners in a partly deliberative, partly adversarial, context, which
not only tolerates, but also presupposes, their active input to the decision-making process. In ad-
dition, the grounds for imposing compulsory measures that interfere with property rights need to
be anchored explicitly in the social functions of the affected properties, not individual interests.
A measure is warranted only when it enhances property values, also in the sense of improving
conditions for the communities that take their livelihoods from the affected properties. Clearly,
this broader sense in which consolidation serves to protect property is not matched by any ad-
ministrative safeguards in expropriation law. It should be noted that this positive assessment of
consolidation as an alternative to expropriation is premised on the fact that property in Norway is
distributed in an egalitarian manner among the members of local populations, especially in rural
areas. If land consolidation is used outside of this context, even in urban Norway, one might ask
whether the processes truly empowers the community, or merely the landowners.
Arguably, the existing land consolidation system is an incomplete solution to the legitimacy
issues that arise in such cases. Moreover, land consolidation might even have indirect effects that
make those issues harder to resolve. For instance, it might be that consolidation will undermine
local democracy by allowing powerful owners to remove certain property issues from the broader
political agenda. The consolidation courts could become arenas used by powerful owners to prevent
marginalised group from accessing decision-making processes of societal significance.
On the other hand, it is wrong to assume that empowering owners will not also benefit non-
owners. As long as the owners are themselves members of the local community, the fact that they
are offered increased protection through land consolidation can positively affect the community as
a whole. As I discussed in chapter 2, the social function theory of property asks us to recognise
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such effects. Indeed, a community represented by local property owners might be in a much better
position to participate in decision-making than a local community represented by career politicians,
expert planners, or judges, who all lack local grounding.97
How well a property-based form of representation will work is likely to depend closely on the
distribution of property within the community, and the legal framework surrounding the property
in question. If property rights are spread across many members of the community, if ownership
is shared, or it obligations towards non-owners occupies a prominent place within the private
law of property, it should help make decision-making through consolidation more representative
of broader community interests. In addition to this comes the fact that the land consolidation
process has a judicial form, meaning that a judge is already present, as an administrator and a
representative of public interests. Moreover, the judge is required to consider what is best for the
properties, not the owners. Hence, on a human flourishing account of which functions property
should fulfil, the interests of non-owners need to be taken into account. This also entails that the
owners participating in consolidation are indeed meant to be representatives of their communities,
with obligations as well as rights.
It should also be emphasised that so far in Norway, the potential for elite capture in consolid-
ation seems to be relatively limited.98 Land consolidation is primarily used to organise decision-
making among owners, who are protected individually by the no-loss guarantee. Moreover, a con-
97 This issue is related not only to the social function theories of property, covered in chapter 2. There is also a
connection to the debate on local elites in commons and development research, c.f. chapter 3, section 3.6. While
elite capture is a worry, it has been pointed out that local elites can bring significant added value to development
projects, see generally Alice H Amsden, Alisa DiCaprio and James A Robinson (eds), The Role of Elites in Economic
Development (Oxford University Press 2012). Moreover, interventions that seek to marginalise elite members, rather
than co-opting them, can turn out to do more harm than good (although the evidence on elite co-option is also
non-conclusive, further suggesting the importance of the social context). See, e.g., Sam Wong, ‘Challenges to the
elite exclusion–inclusion dichotomy – reconsidering elite capture in community-based natural resource management’
(2013) 20(3) South African Journal of International Affairs 379; Alex Arnall and others, ‘NGOs, elite capture and
community-driven development: perspectives in rural Mozambique’ (2013) 51(02) The Journal of Modern African
Studies 305. Further exploration of the link between the role of elites in economic development and property-based
representation in decision-making about development in Norway is left for future work.
98 Although related issues have been raised, specifically with respect to the increasing power of the consolidation
court to interfere with private property, see Stenseth, ‘De nye reglene om “urbant jordskifte”. En presentasjon og
vurdering’ (n 2).
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solidation measure will have no direct legal consequences for non-owners or binding consequences
for other branches of government. For instance, if a land consolidation court orders a community
of owners to pursue hydropower development, this does not mean that the water authorities are
compelled to give the necessary licenses. If environmental interests or the interests of non-owners
suggest otherwise, a license will not be granted. The Norwegian system – so far – implements a
fairly strict division of power in this regard, so that land consolidation cannot be used to capture
significant power outside the context of decision-making among owners.
However, as I have already mentioned, there have been indications that the scope of consolid-
ation will be broadened, with governmental agencies and other stakeholders more often included
in consolidation proceedings that concern their areas of competence. In light of this, there is a
reason to worry that the community representation might become too narrow in the future, so
that consolidation itself will come to lack legitimacy. Hence, in some contexts, it might be ad-
visable to further extend the class of persons that can be recognised as having legal standing in
consolidation disputes, to include non-owners without formally recognised property rights (e.g.,
neighbours, tenants or employees).
However, there are some good reasons for caution. First, there are obvious pragmatic concerns
related to the increased cost and complexity of the procedure. From the Norwegian experience, it
seems that a few hundred parties would be manageable, but more than that takes us to uncharted
territory. Second, moving away from property as a basis for legal standing in consolidation might
in fact make it easier for powerful external actors to unduly influence the process. This can be
an indirect effect, arising from good intentions. For instance, if a large-scale development involves
razing an impoverished part of town, it will not be a good idea to give full legal standing in
consolidation to the employees of the development company that stands to benefit. This would be
so even if the employees could be classified as ‘locals’ under some imprecise standard for determining
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who to include in the consolidations process.99
The overarching question is how to ensure that land consolidation courts remain respectful
towards both owners and communities, while providing a good basis for equitable and participatory
decision-making about how to manage property. In Norway after 2016, any potential taker can be
granted legal standing in consolidation disputes, so this challenge is becoming pressing. What will
the role of the new parties be? Will they become potential partners that owners can rely on to
implement projects in the public interest, or will they be regarded as the main stakeholders, whom
the land consolidation courts should assist so that they may successfully impose their will on local
communities? It will be very interesting to follow this development further.
Clearly, the consolidation proposal is related to the theoretical argument made in chapter 3, in
favour of alternatives to expropriation based on local institutions for self-governance. As noted by
Ostrom and others, congruence with local conditions is crucial to the success of such institutions.100
Hence, no single institutional framework is likely to work in all cases. This was also the lesson drawn
from the critical assessment of the Land Assembly Districts proposed by Heller and Hills.101 This
proposal, aiming for self-governance while striving to limit the risk of abuse in all situations, ends
up catering only to a very thin notion of participation, arguably without effectively reassuring
those who worry about new ways in which governance might fail.
Setting up a Land Assembly District might still be appropriate, in which case a land consolid-
ation court is ideally placed to order it.102 More generally, the consolidation procedure is always
temporary, but consolidation leaves a lasting effect on how decision-making takes place within the
99 This echoes Heller and Hills’ worry that local community members with an “affiliation” to the developer might be
able to unduly influence decision-making in a Land Assembly District, as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6.1.
100 See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge University
Press 1990) 92.
101 See the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.6.
102 Arguably, a Norwegian land consolidation court would have to set it up as negotiations for a leasehold only, as in
the hydropower cases, to avoid a full transfer of property that might fall outside the meaning of “joint use”, see
Holen (n 90).
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affected area. In joint use cases, a consolidation court literally sets out to design an institution for
local self-governance. This institution can then subsequently be tasked with resource management
after the judicial proceedings come to an end.
The underlying idea at work here is to use special tribunals to interface between governments
and communities, while overseeing and gently directing decision-making at the community level.
This can be a way to set up a link between theories of self-governance and legally enforcible
human rights principles. Developing this link further can become a path towards sustainability
that will not unduly inflate the power of states and markets, but rather allow people to flourish
through participation in just social structures anchored in property. It also promises to address the
crucial problem of institutional nesting in a neat way, to ensure that local decision-making takes
place in an orderly and equitable fashion, in a way that can also inform and remain sensitive to
decision-making processes in other institutions.103
This observation remains preliminary at this stage, but I think it points to a promising direction
for future work. The intuitive appeal of the consolidation idea appears significant, especially because
of its potential as a means to enlist the help of a judicial body to build and improve democracies
from the ground up – starting with people in their communities, and their link to the properties
they rely on for their subsistence and well-being.
6.6 Conclusion
The Norwegian land consolidation courts are unique judicial bodies which can be tasked with
enabling coordination and participation in decision-making among groups of owners, increasingly
also in conjunction with commercial partners and regulators. This suggests a new take on the role
that tribunals can play in relation to decision-making regarding property, economic development,
103 Compare the discussion in chapter 3 section 3.6.
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and public interests. Arguably, the sensitive issues that can arise in this context, and the need for
orderly interaction between owners, market actors and government bodies, is a reason for courts
to get involved ex ante, by taking charge of the whole process.
The land consolidation courts in Norway can get involved in this way because they have wide
powers to organise self-governance, including the possibility of using compulsion to ensure that
owners participate on reasonable terms that will benefit their properties. As shown in this chapter,
consolidation can therefore be a powerful alternative to takings for economic development. In
practice, however, current practices of land consolidation work best when there is a basic agreement
among a majority of owners that development is desirable, or at least tolerable. The current
procedure is less effective when there is deep disagreement about whether or not development
should proceed at all.
To make consolidation better suited for dealing with deep disagreement, it might be appropriate
to enhance the power of the land consolidation court, also in the direction of extending its authority
to compel owners to engage with development projects that they fundamentally disagree with. But
if this is done, it is important to simultaneously ensure that land consolidation remains a service
to the owners. This challenge is currently arising with greater urgency in Norway, as the legislator
has recently taken steps to increase the scope of consolidation further, including granting legal
standing to other stakeholders. It will be interesting to see in the years to come how this will
influence the system, especially with regard to the balance of power between different stakeholders
in the process.
However, as argued in this chapter, consolidation as an alternative to expropriation has already
been developed far enough to shed interesting light on the legitimacy question studied in this
thesis. Indeed, land consolidation has been shown to be a highly versatile framework for enabling
self-governance, more so than the Land Assembly Districts proposed by Heller and Hills.104 Unlike
104 Michael Heller and Rick Hills, ‘Land Assembly Districts’ (2008) 121(6) Harvard Law Review 1465.
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Land Assembly Districts, the alienation of property is rarely if ever the aim (or even the side-effect)
of consolidation. Rather, the aim is to provide a democracy-on-demand for decision-making about
economic development, in a way that should allow owners to adapt to changing property obligations
while helping maintain a reasonable balance of power between them, their local communities, and
society as a whole. As such, consolidation seems worth considering further also for its potential
applications in different jurisdictions and property contexts.
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Proudhon got it all wrong. Property is not theft – it is fraud.1
That’s what makes it ours – being born on it, working on it, dying on it. That makes ownership,
not a paper with numbers on it.2
This has been a thesis in two parts, each of which have approached the issue of economic de-
velopment takings. The first part took a theoretical approach, starting from the notion of property
itself, to answer the question of why it should be protected. This, in turn, gave rise to a framework
for assessing the legitimacy of economic development takings, and for formulating alternatives to
it that could obviate the need for dispossessing current owners.
The second part of the thesis approached the issue of legitimacy concretely, by giving a case
study of takings of waterfalls for hydropower development in Norway. The political, social and
economic context was also analysed, leading to an application of the Gray test formulated in
the first part of the thesis. Moreover, the case study considered the possibility of alternatives to
expropriation, by assessing the Norwegian institution of land consolidation, which is now often
used by local owners who wish to undertake hydropower development themselves.
In the following, I offer a brief summary of the main points discussed in each chapter. While
doing so, I hope to shed further light on a broader thread that runs through the work done in this
1 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) The Cambridge Law Journal 252, 252.
2 John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (Penguin Books 1939) 33.
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thesis, pertaining to the importance of social justice considerations in takings law and the function
of private property as an anchor for local self-governance and sustainable resource management in
democratic societies.
Property theory
To arrive at a theoretical framework for discussing economic development takings, chapter 2 con-
sidered various theories of property. The chapter noted that there are differences between civil law
and common law theorising about ownership, but concluded that these differences are not particu-
larly relevant to the legitimacy issues that arise when property is taken for economic development.
In particular, the chapter observed that neither the bundle theory, dominant in the common law
world, nor the dominion theory, taught to many civil law jurists, helps to clarify the distinguishing
features of economic development takings. Traditional thinking both in civil and common law jur-
isdictions has a tendency to disregard the social and political context of takings; private property
is approached as a collection of disparate individual entitlements, not as an interconnected web of
social functions. This implies that the broader societal effects of takings will often not be considered
by the courts when owners protest against the use of eminent domain by invoking property clauses
in constitutional and human rights law.
The thesis set out to arrive at a theoretical foundation for thinking about property that would
support a more comprehensive approach to takings, especially in the context of economic develop-
ment. The chapter focused especially on theories that emphasise property’s crucial role in many
social and political relations within a society. Such social function theories provide important de-
scriptive insights into the workings of property and its role in the legal order. Chapter 2 highlighted
this aspect and argued that we should try to decouple descriptive insights from normative claims
about property. If we succeed in doing this, the social function theory can serve as common ground
for further value-driven debates that cross ideological divisions.
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Following up on this preliminary argument, chapter 2 clarified the normative starting point
of this thesis, by expressing support for the human flourishing theory proposed by Alexander
and Pen˜alver. This theory is based on the premise that property rights should be integrated in
the legal order in such a way that they enable – and possibly compel – individuals and their
communities to participate in social and political processes. Property can then become an anchor
for democracy, since it provides a starting point for participatory decision-making on the basis
of mutual obligation and respect, empowering owners and non-owners alike. In this regard, the
human flourishing theory rightly emphasises the duties associated with private property, especially
those duties that are directed at non-owners. The successful execution of such duties necessitate
inclusive institutions for collective decision-making in cases when conflicting property interests are
at stake.
The human flourishing theory emphasises how such institutions can arise from the structure of
property itself, obviating the need for external interventions rooted in the authority of the state.
The theory also contains a further insight concerning the scope of the state’s obligation to protect
property. In particular, the human flourishing theory leads to the conclusion that protecting prop-
erty implies a commitment to also protect the right to self-governance for local communities. Being
an owner of a property implies a right and a duty to take active part in decision-making regarding
that property, also in situations involving large-scale economic development. This becomes directly
relevant to the question of legitimacy in economic development takings, since a key worry is that
such takings allow powerful stakeholders to capture decision-making processes at the expense of
owners and communities.
Following up on the theoretical argument, chapter 2 sketched what a social function perspect-
ive could imply in practice by considering Kelo, the paradigmatic case of a taking for economic
development in the US. It was observed that the disagreement within the Supreme Court seemed
to turn, in part, on the willingness of the justices to adopt a social function perspective on the case.
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Justice O’Connor, who led the dissenting minority, departed from a formalistic, entitlements-based
approach, when she argued that takings for economic development should be prohibited because
such takings would systematically bestow benefits on powerful commercial interests at the expense
of weaker social groups. In addition, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, who voted with
the majority to uphold the taking, emphasised the danger that commercial incentives could distort
decision-making processes, creating a democratic deficit within government institutions endowed
with eminent domain powers. These two themes, pertaining to the social fairness and institutional
legitimacy of takings for economic development, remained in focus throughout the remainder of
the thesis.
Testing for legitimacy and looking for alternatives to eminent domain
In chapter 3, I gave a more in-depth presentation of economic development takings in selected
jurisdictions, focusing on the UK, the US, and the ECtHR. These jurisdictions adopt distinctly
different approaches to the legitimacy question, yet they remain easily comparable with each other.
In the UK, judicial review is traditionally anchored in procedural rules, while in the US the tradi-
tional starting point is the requirement that a taking is permitted only when it is for a “public use”.
Chapter 3 argued in favour of an approach that combines procedural and substantive standards of
fairness, by testing the democratic merit of the decisions that result in the application of eminent
domain. It was argued that such an institutional approach to fairness has started developing at
the ECtHR in response to the introduction of the pilot judgement procedure, which is applied in
cases that could indicate systemic problems at the state level.
The chapter went on to propose a concrete heuristic for assessing the legitimacy of economic
development takings. This heuristic, referred to as the “extended Gray test”, consists of a set of
indicators of eminent domain abuse, many of which are due to Kevin Gray, a leading UK property
scholar. In addition to Gray’s original indicators, chapter 3 added three additional points based
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on the work done in this thesis, to highlight the position of directly affected non-owners and the
institutional fairness dimension of legitimacy. Hence, the extended Gray test tracks recent devel-
opments at the ECtHR and should be a good fit for jurisdictions that emphasise the need to strike
a “fair balance” between opposing interests in takings cases. Furthermore, the test incorporates
several aspects of the social function theory of property. This is evident already from Kevin Gray’s
original indicators of abuse, which looks at the takings issue from a broad vantage point by asking
how the interference will affect communities and the environment, not merely the individual own-
ers. This makes the extended Gray test stand out in the literature, especially in the UK and the
US, where individualistic perceptions of property have tended to dominate. As argued in chapter
3, the test should be able to identify many, if not most, cases of eminent domain abuse, especially
in the context of economic development.
Following up on the presentation of the Gray test, chapter 3 considered the question of how
to increase legitimacy without giving up on the idea that the collective should be entitled to push
for economic development. It was argued that the work of Elinor Ostrom and others on common
pool resources provides a good starting point when trying to design improved frameworks for
making decisions about economic development on privately owned land. Specifically, the chapter
briefly presented Ostrom’s design principles for local self-governance of natural resources, which
can be used as a starting point when designing procedures to replace eminent domain for economic
development.
The chapter went on to consider a proposal that has already been made along these lines,
namely the idea of Land Assembly Districts, due to Heller and Hills.3 This proposal was analysed
in depth, and the chapter pointed out some potential problems with it, including a tension between
the overarching goal of self-governance and the perceived danger of elite capture at the local level.
In the end, the chapter concluded that a single institutional framework is unlikely to work in all
3 See Michael Heller and Rick Hills, ‘Land Assembly Districts’ (2008) 121(6) Harvard Law Review 1465.
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contexts; institutions for self-governance need to be attuned to local conditions so they cannot be
made too general or justified in overly theoretical terms. Indeed, sensitivity to local conditions is
one of the key design principles proposed by Ostrom, and should influence also the proposals we
come up with for institutional reforms in the law of takings.
This observation marked the end of the first part of the thesis. In the second part, the thesis
considered the case of Norwegian hydropower. This led to an analysis of the legitimacy of waterfall
takings, including an application of the extended Gray test as well as a case study of the land
consolidation courts and their power to set up local institutions for self-governance that can obviate
the need for eminent domain. In this way, the second part of the thesis applied key aspects of the
theory developed in the first, while exploring further the idea that social functions run as a common
thread through individual property rights.
Norwegian waterfalls and their social functions
Chapter 4 introduced the case study and provided background information that placed it in a
broader context with respect to Norwegian law. The legal and regulatory framework surrounding
hydropower development was discussed, and its history was traced back to pre-industrial times.
The chapter emphasised that local rights to hydropower have a long tradition in Norway, with
communities of smallholders typically holding the rights to harness power from local rivers in
common, as incidents of their shared ownership of the surrounding outfields. This arrangement
dates from a time when grist mills and saw mills were important to many local communities,
whose proprietary rights provided them with an opportunity to benefit from local resources.4
After the advent of the industrial age, and particularly following the Second World War, the
state took the view that hydropower was a public good that should be exploited for industrial
4 As noted in chapter 4, Norwegian tenant farmers also enjoyed such rights before they started buying back their
farms in the 17th and 18th century. In particular, tenants would typically have quite extensive rights to natural
resources found in the outfields. This highlights that private ownership of land was always imbued with egalitarian
social functions in Norway.
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development in the interest of the general public. This resulted in a tension between local self-
governance, rooted in private property, and central management, rooted in the authority of the
state. The tension became particularly severe after the liberalisation of the electricity sector in the
early 1990s. This reform reorganised hydropower development as a commercial pursuit, meaning
that when the state uses its regulatory powers, it tends to bestow benefits on commercial companies
at the expense of local resource owners. At the same time, local owners themselves have been
empowered by the liberalisation reform, since they can now engage in commercial hydropower
development as market participants. This has been a side-effect of the fact that a market for
electricity was set up, founded on the idea that all actors should have access to the electricity grid
on non-discriminatory terms.
Chapter 4 discussed the resulting system in some depth, addressing also the question of whether
or not the liberal market functions as intended. It was pointed out that the energy reform has
marginalised the municipality governments, who used to play an important role because they were
in charge of public utilities for the supply of electricity in their own local district. The result has been
a concentration of power in the hands of the larger energy companies, a centralisation effect that
threatens to undermine the market-stimulating intentions behind the reform. Specifically, chapter 4
argued that the regulatory framework is currently unable to accommodate new actors and facilitate
competition on non-discriminatory terms. Special attention was directed at the position of waterfall
owners and the companies that specialise in cooperating with them. It was argued that owners
and small-scale development companies suffer under a regime that often tolerates, and sometimes
encourages, discrimination against them.
The chapter went on to discuss how smaller market actors tend to organise themselves. First, the
chapter presented an early organisational model that emphasised respect for property rights, local
communities, and the environment. According to this model, owners and their communities would
typically retain controlling stakes in development projects; external partners would provide capital
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and technical expertise either as a paid service or in return for a minority stake in the enterprise.
Many owner-led hydropower plants have since been built according to this model, demonstrating
its commercial viability.
However, later developments have led to an increased concentration of power and ownership also
in the small-scale segment of the electricity production sector. Specifically, external partners now
typically demand controlling stakes in development projects and do not concede to organisational
provisions meant to protect communities and the environment. Effectively, resource owners and
their communities are asked to remain on the sideline. In many cases, local people have agreed to
this in return for a promise of higher compensation in the future, calculated as a percentage of
income from the generation of electricity. It has turned out that such promises have often been
made with little realism. As discussed in chapter 4, there has been speculation in the small-scale
market, where upstart energy companies have entered into a large number of agreements with local
owners without carrying out much actual development.
In general, chapter 4 argued that recent developments in the small-scale sector marks a sharp
departure from initial visions of this sector, visions that emphasised values such as local self-
governance and environmental sustainability. Instead, the values and practices of leading small-scale
actors have become increasingly similar to those of the established market actors. The chapter went
on to argue that this might be a contributing reason why small-scale development now appears
to be falling out of political favour. Today, critical voices claim that large-scale development is
better, not only because it is more efficient, but also because it is more environmentally friendly.
The specific argument provided for this claim is that small-scale projects affect a greater number
of square meters per energy unit they produce. As noted in chapter 4, this is no doubt true, since
many small-scale plants will typically be required to match the energy output of a single large-
scale plant. Unfortunately, issues relating to more substantive notions of sustainability, as well as
issues relating to benefit sharing and local participation in decision-making, appear only at the
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fringes of the present debate. Hence, policies are now at risk of being formulated on the basis of
an incomplete picture of what is at stake. As suggested in chapter 4, this makes the present thesis
a timely contribution that could also inform policy making on hydropower in Norway.
Expropriation as an automatic consequence of a development license
In chapter 5, the legal framework surrounding expropriation of waterfalls was studied in depth.
In addition to presenting the law, the chapter also discussed administrative practices developed
by the water authorities. The chapter showed that current regulatory framework is based on an
individualistic and narrow understanding of the meaning of private property; the presumption is
that property embodies purely private values, while public values need to be pursued through direct
government intervention, if necessary also by redistributing or negating property rights. Chapter
5 tracked how this perspective has shaped the law of expropriation of water resources.
Historically, the narrow perspective on private property was accompanied by a similarly narrow
perspective on public values, a perspective that implied a sharp distinction between commercial and
public uses of property. Hence, the law of expropriation initially tended to restrict the takings power
to specific purposes that clearly served the common good. This was the case also in the context
of water law, where the government did not initial have any authority to expropriate waterfalls
for the purpose of developing hydropower. However, as noted in chapter 5, the increasing focus
on electricity production as a public service resulted in the introduction of new authorities to
expropriate waterfalls for public utilities. Initially, however, expropriation could not take place for
commercial purposes or in favour of private companies.
The restrictions placed on the power to expropriate waterfalls gave legitimacy to the legal
framework. Still, the increasing centralisation of the energy sector and the increasing scale of
projects seen after the Second World War led to increased tension surrounding new hydropower
projects. Tensions came to a high-point in the case of Alta, when the indigenous Sami population
277
from the north of Norway objected to a project that would have detrimental effects on Sami
communities and their way of life. In collaboration with environmental groups, they launched a
legal challenge directed at the development license, resulting in one of the most comprehensive
cases ever dealt with by the Supreme Court. In the end, the development interests triumphed,
and the regulatory framework surrounding hydropower and expropriation was given a stamp of
approval.
As noted in chapter 5, the Alta conflict contributed to increased awareness of indigenous rights
in Norway, starting a development that has since resulted in better protection of Sami rights within
the legal order. No similar mechanism occurred in the law of hydropower; the precedent set by Alta
remains leading in disputes over the legitimacy of licensing decisions and expropriation orders. This
is so despite the fact that the context of waterfall expropriation has changed dramatically since
the liberalisation of the electricity sector. Unlike before, expropriation is now regularly ordered for
commercial purposes, to the benefit of limited liability companies.
As showed in chapter 5, this change of context has hardly influenced the administrative practices
adopted by the water authorities. Rather, the traditional approach, which evolved when electricity
generation was still organised as a public service, remains in force. The key feature of this approach
is that it renders expropriation a de facto automatic consequence of obtaining a development license;
if an energy company manges to obtain a development license for a large-scale project, the right
to expropriate waterfalls is granted to it by default. As shown in chapter 5, this leaves the owners
and their local communities in a precarious position. Essentially, they enjoy very limited protection
under administrative law, far less than members of special interest groups.
Chapter 5 discussed the practical fallout from this when considering the case of Jørpeland. This
case illustrated how expropriation has become a tool that market players can use to gain the upper
hand in competition for resources owned by local communities. The chapter noted that Jørpeland
is not unique in this regard, and that the compensation formula that is being developed through
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case law at the Supreme Court renders expropriation a highly profitable way for energy companies
to acquire water resources. Hence, the current state of hydropower law in Norway adds weight
to the prediction made by Justice O’Connor in Kelo, namely that economic development takings
would systematically benefit powerful commercial interests at the expense of weaker members of
society. In Norway, with respect to waterfalls, her prediction appears to have come true.
Land consolidation, self-governance, and sustainable resource management
In chapter 6, the Norwegian system of land consolidation was presented. It was shown to be a
unique institution that combines a property-based approach to land management with a broad
authority for the courts to intervene in order to organise collective decision-making and promote
sustainable resource management at the local level. The chapter went on to show that the system
of use directive has become widely used in recent years to facilitate hydropower projects organised
by local owners. In some cases, it is also used to deprive some owners of their holdout power by
compelling them to participate in a development project that they oppose.
In consolidation cases, interference in property is not justified by reference to the public interest.
Instead, consolidation relies on proof that benefits will outweigh harms at the local level, with
respect to each affected property. This requirement targets the property as a functional unit,
irrespective (in principle) of the individual interests of its current owner. Hence, depending on
what functions of property are regarded as more important, the wishes of the owner might have to
yield to other priorities, including priorities reflecting the common good. However, no deprivation
of property is authorised, the owners retain their properties. At the same time, the compensatory
perspective is abandoned; if the property as a functional unit does not suffer a loss as a result of
consolidation, no compensation is payable to the owner as an individual.
As demonstrated in chapter 6, this perspective diverges from a perspective that sees private
property as a way to encapsulate the financial entitlements of individuals. Instead, the perspective
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on property inherent in the land consolidation model is much closer to that postulated by the
social function theorists discussed in chapter 2, especially those that focus on human flourishing
as the underlying purpose of private property rights. Indeed, land consolidation relies on a highly
functional perspective on property: beneficial resource uses, not individual entitlements, take center
stage throughout the process. This might limit the power of the owners to do as they please, but it
does not marginalise them. After all, it is hard to deny that one of the primary functions of private
property is to bestow rights and obligations on its owners. Moreover, in normal circumstances, it
would be safe to assume that when a property benefits, then so does its owner.
For this reason, it also seems that consolidation can be used to address the democratic deficit of
economic development takings in an elegant way. Chapter 6 addressed this possibility and argued
that the land consolidation courts are in effect authorised to design and implement self-governance
arrangements that approach private property rights in a local community as a common pool re-
source. This connected the case study of Norwegian hydropower with the discussion provided at
the end of chapter 3, regarding institutional alternatives to eminent domain for economic devel-
opment. In particular, it connected the system of land consolidation courts with theories about
self-governance and sustainable resource management.
As argued in chapter 6, land consolidation is attractive as a vehicle for sustainable self-
governance of community resources. Moreover, it provides the public with a means to strongly
influence owners and communities, without having to resort to the use of expropriation. A poten-
tial worry is that powerful stakeholders can abuse the consolidation system in much the same way
as they abuse the state’s eminent domain power. Chapter 6 argued that in order to address this
worry, the law of land consolidation needs to clearly identify owners and local communities as the
primary stakeholders. The consolidation process should be designed to help local people manage
their properties in accordance with public interests, not as a means of depriving communities of
control over local resources. This requires a clear commitment on part of the state to limit the
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power of commercial interests and public-private partnerships in consolidation proceedings.
Assuming that such a commitment can be fulfilled, chapter 6 argued that use directives issued
by a land consolidation court can be empowering to local owners, who are then called on to
participate in collective decision-making guided by a panel of judges. Specifically, chapter 6 argued
that land consolidation can be used to deal with many of the challenges that arise at the intersection
between private property rights, local community interests, and economic development for the
common good. For this reason, the Norwegian model should be of interest also to scholars from
other jurisdictions, especially those that subscribe to an egalitarian ideal of what property should
be and what social functions it should support.
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